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The construction industry is increasingly reliant on the voluntary effort to reduce 
accidents on construction sites. As investments in construction safety cannot be 
limitless, there is a need for a scientific way to support the decision making about the 
amount to be invested for construction safety.  
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the financially optimum level of investments in 
workplace safety for building construction projects in Singapore. To fulfill the aim 
and four specific objectives, a correlation/regression research design was adopted. 
Data was collected using multiple techniques (structured interviews, archival data and 
questionnaires) with 23 building contractors on 47 completed building projects. Data 
collected were analyzed using various statistical and mathematical techniques, e.g., 
bivariate correlation analysis, regression analysis, moderation analysis, mediation 
analysis and extreme value theorem. The analysis revealed some key findings. 
 
(1) This study examined the effects of safety investments on safety performance of 
building projects. It was found that voluntary safety investments are more effective or 
efficient to reduce accident frequency rate of building projects than basic safety 
investments. The result of moderation analysis indicates that there is a stronger 
positive effect of basic safety investments on accident prevention under higher project 
hazard level and higher project safety culture level. The result of mediation analysis 
x 
 
for the effect of voluntary safety investments on accident frequency rate shows that 
the effect of voluntary safety investments is partially mediated by safety culture of the 
project.  
 
(2) This study investigated the factors determining safety performance of building 
projects and their interrelationships. The results show that safety performance of 
building projects is determined by safety investments, project hazard level, safety 
culture level and the interactions among these variables. The variables and their 
relationships (including the main effects, interactive effects, and mediated effects) are 
integrated in a graphic model for determining safety performance of building projects.  
 
(3) This study investigated the costs of accidents to building contractors. Results show 
that the average direct accident costs, indirect accident costs and total accident costs 
of building projects account for 0.165%, 0.086% and 0.25% of total contract sum, 
respectively. It was found that there is a stronger positive effect of accident frequency 
rate on total accident costs under higher project hazard level. 
 
(4) The optimization model of safety investments was examined in this study. Results 
show that the financially optimum level of voluntary safety investments could be 
achieved through the minimization of total controllable safety costs of building 
projects. It was also found that the financially optimum level of voluntary safety 
investments varies with different project conditions. Results show that the financially 
xi 
 
optimum level of voluntary safety investments of building projects in Singapore is 
about 0.44% of the contract sum (i.e., when both safety culture and project hazard are 
at the mean level). 
 
This study contributes to knowledge in construction safety management by 
discovering that safety performance of building projects is determined by safety 
investments, safety culture and project hazard level, as well as their interactions. It 
also found that the effect of safety investments on safety performance varies with 
different levels of safety culture and project hazard. Moreover, this study further 
develops the theory behind optimization of safety costs by integrating the impacts of 
project hazard level and safety culture level of building projects in the analysis. Such 
knowledge provides the basis for financial decision making to manage construction 
safety for building contractors.  
 
Keywords: Safety investments, Accident costs, Optimization, Construction safety, 
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For the past few decades, efforts have been made by the government and industries in 
Singapore to address the problem of construction safety. The significance of the 
construction safety is overwhelming because construction is one of the most 
dangerous occupations in Singapore (Imriyas et al., 2007a). The construction industry 
accounts for 29 per cent of the total number of industrial workers, but accounts for 40% 
of workplace accidents (Chua and Goh, 2004). The Workplace Safety and Health 
(WSH) statistics published by Ministry of Manpower, Singapore (MOM, 2009) 
revealed that the accident frequency rate (AFR) and accident severity rate (ASR) are 
far higher than the average level among all the industries in Singapore (see Figure 
1.1).  
 
In addition, Figure 1.2 shows that accident frequency rate of all industries has 
experienced a continuous reduction from 1997 (the accident frequency rate was 2.6 
accidents per million man-hours worked) to 2009 (the accident frequency rate was 1.8 
accidents per million man-hours worked) (MOM, 2008a, 2010). There is, however, no 
apparent improvement in the construction safety performance. As can be seen in 
Figure 1.2, the accident frequency rate of construction industry has been stagnating at 











a Six new sectors under WSH Act11 include: Water supply, sewerage and waste management; Hotels 
and restaurants; Health activities; Services allied to transport of goods; Veterinary activities; 
Landscape care and maintenance service activities 
 







Figure1.2: Industrial Accidents by AFR (Adapted from: Feng and Teo, 2009) 
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Fatalities and severe injuries continue to happen at construction sites in recent years. 
The collapse of Nicoll Highway along with two other major accidents in 2004, which 
claimed a total of 13 lives, is a stern reminder that more needs to be done to protect 
workers (MOM, 2007a). Such high frequency and severity rates had prompted the 
government, industries, and researchers to examine various strategies for enhancing 
construction site safety performance. 
 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
 
In 2005, the government undertook a fundamental reform in the WSH framework in 
order to achieve a quantum improvement in the safety and health for workers. The 
target was set to halve the current occupational fatality rate within 10 years (from 4.9 
fatalities per 100,000 workers in 2004 to 2.5 in 2015) and attain standards of the 
current top ten developed countries with good safety records (MOM, 2007b). The new 
framework is guided by three principles (see Table 1.1). It is designed to engender a 
paradigm shift in mindset where the focus is on reducing the risks and not just 
complying with prescriptive rules (MOM, 2007b). Industry will be required to take 
greater ownership of safety outcomes. Businesses should realize that good WSH 
performance will enhance business competitiveness, for example, good corporate 
image, cost savings in terms of higher productivity and fewer disruptions to work due 
to accidents. It is suggested that the potential benefits of good WSH performance may 
motivate businesses to voluntarily invest in WSH loss control activities, instead of just 
complying with rules and regulations. 
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Table 1.1: Principles of the New WSH Framework 
Three Principles 
Desired Mindset Change 
From To  
Reduce risk at source by requiring all 
stakeholders to eliminate or minimize 
the risks they create 
Managing risks Identifying and 
eliminating risks before 
they are created 
Greater industry ownership of WSH 
outcomes 
Compliance with 
“Letter of the law” 
Proactive planning to 
achieve a safe workplace 
Prevent accidents through higher 
penalties for poor safety management 
Accidents are costly Poor safety management 
is costlier 
(Source: MOM, 2007b) 
 
The reform in the WSH framework suggests that if the prescriptive rules and 
enforcement procedures do not produce desired results, attention should be directed 
toward a self-regulating or self-motivating solution to this problem. The Robens 
Report, Safety and Health at Work (1972) takes the view that too much law 
encourages apathy and apathy is what causes accidents at work. Therefore, voluntary, 
self-generating effort seems to be an important way to reduce accidents in industry 
(Nichols, 1997).  
 
To many people, the main objective of a business is to make profit, which is also used 
as a criterion of success (Appleby, 1994). Thus, one way in which such a 
self-generating solution could occur would be if decision makers of a business had 
in-depth understanding of the financial cost and its implications of WSH issues. The 
main driving force behind the industrial safety movement is the fact that accidents are 
expensive, and substantial savings can be made by preventing them (U.S. Department 
of labor, 1955). Many modern managers treat preventing accidents as an investment – 
an investment with significant returns, both humane and economic (Bird and Germain, 
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1996). Brody et al. (1990) pointed out that when prevention activities are perceived as 
sufficiently profitable, the investor will likely undertake the investments voluntarily.  
 
However, as the investments in workplace safety cannot be limitless, the problem is 
that it is not known how much money should be invested in improving workplace 
safety performance. There is, therefore, a need for a scientific way to support the 
decision making about the amount to be invested for workplace safety. The present 
study was proposed to address this need by investigating the desirable level of safety 
investments for building projects. 
 
The subsequent section provides a brief overview of the effect of safety investments 
on safety performance and the optimum safety costs and investments, and then 
identifies the knowledge gap. A more detailed review of literature is presented in 
Chapter two.  
 
1.3 Knowledge gap 
 
1.3.1 Effect of safety investments on safety performance 
 
Safety investments are defined as the costs which are incurred as a result of an 
emphasis being placed on safety control, whether it is in the form of safety training, 
safety incentives, staffing for safety, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), safety 
programs, or other activities (Hinze, 1997). A detailed review of safety investments is 
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provided in Section 2.3.1.  
 
A popular assumption holds that the higher the safety investment is, the better the 
safety performance will be (Levitt, 1975; Laufer, 1987b; Brody et al., 1990; Hinze, 
2000); nevertheless, little empirical evidence was found to support this assumption. 
Crites (1995) compared safety performance with the size and funding of formal safety 
programs over an 11-year period (1980-1990). However, it was found that safety 
performance was independent of – or even inversely related to – safety investment.  
 
Tang et al. (1997) examined the function of the relationship between safety 
investment and safety performance of building projects in Hong Kong and found a 
weak correlation coefficient (0.25) between safety investment and safety performance. 
They assumed that the low coefficient of correlation (0.25) might be due to the 
difference in safety culture of the different companies. However, no empirical 
evidence was provided to support this assumption. 
 
Crites (1995) and Tang et al. (1997) provided empirical evidence for the relationship 
between safety investments and safety performance; nevertheless, they failed to 
identify the factors influencing this relationship. The reasons for why safety 





The accident causation theories, risk compensation theory and risk homeostasis theory 
suggest that safety performance is likely the result of the interactions of safety 
investments, safety culture and project hazard (please refer to Section 3.2 for a 
detailed discussion). The effect of any factor on safety performance may vary with 
changes in the other two factors. However, it appears that so far no studies have been 
conducted to investigate the interactive effects of safety investments, safety culture 
and project hazard on safety performance. It is still unclear whether the relationship 
between safety investments and safety performance is affected by other factors, such 
as initial hazard level and safety culture level of the project.  
 
1.3.2 Optimization of safety investments 
 
The concept of optimum safety investments states that a company would invest a 
certain amount of dollars in safety which will coincide with the minimal point of total 
safety costs (Diehl and Ayoub, 1980; Hinze, 2000). Theoretical/hypothetical analyses 
(Brody et al., 1990; HSE, 1993b; Laufer, 1987) and empirical investigations (Tang et 
al., 1997) have been conducted to apply the concept of optimum safety investments to 
workplace safety management. A detailed review of these studies is provided in 
Section 2.5.3.  
 
HSE (1993b) suggested that it is possible to identify a level of OHS risk that 
represents the optimum economic level of safety investments and accident costs. This 
risk level coincides with the point at which the cost benefits of safety interventions are 
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just equal to the additional costs incurred (HSE, 1993b). Laufer (1987a, b) 
demonstrated the application of the concept of optimum safety investments through 
the hypothetical changes in the method of determining insurance premiums in Israel 
and in management’s perception of accident prevention costs. Brody et al. (1990) 
applied the concept of optimum safety investments to demonstrate the importance of 
indirect accident costs. However, these studies were carried out based on the 
hypothetical relationships among safety investments, accidents cost, and safety 
performance. As these studies were without the support of empirical evidence, there is 
a need for empirical examinations on optimum safety investments. This need was 
addressed by Tang et al. (1997) in their empirical research on safety cost optimization 
of building projects in Hong Kong.  
 
Tang et al.’s (1997) empirical study adds valuable insight into the relationship among 
safety investments, accident costs, total safety costs, and safety performance. 
Functions and curves for the relationships among these factors were developed. 
Although it quantified the minimal level of safety investments required for building 
projects in Hong Kong, some limitations of this study seem to be prominent.  
 
Firstly, much of the analysis in their research was based on speculation and 
assumption. For example, the exponential relationship between safety 
costs/investments and safety performance seems to be a “rule of thumb” relationship 
instead of any theoretically derived relationship. Thus, Tang et al.’s (1997) study 
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lacked rigorous mathematical analysis on the relationships between safety investments, 
accident costs and safety performance.  
 
Secondly, the optimal safety investments formula (presented as the percentage of 
contract sum) found by Tang et al. (1997) is a coarse measure because the formula is 
universal for any type of building project regardless of the characteristics of an 
individual project. The formula also cannot be tailored for an individual project, 
whereas studies have shown that the initial project hazard level and project/contractor 
safety culture level do have impacts on the safety performance. The functions 
describing the relationship among safety investments, overall safety costs, accident 
costs and safety performance obtained by Tang et al. (1997) failed to show the 
influences of project hazard level and safety culture level.  
 
In summary, previous studies failed to: (1) identify the factors influencing the 
relationship between safety performance and safety investments; (2) explain why 
safety performance was weakly or even inversely related to safety investments; (3) 
address the possible interactive effects of safety investments, safety culture and 
project hazard on safety performance; (4) develop rigorous mathematical models on 
the relationships among safety investments, accident costs, and safety performance; 
and (5) integrate the impacts of project hazard level and safety culture level in the 




Therefore, the gaps in knowledge are: (1) it is not known what factors influence the 
relationship between safety performance and safety investments; (2) there is no 
systematic model addressing the possible interactions of safety investments, safety 
culture, and project hazard; and (3) there is no rigorous safety investments 
optimization model with integration of project-specific factors, such as safety culture 
level and project hazard level. These aspects would be addressed in this study.  
 
1.4 Research objectives 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the financially optimum level of 
investments in workplace safety by exploring the relationships between safety 
investments, safety performance and accident costs for building projects in Singapore. 
The specific objectives of this research are given below. 
 
Objective 1 - To examine the effects of safety investments on safety performance of 
building projects. 
Objective 2 – To develop a model for determining safety performance of building 
projects. 
Objective 3 – To investigate the costs of accidents for building projects. 





1.5 Significance of study 
 
This study may provide the basis for financial decision making to manage 
construction safety for building contractors. Such knowledge should be of interest to 
building contractors as they may use it to effectively allocate resources to various 
activities within the fixed project budget and to better control the costs of the whole 
project. Understanding the principle of optimal safety investments, project decision 
makers would regard reasonable investments in workplace safety as a profitable 
activity, and then would be more ready to integrate the investments in workplace 
safety as a part of the whole business planning. On the other hand, this study may 
offer a better understanding of the theory behind: 
 the effects of the interactions between safety investments, project hazard level 
and safety culture level on safety performance, and 
 the decision making mechanism on the desirable level of safety investments of 
building projects.  
 
1.6 Unit of analysis and scope of research 
 
Since safety costs vary with regions, industries, and level of organisations (project or 
company level), this study was conducted at the project level in the context of 
building construction in Singapore. This is because: (1) building construction is the 
most significant segment of Singapore’s construction industry as the demand for 
buildings is around 70% of the total construction demand (BCA, 2006); and (2) time 
and resource constraints impede the development of a universal model to cater for all 
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types of construction projects.  
 
The research problem and objectives of this study suggest a project level of analysis. 
The unit of analysis in this study is a contractor’s project. Safety investments and 
accident costs are confined to those incurred by the project (including those relevant 
overhead costs allocated to the project) from the perspective of contractors (including 
main contractors and subcontractors). Consultant and client project organisations were 
not targeted in the research design. Those costs and investments incurred by the other 
parties of building projects (e.g. the consultants and clients) are not included in this 
study. For the contractor’s project in this context, typical members include: project 
manager/director, site manager, site engineer, site quantity surveyor, planning 
engineer, safety manager, safety officer, safety supervisor, foreman, etc.  
 
In this study, the costs of workplace accident are confined to the financial losses of 
contractors (including main contractors and subcontractors) which are allocated to the 
project. Unlike the financial costs of accidents, social costs are those ‘costs incurred 
by the society because additional resources are required to be utilized when 
construction accidents occur, and if there were no accidents, the utilization of these 
society’s resources could have been saved’ (Tang et al., 2004; Saram and Tang, 2004, 
p. 645-646). The social costs and non-material losses due to pain, suffering and loss 
of enjoyment of life undergone by the victim are not included in this research because 
they do not reflect the losses born by the contractors. The intangible costs of accidents 
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(e.g., damage to company reputation and morale of employees) were also excluded 
from this study because this study concentrated only on financial aspects of accidents 
due to the constraints of time and resources.  
 
Researchers have grouped the root causes of accidents on construction sites into four 
categories: management failure, unsafe acts of workers, non-human-related events and 
an unsafe working condition (refer to Section 2.2). However, the impacts of 
non-human-related-factors like inclement weather, unexpected ground conditions and 
natural disasters on safety performance of building projects are not within the scope of 
this research.  
 
1.7 Definition of terms 
 
1.7.1 “Accident(s)” versus “injuries”  
 
The terms “accidents” and “injuries” often are mistakenly used interchangeably. 
Actually, the meanings are different, and the differences are important for statistical 
accuracy and the orienting of safety management objectives (Grimaldi and Simonds, 
1975). In the “Workplace Safety and Health (Incident Reporting) Regulations 2006” 
of Singapore (MOM, 2006), an accident is defined as any unintended event which 
causes bodily injury to a person and a workplace accident is any accident occurring in 
the course of a person’s work, with the following exceptions: (1) any accident that 
occurs while a person is commuting to and from the workplace; (2) any traffic 
accident on a public road; and (3) any accident that occurs in the course of a domestic 
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worker's employment. Thus, one accident may involve several injuries. Since this 
study is conducted in the context of building construction in Singapore, this definition 
of accident is adopted throughout this study. Therefore, according to this definition, 
the numbers of “accidents” and “injuries” experienced by a given organisation for a 
period of time are unlikely to be equal.  
 
1.7.2 Financial costs of accidents 
 
Losses could be incurred by private individuals, firms and society due to the 
occurrence of construction work injuries. Financial costs of work injuries represent 
the losses incurred by the private investors, such as contractors, due to the occurrence 
of construction accidents (Tang et al., 2004). Losses incurred by society, such as 
human suffering and impact on family and society, are referred to as social costs of 
work injuries (Tang et al., 2004). Social costs of work injuries will result in the 
utilization of national resources, while financial costs of work injuries will only result 
in the utilization of resources of private investors. In this study, financial costs of 
accidents refer to the financial losses born by firms as a result of accidents.  
 
1.7.3 Safety investments 
 
Safety control activities represent those practices implemented by private investors, 
such as contractors, aimed at reducing the risk or preventing the occurrence of 
accidents which result in the injuries of workers (Hinze, 2000). The investments in 
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safety control activities are then defined as the costs which are incurred as a result of 
an emphasis being placed on safety control, whether it be in the form of safety 
training, safety incentives, staffing for safety, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), 
safety programs, or other activities (Hinze, 2000). In this study, the terms 
“investments in safety control activities”, “investments in workplace safety” and 
“safety investments” are used interchangeably.  
 
1.8 Organisation of the thesis 
 
The thesis is organized into eight chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the background, 
research problems, knowledge gap, research objectives, significance and scope of this 
study. Chapter 2 reviews the previous studies based on the research problems and the 
objectives of this study. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical basis of this study and 
develops the theoretical framework for this study. Chapter 4 presents the methodology 
of this study. Chapters 5 analyses the data collected. Chapter 6 discusses the statistical 
results within the context of theories. The last chapter presents the summary of main 
findings, the contributions and the limitations of this study, and proposes 

































The purpose of this chapter is to review the existing body of knowledge relating to 
factors determining safety performance and economic aspects of construction safety. 
Section 2.2 reviews the theories of accident causation. Section 2.3 identifies the 
factors influencing safety performance based on the accident causation theories and 
reviews the measurement of the factors. Section 2.4 reviews the theories of accident 
costs and provides some background information about the measurement of accidents 
costs. Then, factors influencing the size of direct and indirect accident costs as well as 
the ratios between them are identified. In section 2.5, previous studies on the 
economic evaluation of safety investments and theories about safety costs/investments 
optimization are reviewed.  
 
2.2 Accident causation theory 
 
Heinrich et al. (1980) defined an accident as an unplanned and uncontrolled event in 
which the action or reaction of an object, substance, person, or radiation results in 
personal injury or the probability thereof. Accident prevention activities are likely to 
be shaped by causes of accidents (Lingard and Rowlinson, 2005). Many researchers 





The research in accident causation theory was pioneered by Heinrich (1931), who 
analyzed 75,000 accidents reports and developed the domino theory (model) of 
accident causation. There are five dominoes in this model: ancestry and social 
environment, fault of person, unsafe act and/or mechanical or physical hazard, 
accidents, and injury. Heinrich (1931) suggested that this theory was likened to 
dominoes falling, i.e., if one condition occurred, it would cause the next and so on. 
Heinrich’s (1931) analysis also led him to conclude that 88 per cent of accidents were 
caused by unsafe acts, and only 10 per cent were caused by unsafe conditions. 
Peterson (1982) summarized Heinrich’s accident causation theory (1931) into two 
main points: (1) people are the fundamental reason behind accidents; and (2) 
management is responsible for the prevention of accidents. This suggests that 
accidents could be somewhat prevented through endeavours of management.  
 
Heinrich’s (1931) theory was criticized for focusing too much on the immediate 
causes of accidents. Many researchers have updated Heinrich’s domino model with an 
emphasis on management as a primary cause in accidents, e.g., the updated domino 
sequence (Bird, 1974; Bird and Loftus, 1976), the Adams updated sequence (Adams, 
1976) and the Weaver updated dominoes (Weaver, 1971). These upgraded domino 
models traced the occurrence of accidents back to lack of management control. The 
updated domino models suggest that management failure is the root cause of accidents 
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and that the long-term solutions must focus on the first domino in the sequence, 
management control.  
 
The multiple causation models, which are management based instead of domino based, 
hold that many contributing factors, causes and sub-causes combine together in a 
random manner causing an accident (Petersen, 1971). Petersen (1971) argued that 
these factors need to be addressed in accident investigation so that the surrounding 
factors to the accident could be revealed. Petersen (1971) believes that unsafe acts or 
unsafe conditions may be the proximate causes rather than the root causes of an 
accident. Thus, trying to find out the unsafe acts or unsafe behaviours is dealing only 
at the symptomatic level (Abdelhamid and Everett, 2000). Hopkins (1995) suggests 
that it is misguided to attribute accidents to either and unsafe acts or an unsafe 
condition because most accidents are the result of a complex interaction of multiple 
causes.  
 
DeReamer (1980) has grouped the causes of accidents into two categories: immediate 
causes of accidents and contributing causes of accidents. The former includes unsafe 
acts and unsafe conditions, while the latter includes mental and physical conditions of 
the workers and the management policies. In construction industry, Abdelhamid and 
Everett (2000) have grouped the root causes of accidents on construction sites into 
four categories: (1) management actions/inactions; (2) unsafe acts of workers; (3) an 
unsafe working condition that is a natural part of the initial construction site 
conditions; and (4) non-human-related events. For example, management may fail to 
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provide adequate personal protective equipments; fail to maintain or safeguard tools 
and equipment; fail to provide proper supervision; fail to regularly check work 
progress, tools, equipments and temporary structures; and violate workplace standards 
by allowing slippery floors, insufficient ventilation, poor housekeeping; etc. A worker 
may commit unsafe acts regardless of the initial conditions of the work. Example of 
worker unsafe acts include the decision to proceed with work in unsafe conditions, 
lack of skill and training, disregarding standard safety procedures such as not wearing 
safety helmet or safety glasses, working with insufficient sleep, sabotaging equipment, 
etc. Unsafe working condition is a condition in which the physical layout of the 
workplace or work location, the status of tools, equipment, and material are in 
violation of contemporary safety standards. Examples of such unsafe working 
conditions include open-sided floors, defective ladders, improperly constructed 
scaffolds, defective tools/equipments, uneven terrain, concealed ditches, etc. The last 
category of root causes is non-human-related events, such as earthquakes, storms, 
unexpected ground conditions/terrain, etc (Abdelhamid and Everett, 2000).  
 
Fang et al. (2004) divided hazard factors into two categories: (1) factors outside the 
construction site, such as the safety involvement of the employer, designer, 
subcontractor, consultant, insurer and the public demand and concern on occupational 
health and safety; and (2) on-site hazards, including the physical conditions and all 
on-site activities of managers, workers and other organisations, which are then 
grouped into two categories: immediate factors and contributing factors (see Figure 
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2.1). An immediate hazard factor is a factor that can cause an accident physically and 
directly, whether the accident happens or not, including unsafe acts and unsafe 
conditions. A contributing hazard factor is a factor that can further explain immediate 
hazard factor, including safety management policy, manager and worker’s mental or 
physical conditions, initial construction site conditions, and so on. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Hazard Factors on Construction Site (Source: Fang et al., 2004) 
 
 
2.3 Factors influencing safety performance of building projects 
 
Efforts to prevent accidents are likely to be shaped by the root causes of accidents 
(Lingard and Rowlinson, 2005). The accident causation theories suggest that lack of 
management control is the root cause of accidents and thus the accidents could be 
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somewhat prevented through management efforts. The Oxford English Dictionary 
(OED, 2012) defines the control as the ability or power to determine or influence 
people’s behaviour or the course of events. Langer (1975) noted that ‘In skill 
situations there is a causal link between behaviour and outcome. Thus, success in skill 
tasks is controllable. Luck, on the other hand, is a fortuitous happening. Success in 
luck or chance activities is apparently uncontrollable’ (as cited in Kahneman et al., 
1982, p.231). However, due to people’s strong desire to completely master their 
environment and control chance events (Adler, 1930; Hendrick, 1943; White, 1959; 
DeCharms, 1968) and the fact that skill and chance factors are so closely associated in 
people’s experience, Langer (1975) found that there is ‘an expectancy of a personal 
success probability inappropriately higher than the objective probability would 
warrant’ (as cited in Kahneman et al., 1982, p.232), which is referred to as the 
illusion of control. Langer’s (1975) research suggests that the lack of management 
control cannot account for all the failures in managing WSH risks due to the role of 
chance factors. Therefore, in addition to the level of management efforts in accidents 
prevention, safety performance of building projects is also associated with the 
inherent project hazards and non-human related events, such as natural disasters and 
inclement weather (Abdelhamid and Everett, 2000; Imriyas et al., 2007b; Teo and 
Feng, 2010, 2011). The management efforts could be in the form of physical input 
such as the investments in safety personnel, safety facilities and equipments, safety 
training, and other safety related activities, and cultural input such as the cultivation of 
safety culture in construction sites (Feng, 2009; Teo and Feng 2011). The inherent 
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project hazard is a natural part of the initial construction site conditions owing to the 
scope and location of the project (Abdelhamid and Everett, 2000; Imriyas et al., 
2007b). Non-human related events like natural disasters and inclement weather are 
beyond control and prediction (Teo and Feng, 2010). The subsequent sections review 
the literature about the definitions and measurement of safety investments, safety 
culture, and inherent project hazards.   
 
2.3.1 Safety investments (Physical input) 
 
2.3.1.1 Concept of safety investments 
 
Safety investments are cost paid for pursuing people’s health, the security of life, and 
living safeguard (Hinze, 2000). It is aimed at protecting the health and physical 
integrity of workers and the material assets of a contractor (Tang et al., 1997). Safety 
investments were also referred to as the costs of safety by Hinze (2000), who 
presented that the costs of safety are those which are incurred as a result of an 
emphasis being placed on safety, whether it be in the form of training, drug testing, 
safety incentives, staffing for safety, personal protection equipment, safety programs, 
etc. According to Hinze (2000), investments in safety must be viewed as a means to 
improve the bottom line, and naturally, to reduce the incidence of injuries, rather than 



















Figure 2.2: Emphasis on Safety and Injury Occurrence (Source: Hinze, 2000) 
 
Safety investments are always believed to have a positive impact on safety 
performance of building projects (e.g., Levitt, 1975; Laufer, 1987a, b; Brody et al., 
1990; Tang et al., 1997). However, this impact is largely an issue of probabilities, as 
there might be no injuries even if there is no investment in safety. The decision tree 
developed by Hinze (2000) may best illustrate the issue of probabilities (see Figure 
2.2). It shows the various possible outcomes related to emphasizing safety and 
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high injury cost becomes relatively small. On the other hand, if the investments in 
safety are low, the chance of sustaining high injury cost can be relatively high. 
 
However, much of the analysis in these studies was based on assumptions. Little 
empirical evidence was found to support their arguments. Crites (1995) compared 
safety performance with the size and funding of formal safety programs over an 
11-year period (1980-1990), and it was found that safety performance was 
independent of – or even inversely related to – safety investment. Tang et al. (1997) 
examined the function of the relationship between safety investment and safety 
performance of building projects in Hong Kong and found a weak correlation 
coefficient (0.25) between safety investment and safety performance. They assumed 
that the low correlation coefficient might be due to the difference in safety culture of 
the different companies without the support of empirical evidence. These studies 
failed to address the possible interactions of safety investments and other factors 
influencing safety performance. From these studies, it is still unclear whether the 
relationship between safety investments and safety performance is affected by other 
factors, such as initial hazard level and safety culture level of the project. 
 
2.3.1.2 Components of safety investments 
 
The components of safety investments have been discussed in some previous studies 
(e.g., Laufer, 1987a, b; Brody et al., 1990; Tang et al., 1997; Hinze, 2000). Accident 
prevention comprises expenses for safety planning, acquisition of equipment and 
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protective installations, personnel training, salaries for safety staff, safety 
measurement and accident investigations (Laufer, 1987a, b). Brody et al. (1990) 
classified safety investments into three types: (1) Fixed prevention costs (FPC); (2) 
Variable prevention costs (VPC); and (3) Unexpected prevention costs (UPC). FPCs 
are incurred before production takes place and exist regardless of the accident rate. 
Examples of FPCs include human resources allocated to safety. VPCs are proportional 
to accident frequency and severity. They include time taken by accident analysis 
specialists attempting to identify causes and to prescribe corrective measures. UPCs 
relate to measures initially unforeseen when a production procedure is originally 
conceived or when machinery is designed or purchased.  
 
In an attempt to optimize construction safety cost, Tang et al. (1997) collected the data 
on the investments in safety of building projects in Hong Kong. The information on 
safety investments was divided into three major investments components, namely (1) 
safety administration personnel, (2) safety equipment, and (3) safety training and 
promotion. Investments in safety administration personnel comprise the salaries of 
these personnel, such as safety officers, safety supervisors, or safety managers in 
some large companies, and their supporting staff such as clerks and typists. 
Investments in safety equipments include the expenditures on personal protection 
equipments and other equipments that involve the provision of safety on building sites. 




Hinze (2000) discussed the most salient components of a safety program. Various 
experts (primarily associated with the petro-chemical and industrial sectors) in 
industry were consulted about the costs of the various components of a safety 
program. These safety program elements include: (1) substance abuse testing; (2) 
staffing; (3) training; (4) personal protective equipment; (5) safety committees; (6) 
investigations; (7) preparation and implementation of safety program; and (8) safety 
incentives.  
 
2.3.2 Safety culture (Cultural input) 
 
2.3.2.1 Organisational culture and climate 
 
• Concepts of organisational culture 
 
The American Heritage Dictionary defines culture as ‘the totality of socially 
transmitted behaviour patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and all other products of 
human work and thought considered as the expression of a particular period, class, 
community, or population’. Since the early 1980s, culture studies have acquired the 
dominant status in the management academia (Hofstede, 1991; Cameron and 
Ettington, 1998; Brown, 1998; Collins, 2000; Martin, 2002). The concept of 
organisational culture had its roots in several disciplines including psychology, 
sociology, anthropology and management. These diverse perspectives resulted in 
numerous and conflicting approaches to define organisational culture (Cooper, 2000; 




Organisational culture was defined as: a pattern of beliefs and expectations shared by 
the organisation’s member (Schwartz and Davis, 1981); the way we do things around 
here (Deal and Kennedy, 1982); a general constellation of beliefs, norms, customs, 
value systems, behavioural norms, and ways of doing business (Tunstall, 1983); a set 
of commonly held attitudes, values, assumptions, beliefs that guide the behaviour of 
an organisation’s members (Martin, 1985); commonly held and relatively stable 
beliefs, attitudes and values that exist within the organisation (Williams et al., 1993); 
the collective mental programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one 
organisation from another (Hofstede, 1991); etc.  
 
Schein (1992, p.8-9) provides a useful summary of the way the concept of culture has 
been used by various researchers: observed behavioural regularities, group norms, 
espoused values, formal philosophy, rules of the game, climate, embedded skills, 
habits of thinking, shared meanings and root metaphors. Cooper (2000) attributed the 
difference between various definitions of organisational culture to ‘their focus on the 
way people think, or on the way people behave’ (p.112). Moreover, after discussing 
whether it is better to focus on values or practices in defining organisational culture, 
Hofstede (1991) stated that ‘shared perceptions of daily practices should be 
considered to be the core of an organisation’s culture’ (p. 182-183). Despite the 
distinction of different definitions of organisational culture in terms of their focus on 
values or practices, Hopkins (2006) stressed that they are not necessarily in conflict 
with each other, as ‘a definition in terms of practices does not deny the importance of 
values in any complete understanding of culture’ (p.876). 
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• Dimensions of organisational culture 
 
A number of attempts have been made to map the main features or levels of 
organisational culture. Hofstede (1991; 2001) discusses organisational culture 
primarily in relation to national culture. The Hofstede dimensional model of national 
culture (Hofstede, 2001) distinguishes national cultures according to five dimensions: 
power distance; individualism/collectivism; masculinity/femininity; uncertainty 
avoidance; and long-/short-term orientation. He conceives culture as having multiple 
layers: norms and values (core layer), rituals, heroes and symbols (outer layer). At 
each of these levels, culture has its manifestations which can be studied separately. 
According to Hofstede (1991), only the last three layers are relevant in considering 
organisations. He refers to the last three layers as ‘practices’ in contrast the core layer 
–norms and values. The practices are more easily changed than the norm and values, 
while the more outward a layer is situated, the more superficial it is.  
 
Schein (1992) depicts organisational culture into three different levels: Artifacts, 
espoused values, and basic underlying assumptions. At the deepest level are the 
taken-for-granted assumptions about the organisation from which values are formed 
and actions are derived. They serve as a mental map for members to guide their 
behaviours and to shape their way of seeing, thinking, and feeling about what is 
happening around them. At the intermediate level are organisational members’ 
espoused values and ideals (i.e. how they think and feel) that shape their behaviours. 
The most accessible level (the surface level) refers to physical manifestations and 
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overt routine behaviours grounded in values and assumptions. These are the artifacts 
and products of a culture that we can see, hear and feel (Cai, 2005). Hofstede, as the 
pioneer in the culture studies, identified six mutually independent dimensions of 
organisational culture using factor analysis (Hofstede, 1991). These dimensions are: 
process oriented vs results oriented; employee oriented vs job oriented; parochial vs 
professional; open system vs closed system; loose control vs tight control and 
normative vs pragmatic.  
 
Other key dimensions of organisational culture identified include depth, breadth and 
progression (Eldridge and Crombie, 1974). Depth refers to the way in which culture is 
reflected the organisation’s policies, procedures, processes, programs, values, 
strategies, behaviours and other features. Breadth is represented in the lateral 
coordination of different organisational components. Progression refers to the time 
dimension, and is similar to the developmental aspect of culture espoused by Schein 
(1992). Gorman (1989) identified three further dimensions: strength, pervasiveness 
and direction. Strength is the extent to which organisation members embrace core 
level meanings. Pervasiveness refers to the extent to which beliefs and value are 
shared across the organisation. Direction refers to the extent to which organisational 
culture embodies behaviour that is consistent with espoused strategy. Jaeger (1986) 
used a set of four dimensions namely power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism and masculinity, which were originally developed by Hofstede (1980) 
for defining national cultures. Rousseau (1990) used a two-dimension of 
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organisational culture in a survey of a large service organisation: 
satisfaction-orientation and security-orientation. Marcoulides and Heck (1993) used 
five dimensions to depict organisational culture: organisational structure, 
organisational values, task organisation, organisational climate and employee attitudes. 
Ashkanasy, Broadfoot and Falkus (2000) developed ten dimensions of organisational 
culture, which comprise leadership, structure, innovation, job performance, planning, 
communication, environment, humanistic workplace, development of individual and 
socialization on entry.  
 
• Organisational culture and organisational climate 
 
Various researchers have attempted to distinguish the concept of organisational 
culture from the concept of organisational climate, which have been used 
interchangeably. Glendon and Stanton (2000, p.198) argued that ‘while there is a 
relationship and some overlap between these terms, organisational climate refers to 
the perceived quality of an organisation’s internal environment’. Hofstede (1986) 
narrows organisational climate down to job satisfaction and to something that is 
typically the concern of lower and middle management. Hofstede (1986) regards 
organisational culture as top-management’s business. Rousseau (1988) reviewed 13 
definitions of organisational climate over a 21-year period, in which employee 
attitudes and perceptions were identified as the main features of organisational climate. 
Furnham and Gunter (1993) regard organisational climate as an index of 
organisational health, but not a causative factor in it. Mearns et al. (2003) refers to 
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climate as a manifestation of culture. They argue that climate is directly measurable 
while culture is too abstract to be measured directly. Hale (2000) defines climate as 
the situation at a particular point in time while culture refers to more enduring 
phenomena.  
 
Through a comprehensive review of organisational culture theory and research, 
Guldenmund (2000, p.221) concludes that ‘the term organisational climate was 
coined to refer to a global, integrating concept underlying most organisational events 
and processes’. Guldenmund (2000) suggests that the difference between climate and 
culture may be little more than terminological fashion. Nowadays, ‘the term 
organisational climate has come to mean more and more the overt manifestation of 
culture within an organisation’ (Guldenmund, 2000, p.221). It is also observed that the 
terms climate and culture originated from different academic disciplines, namely 
social psychology and anthropology, respectively (Hopkins 2006). Climate and 
culture tend to be associated with the different research strategies: quantitative 
approach and qualitative approach, respectively. Therefore, Hopkins (2006, p.877) 
suggests that ‘while the distinction between culture and climate remains elusive, what 
is clear is that there are real choices to be made in terms of research strategy’. 
 
2.3.2.2 From organisational culture to safety culture 
 
• Concepts of safety culture 
 
Contrasting perspectives on organisational culture can be used as a framework for 
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appreciating how values, attitudes and beliefs about safety work are expressed and 
how they might influence directions that organisations take in respect of safety culture 
(Glendon and Stanton 2000, p. 201). The term safety culture was first introduced in 
International Safety Advisory Group’s (INSAG’s) Summary Report on the 
Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA, 1986). The IAEA (1986), in its attempt to understand why the 
accident occurred, concluded that ‘a poor safety culture’ was one of the major reasons 
for the disaster. Safety culture was defined by “Safety Culture” (International Safety 
Advisory Group, Safety-Series 75-INSAG-4) as assembly of characteristics and 
attitudes in organisations and individuals, which establishes that, as an overriding 
priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their 
significance (IAEA, 1991). Since then, a considerable number of definitions of safety 
culture have abounded in the safety literature (Choudhry, 2007; Guldenmund, 2000; 
Wiegmann et al., 2004). According to Flin (2007), the most widely accepted 
definition of safety culture comes from the nuclear power industry. ‘The safety culture 
of an organisation is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the 
style and proficiency of, an organisation’s health and safety management. 
Organisations with a positive culture are characterized by communications founded 
on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety and by confidence 




A recent review of safety culture literature by Wiegmann et al. (2004) identified a set 
of critical features regardless of the particular industry from the various definitions of 
safety culture. These critical features include the following: ‘(1) safety culture is a 
concept defined at the group level or higher that refers to the shared values among all 
the group or organisation members; (2) safety culture is concerned with formal safety 
issues in an organisation and closely related to, but not restricted to, the management 
and supervisory systems; (3) safety culture emphasizes the contribution from everyone 
at every level of an organisation; (4) the safety culture of an organisation has an 
impact on its members’ behaviour at work; (5) safety culture is usually reflected in the 
contingency between reward systems and safety performance; (6) safety culture is 
reflected in an organisation’s willingness to develop and learn from errors, incidents, 
and accidents; (7) safety culture is relatively enduring, stable, and resistant to change’ 
(Wiegmann et al. 2004, p. 123).  
 
Notwithstanding its recent appearance in the field of safety management, safety 
culture has begun to gain acceptance due to its critical role for improving safety 
performance (e.g., Cooper, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000; Wiegmann et al., 2004). As 
suggested by Cooper (1997), safety culture impacts not only on accident rates, but 
also on work methods, absenteeism, quality, productivity, commitment, loyalty and 
work satisfaction (Cooper, 1997). A good safety culture might be reflected and 
promoted by: (1) senior management commitment to safety; (2) shared care and 
concern for hazards and solicitude over their impacts upon people; (3) realistic and 
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flexible norms and rules about hazards; and (4) continual reflection upon practice 
through monitoring, analysis, and feedback systems (Cooper, 1997; Pidgion and 
O’Leary, 1994).  
 
• Models of safety culture 
 
Many researchers have attempted to develop a theoretical model of safety culture 
which explains the concept of safety culture and determines how safety culture may 
be measured. Clarke (2000) mapped various aspects of safety culture based on Shein’s 
(1992) three-level model of organisational culture. According to Clarke (2000), at the 
deepest level of safety culture model is the basic understanding that safety is the 
overriding priority, which is manifested as all organisational members’ attitudes 
towards safety (the intermediate level) and as safety related organisational strategy, 
structures, artefacts, and practices, as well as organisational members’ norm and 
practice (the surface level).  
 
Guldenmund (2000) defines safety culture as those aspects of the organisational 
culture which will impact on attitudes and behaviours related to increasing or 
decreasing risk. Guldenmund (2000) also conceptualised safety culture as having 
three layers or levels at which it may be studied separately. The core layer is assumed 
to consist of basic assumptions, which are unconscious and relatively unspecific and 
which permeate the whole of the organisation. The next layer consists of espoused 
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values, which are operationalised as attitudes towards the specific objects: hardware, 
software, people and behaviour. The outermost layer consists of particular 
manifestations of specific objects such as inspections, posters, wearing of personal 
protective equipment, accidents or incidents, near-misses or different types of 
behaviour.  
 
According to Cooper (2000), ‘The prevailing organisational culture is reflected in the 
dynamic reciprocal relationships between members’ perceptions about, and attitudes 
towards, the operation of organisational goals; members’ day-to-day goal-directed 
behaviour; and the presence and quality of the organisation’s systems and 
sub-systems to support the goal-directed behaviour’ (p. 118). The reciprocal 
relationships between the three factors have been recognized and reflected in several 
major models of safety culture (Bandura, 1986; Cooper, 2000; Geller, 1994, 1996).  
 
The model of reciprocal determinism developed by Bandura (1986) offers the 
framework in which the psychological, behavioural and situational elements and their 
interactions precisely reflect those accident causation relationships found by many 
researchers (e.g. Heinrich et al., 1980; Reason, 1990). In order to reflect the concept 
of safety culture, Bandura’s model was adapted by Cooper (2000), who suggested that 
‘organisational culture is the product of multiple goal-directed interactions between 
people (psychological); jobs (behavioural); and the organisation (situational)’ (p.118). 
In the adapted model by Cooper, the internal psychological aspects of safety culture, 
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such as attitudes and perceptions, can be assessed by safety climate questionnaires 
(Zohar, 1980). The observable behavioural aspects of safety culture can be assessed 
through peer observations, self-report measures and/or outcome measures (Komaki, 
Barwick and Scott, 1978; Sulzer-Azaroff, 1987); and the objective situational aspects 
of safety culture, such as safety rules and procedures, can be assessed through safety 
management systems audits/inspections (Cooper, 1997; Teo and Ling, 2006). 
 
Other researchers, such as Geller (1994, 1996) and Choudhry et al. (2007) also put 
forward models to reflect the concept of safety culture. The Total Safety Culture 
model by Geller (1994, 1996) distinguished three dynamic and interactive factors: 
Person, Behaviour, and Environment. The only difference between Geller’s model and 
Cooper’s model is that the term environment is used in the former model while the 
term situation is used instead in the latter model. Another model presented by 
Choudhry et al. (2007) was built upon Geller’s model and Cooper’s model and in the 
context of construction industry, with the distinction that the construct environment in 
Geller’s model and situation in Cooper’s model are incorporated into a new construct 
–situation/environment–to reflect not only the situational aspects of the organisation 
but also the specific conditions of the construction project. The reciprocal interactions 
among psychological, behavioural and environmental/situational variables, which 
have been recognized and reflected in the major safety culture models, indicate that 
the three dimensions to measure the overall safety culture of an organisation are 
psychological, behavioural and situational/environmental aspects of safety culture. 
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• Safety culture and safety climate 
 
Just like the relationship of organisational culture and organisational climate, the 
concept of safety climate, which was mainly derived from the organisational climate 
theory and research, is similar and closely related to the concept of safety culture 
(Clarke, 2000). Some researchers used the term safety culture interchangeably with 
the term safety climate (Cox and Cox, 1991; Lee, 1998), while others attempted to 
distinguish between the two concepts (Flin et al., 1998; Cox and Flin, 1998; 
Choudhry et al., 2007). Zohar (1980) first defined safety climate as a summary of 
‘perceptions that employees share about their work environment’ (p. 96). Flin et al. 
(1998) defined safety climate as the perceived state of safety of a particular place at a 
particular time. It is therefore relatively unstable and subject to change depending on 
features of the operating environment. More recently, Zohar (2003) suggested, ‘safety 
climate relates to shared perceptions with regard to safety policies, procedures and 
practices’ (p. 125). According to Wiegmann et al. (2004), although literature has not 
presented a generally accepted definition of safety climate, ‘many definitions do have 
commonalities and do differ from safety culture in important ways’ (p. 124). These 
commonalities include: ‘(1) safety climate is a psychological phenomenon that is 
usually defined as the perceptions of the state of safety at a particular time; (2) safety 
climate is closely concerned with intangible issues such as situational and 
environmental factors; and (3) safety climate is a temporal phenomenon, a ‘snapshot’ 




The aforementioned commonalities extracted from various definitions of safety 
culture and safety climate indicate that the two terms should not be viewed as 
alternatives. Safety climate tends to be the overt manifestation of safety culture within 
an organisation (Schein, 1990; Teo and Feng, 2009). It is also commonly accepted that 
safety climate provides an indicator of the underlying safety culture (Cox and Flin, 
1998; Teo and Feng, 2009). This is further confirmed by Teo and Feng’s (2009) 
empirical research, which examined the relationship between safety climate and safety 
culture in construction environment and concluded that safety climate can be a 
reliable indicator of the overall safety culture in the construction project organisations.  
 
• Assessing safety culture  
 
In order to assess safety culture of an organisation, a variety of qualitative (e.g. 
observations, focus group discussions, historical information reviews, and case studies) 
and quantitative (surveys) methods can be used (Wreathall, 1995). With qualitative 
measurement strategies, which originate in the discipline of anthropology, 
organisation members usually serve as informants who interact directly or indirectly 
with researchers using their own terms and concepts to express their point of view 
(Rousseau, 1990; Wiegmannet et al., 2004). Therefore, through qualitative 
measurement, intensive and in-depth information can be obtained using the focal 
group’s own language. One of the major drawbacks of the qualitative methods is the 




In contrast, quantitative approaches attempt to numerically measure or score safety 
culture using procedures that are often highly standardized and calibrated 
(Wiegmannet et al., 2004). In quantitative measurement strategies, organisation 
members usually serve as respondents who react to a standard set of questions 
provided by the researchers (Rousseau, 1990). The survey method appears to be the 
predominant strategy for studying organisational cultures (Hopkins, 2006). There are 
numerous safety culture and climate studies which were carried out using the survey 
methods (e.g. Hofstede, 1991; Cox and Cheyne, 2000; Lee and Harrison, 2000; 
O’Toole, 2002; Cooper and Phillips, 2004). Hopkins (2006) suggests that the survey 
method is not only well suitable to studying individual attitudes and values but also 
suitable to studying practices, or ‘the way we do things around hear’. The survey 
methods are relatively easy to use in cross-sectional comparisons, generally simple to 
implement in different organisations and by other researchers, and straightforward to 
interpret according to a common, articulated frame of reference (Wreathall, 1995; 
Wiegmannet et al., 2004). The limitations of the survey methods are: (1) it provides a 
relatively superficial description of the culture of an organisation; and (2) it provides 
little information about dynamic processes of organisational culture.  
 
There appears to be agreement among researchers that both qualitative and 
quantitative methods have unique contributions for assessment and theory testing 
(Wiegmannet et al., 2004). Nonetheless, quantitative approaches, especially surveys 
of individuals’ responses, are often more practical in terms of time and 
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cost-effectiveness (Wreathall, 1995; Wiegmannet et al., 2004). Consequently, surveys 
and questionnaires have been widely used to assess safety culture within a variety of 
industries such as nuclear power, chemical, construction, transportation, and 
manufacturing (Cox and Cheyne, 2000; Lee and Harrison, 2000; O’Toole, 2002; 
Cooper and Phillips, 2004; Molenaar et al., 2009).  
 
2.3.3 Project hazard 
 
According to Imriyas et al. (2007b), the project hazard is a natural part of the initial 
construction site conditions owing to the scope and location of the project. Higher 
project hazard level tends to be associated with higher risk level on site (Imriyas et al., 
2007b). To assess the project hazard level, researchers (Davies and Tomasin, 1996; 
Jannadi and Assaf, 1998) introduced a list of high hazard activities in building 
projects, which are discussed as following. 
 
2.3.3.1 Demolition hazards 
 
Demolition is one of the high-risk activities of the construction industry. According to 
King and Hudson (1985), demolition workers face a variety of hazards: (1) Falling 
from heights; (2) Being hit or trapped by falling objects; (3) Excessive noise from 
hand-held tools, demolition balls, pneumatic drills, explosives and falling parts; (4) 
Vibration from hand-held pneumatic tools; (5) Respiratory hazards from dust which 
may contain toxic constituents such as asbestos and silica; (6) Flying particles causing 
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eye and skin injuries; and (7) Fires and explosives, especially when demolishing tanks 
that contained oils or flammable chemicals. Davies and Tomasin (1996) noted that the 
risk in demolition works is influenced by four variables, namely volume/size of 
demolition, type of structure, method of demolition and level of site supervision.  
 
2.3.3.2 Excavation work hazards 
 
Excavations can be categorized into three common types: trenches; basements and 
wide excavations; and pits/shafts (for pad and pile foundations) (Davis and Tomasin, 
1996). HSE (2005) summarized the ways in which accidents in excavation tend to 
occur. They are: (1) collapse of sides/cave-in; (2) contact with underground utilities; 
(3) dangerous atmospheres; (4) workers being struck by falling materials/objects from 
top; and (5) Workers falling into excavations. Hinze (2005) and Lee and Halpin (2003) 
analysed excavation-related activities and identified five hazard rating variables for 
excavation works: (1) excavation configuration (depth, width and length); (2) 
geological condition (soil type and water table); (3) presence of underground utilities 
(electrical, water and sewer lines); (4) nearby vehicular traffic (vibration and 
surcharge load); and (5) nearby structures.  
 
2.3.3.3 Scaffolding and ladder work hazards 
 
According to Davis and Tomasin (1996), scaffold use may potentially incur the 
following hazards: (1) workers falling from the working platform; (2) workers below 
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the working platform being struck by materials falling from it; and (3) the scaffold or 
part of it collapsing and throwing workers off with the collapsed structure and 
crushing workers under it or nearby. The misuse of ladders, which provide access to 
scaffold or themselves are used as working platform of light works, may also cause 
serious accidents. For instance, ladders slip when users are climbing or working from 
them; users slip or miss their footing while climbing; users overbalance when carrying 
materials or tools; and when defective ladders are used, they fracture under the weight 
of the user (Davis and Tomasin, 1996). Bentley et al. (2006) studied the scaffolding 
and ladder-related accidents and reported two key risk factors: (1) design factors, such 
as height of the scaffold/ladder, suitability of the type for the task and height, and 
adequacy of design (member size, bracing, guardrails, platform size, and toe board); 
and (2) work environment and conditions, such as defects in the members of the 
scaffold/ladder, slippery condition on the platform, loading of materials and workers 
on the platform, and the nature of the platform the scaffold/ladder is rested on. 
 
2.3.3.4 Falsework (temporary structures) hazards 
 
A falsework refers to the temporary structure used to support a permanent structure 
during its construction and until it becomes self-supporting (Imriyas, 2007b). 
Falseworks may be required to support in-situ and pre-cast concrete construction, 
masonry arches as well as timber and steel frameworks. Imriyas (2007b) suggests that 
accidents in falseworks tend to occur by two ways: (1) total or partial collapse of 
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falseworks leading to workers being thrown off or falling off from their place of work; 
and (2) other than the collapse of falseworks, workers slip and fall from falseworks 
through unprotected edges and holes of decking, and access ladders. Davis and 
Tomasin (1996) found that two causes may account for the collapses of falseworks in 
construction sites. One cause lies in the inadequacy of design. Davis and Tomasin 
(1996) further addresses that the deficiency in falsework design is caused by: (1) 
failure to correctly estimate the type and extent of loading; (2) inadequate foundation; 
(3) incorrect choice or use of materials; and (4) lack of provision for lateral stability. 
Another cause of falseworks collapses is poor assembly, which is possibly the result 
of the failure to inspect the materials (such as struts, planks, etc.), the soil condition at 
the foundation and the falsework erection.  
 
2.3.3.5 Roof work hazards 
 
As noted by Parsons and Pizatella (1985) and Gillen et al. (1997), the injuries caused 
by falls from roofs are typically extremely severe, requiring long periods of treatment 
and recovery and resulting in substantial medical costs. Hsiao and Simeonov (2001) 
investigated the fall-initiation factors in roofing works and categorised them under 
three groups: (1) design factors including height of the roof, roofing material property 
(e.g. slippery, brittleness, asbestos, etc.) and inclination of the roof; (2) task factors 
including load handling on the roof top, complexity of the task, and working 
environment, which causes fatigue and loss of balance; and (3) workers factors 
including age and safety consciousness, experience and training in roofing works, and 
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under use/misuse of personal protective equipment.  
 
2.3.3.6 Erection of structural framework hazards 
 
Davies and Tomasin (1996) identified three common types of accidents that occur 
during he erection and assembly of structural steel or pre-cast frameworks. They are: 
(1) erectors falling from heights when at their places of work, going to or returning 
from them; (2) the collapse of the whole or part of the framework causing workers to 
fall or striking those at lower levels; and (3) Workers at lower levels being struck by 
tools or materials falling or being thrown down. Imriyas (2007b) suggests that the 
hazard level in erection works is dictated by the following variables: (1) height and 
size of the structure/erection; (2) design and erection method; and (3) provision of a 
safe workplace such as safe access/egress, safe working platform at heights, safe tools 
containers and safety equipment (safety belt, harness, net, etc.). 
 
2.3.3.7 Crane use hazards 
 
Davies and Tomasin (1996) identified five crane-related hazards: (1) overturning of a 
crane or the structural failure of its parts; (2) dropping of the suspended load; (3) 
electrocution; (4) trapping of people; and (5) accidents during erection and 
dismantling as well as loading and unloading. Researchers (Davies and Tomasin,1996; 
Neitzel et al., 2001; Ederer, 2006) have identified a list of factors that may cause the 
crane failures: (1) operating on slopes; (2) instable crane foundation; (3) overloading; 
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(4) improper maintenance; (5) lack of communication; (6) unsafe working practice of 
workers; and (6) lack of supervision.  
 
2.3.3.8 Construction machinery and tools usage hazards 
 
The types of machinery involved in accidents include excavators and shovels, 
earthmoving equipment (i.e. crawler tractors and bulldozers, scrapers and graders), 
dumpers and dump trucks, forklift trucks, road rollers and lorries (Helander, 1991; 
Davies and Tomasin, 1996; Imriyas, 2007b). The types of construction tools which 
may incur hazards include: (1) knife; (2) hammer, sledge hammer, etc.; (3) 
grinding/cutting machine; (4) jackhammer; (5) drill; (6) manual saw; (7) crowbar, spit, 
etc.; (8) tools for screwing; (9) welding equipment – gas; (10) axe; (11) 
spade/excavation tools; (12) gripping, holding, pinching, pulling tools; (13) chain saw; 
(14) nail gun; (15) compass saw, hole saw, etc.; (16) welding equipment – electrical; 
(17) circular saw; (18) cutting tools; and (19) other tools (Helander, 1991). 
 
The following types of accidents tend to be associated with the use of construction 
machinery and tools (Helander, 1991; Davies and Tomasin, 1996; Fredericks, et al., 
2002; Pontes, 2005; Imriyas, 2007b):  
(1) workers being run-over or struck by machinery moving forward or reversing; 
(2) collision between machinery or with fixed objects such as falseworks or 
scaffoldings;  
(3) overturning of machinery while in operation;  
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(4) workers falling from machinery;  
(5) eye injuries caused by foreign objects getting into eyes by operations such as 
grinding, welding, cutting, drilling and breaking;  
(6) finger/hand injuries by cut and burns; 
(7) injuries caused by moving/broken machine parts;  
(8) electrocution; and 
(9) vibration from powered hand-held tools, causing a group of diseases. One of 
them is blood circulation disturbance known as ‘vibration white finger’. 
 
These accidents are caused by the following risk factors (Helander, 1991; Davies and 
Tomasin, 1996; Fredericks, et al., 2002; Pontes, 2005; Imriyas, 2007b):  
(1) failure of machinery, i.e. inoperative back-up alarms, brake failures, etc.; 
(2) inadequate site planning resulting in poor visibility, inadequate manoeuvre 
space, inadequate signboards and poor site traffic control; 
(3) lack of supervision and training of workers and operators;  
(4) construction noise that masks the sound of back-up alarms and the sound of 
plant; 
(5) faulty tools; 
(6) unsafe handling of tools; and  





2.3.3.9 Works on contaminated sites hazards 
 
According to Worksafe Victoria (2005), a contaminated site may have the following 
substances, which are harmful to workers’ health and safety: (1) metals (e.g. lead); (2) 
inorganic compounds (e.g. cyanide compounds); (3) oils and tars; (4) pesticides; (5) 
other organic compounds (e.g. benzene, toluene and polychlorinated biphenyls); (6) 
toxic, explosive or asphyxiate gases (e.g. methane); (7) combustible substances (e.g. 
petrol); (8) fibres (e.g. asbestos and synthetic mineral fibres); (9) putrescibles or 
infectious materials (e.g. medical/biological wastes); (10) radioactive wastes; and (11) 
other harmful wastes (e.g. unexploded ordinance and syringes). Worksafe Victoria 
(2005) further reported that short or long term health effects to people exposed to 
contaminants rely upon the type of contaminants on site, the quantity of contaminants 
present, and the duration that the workers are exposed on site. 
 
2.3.3.10 Welding and cutting works hazards 
 
The hazards incurred by welding and cutting works on construction sites include 
(Welder, arc, 2005): 
(1) fire or explosion due to extreme temperatures (up to 10,000°F) from welding 
sparks coming into contact with flammable materials (e.g. coatings of metals, 




(2) electric shock from excess moisture (e.g. perspiration or wet conditions) and 
contact with metal parts which are "electrically hot"; 
(3) injuries due to flying sparks, particles of hot metals, molten metals, liquid 
chemicals, acids or caustic liquids, or chemical gases or vapours;  
(4) falls during work on ladders, above ground and in confined spaces;  
(5) exposure to high noise levels from welding equipment, power sources and 
processes;  
(6) exposure to ultraviolet (UV) radiation resulting in skin burns and skin cancer. 
"Welder's flash" (brief exposure to UV radiation) may result in temporary 
swelling and fluid excretion of the eyes or temporary blindness;  
(7) irritation of lungs due to heat and UV radiation; and 
(8) exposure to fumes and chemical substances. 
 
Welder , arc (2005) further reported that the level of hazard posed by welding and 
cutting works relies upon volume of work, location of welding and cutting, use of 
PPEs and housekeeping.  
 
2.3.3.11 Confined spaces work hazards 
 
Confined space refers to ‘a space which by design has limited openings for entry and 
exit, unfavourable natural ventilation that could contain or produce dangerous air 
contaminants, and is not intended for continuous employee occupancy’ (Imriyas, 
2007b). Workers are required to enter confined spaces for tasks such as repair, 
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inspection and maintenance, and are often exposed to multiple hazards (Imriyas, 
2007b). EH&S (2006) identified the main factors that determine the level of hazards 
in a confined space. They include: (1) space configuration (i.e. size of the space and 
size of the ingress/egress); (2) purpose of the confined space (i.e. if it is currently 
being used); (3) activity to be involved inside the space (i.e. welding, application of 
solvents/adhesives, etc.); and (4) level of natural ventilation inside the space. 
 
A particular project may have many of these activities and the level of hazard inherent 
in each activity is determined by its respective risk attributes (Imriyas et al., 2006, 
2007a, b, c). The fishbone diagram (Figure 2.3) proposed by Imriyas et al. (2006, 
2007b) summarised the attributes that are pertinent to each hazard trade. These 
attributes need to be evaluated individually in the project’s context for assessing 





Figure 2.3: Fishbone Diagram – Building Hazard Attributes (Source: Imriyas et al., 2006, 2007b) 
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2.4 Accident costs 
 
Based on the definition of accident (see Section 1.7.1), a workplace accident is any 
unintended event which causes bodily injury to a person in the course of a person’s 
work. Various losses would be incurred by the injured worker(s) after the occurrence 
of an accident. These losses may include costs to victims and their families, to 
employers and to society (Davies and Teasedale, 1994). However, as stated in the 
scope of research (see Section 1.6), this study focused on the financial losses of an 
employer. Costs to victims and their families and to society were not discussed in this 
study.  
 
The study on costs of accident was pioneered by Heinrich (1931) more than 80 years 
ago. Heinrich (1931) classified the costs as direct and indirect costs, and concluded 
that indirect costs are significant as he found that indirect costs accounted for as much 
as four times of the direct costs of accidents.  
 
In the Wealth of Nations Adam Smith (1776) wrote that a man educated at the expense 
of much labor and time may be compared to one of those expensive machines. This 
view helps to shed light on the vast costs of workplace accidents. The concept of 
Human Capital developed by Schultz (1961), Mincer (1958) and Becker (1964) refers 
to the stock of skills and knowledge embodied in the ability to perform labor so as to 
produce economic value. The Human Capital concept indicates that the losses of 
skilled labour services due to injury or illness is likely to incur additional losses to 
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employers and impact upon the competitiveness of the employers (Lingard and 
Rowlinson, 2005). Human Capital concept has been applied to the analysis of injuries 
and illnesses costs, and the Human Capital method was popularized by Rice (1967). 
This method also posits two broad categories of costs: direct costs and indirect costs.  
 
Simonds and Grimaldi (1956) proposed an alternative approach by dividing the costs 
into insured and uninsured costs. They criticized Heinrich’s (1931) definition of 
indirect costs, arguing that many such costs, for example the overhead cost of 
insurance, are direct since they appear in a firm’s financial accounts. Although not all 
of the later researchers were persuaded to change their jargon to insured costs and 
uninsured costs proposed by Simonds and Grimaldi (1956), some of them were 
prompted to re-define the direct and indirect costs as insured and uninsured costs 
(Head and Harcourt, 1997).  
 
The categorization of accident costs into direct and indirect costs or insured and 
uninsured costs implies that focus on the direct costs may fail to reveal the true losses 
to employers due to an accident. Many of the losses incurred by an accident are 
“hidden” and difficult to quantify. These “hidden” costs may be significant, and some 
may be particularly prominent in construction industry. For example, there are heavy 
penalties for time-overruns on construction projects (Lingard and Rowlinson, 2005). 
Therefore, both direct and indirect costs of accidents need to be examined to reflect 
the true costs of accidents to an employer. The following sections review the 
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definitions and components of direct and indirect accident costs to employers.  
 
2.4.1 Direct accident costs 
 
The direct accident costs are those actual cash flows that can be directly attributable to 
or associated with injuries and fatalities (Everett and Frank Jr. 1996; Hinze 1997). The 
direct costs of injuries tend to be those associated with the treatment of the injury and 
any unique compensation offered to workers as a consequence of being injured (Hinze, 
1997). They are typically the costs covered by work injury compensation insurance 
policies. In Singapore, costs covered by Work Injury Compensation Act consist of the 
following (MOM, 2008b):  
 
2.4.1.1 Medical leave wages 
 
Medical leave wages include: (a) full pay up to 14 days for outpatient medical leave; 
and (b) full pay up to 60 days for hospitalization leave. Beyond these two periods, 2/3 
salary is payable up to a maximum period of one year following the date of accident. 
 
2.4.1.2 Medical expenses 
 
These include medical expenses incurred within one year from the date of accident 




2.4.1.3 Lump sum compensation 
 
The compensation amount for permanent incapacity (PI) or death (if any) is subjected 
to the following limits (see Table 2.1):  
 
Table 2.1: Compensation for Permanent Incapacity or Death in Singapore (Source: 
MOM, 2008b) 
 Limits Amount 
Permanent 
Incapacity 
Maximum S$180,000 X % loss of earning capacity 





2.4.2 Indirect accidents cost 
 
Different definitions exist for the indirect costs of accidents, but in general they are 
regarded as consisting of all the costs that are not covered by worker’s compensation 
insurance (Hinze, 1991). The indirect cost theory of workplace accident developed by 
Brody et al. (1990) suggests that the identification of indirect costs will motivate 
cost-minimizing firms to increase investments in accident prevention to improve 
safety performance of building projects. The Accident Cost Iceberg proposed by Bird 
(1974) showed that the proportion of hidden costs could be much larger than the costs 
directly related to the accident.  
 
In order to better understand the indirect accidents cost, a number of past studies have 
been examined. Table 2.2 lists the summary of accidents cost research undertaken 
since 1931. These sixteen studies give a comprehensive representation of indirect 
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accidents cost. In addition to traditional classification of accident cost as direct 
(insured) and indirect (uninsured) costs, several researchers proposed different 
accident cost typologies based on the specific characteristics of the accident costs. For 
example, in the cost typology proposed by Riel and Imbeau (1996), health and safety 
costs are classified into three categories: insurance-related costs; work-related costs; 
and perturbation-related costs. They are also classified as quantifiable, irreducible and 
intangible costs in this typology. Rikhardsson and Impgaard (2004) argued that the 
traditional cost components are rather difficult for management to use, as it would 
require a number of definitions and clarifications before use including asset 
specifications and income definitions. Thus, they categorized accident costs as time, 
materials and components, external services and other costs. These categories reflect 
traditional accounting classifications in accounting systems, thus they are believed to 
be simpler to apply by managers. Despite the debates on various typologies of 
accident costs, the consequences or cost components of accidents seem to be 
consistent among literature.  
 
Table 2.2: List and Summary of Previous Accident Costs Research 












2) Medical aid 
Indirect costs:  
1) Cost of lost time of the injured 
employee; 
2) Cost of time lost by other 
employees; 
4:1 U.S. Construction; 
manufacturing; 
woodwork-ing; 
machine shop;  
and so on. 
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3) Cost of time lost by foremen; 
4) Cost of time spent by first aid 
attendants; 
5) Costs due to damage to machines, 
tools or other property; 
6) Incidental costs due to interference 
with production; 
7) Costs to employers under 
employee welfare systems; 
8) Costs to employers in continuing 
the wages to the injured employee; 
9) Costs due to loss of profit on the 
injured employee’s productivity; 
10) Costs that occur in consequence 
of weakened morale due to the 
accident; 







1) Net insurance premium 
Uninsured costs: 
1) Cost of wages paid for working 
time lost by workers who were 
not injured; 
2) The net cost to repair, replace, or 
straighten up material or 
equipment that was damaged in 
an “accident”; 
3) Cost of wages paid for working 
time lost by injured workers, 
other than workmen’s 
compensation payments; 
4) Extra cost due to overtime work 
necessitated by an “accident”; 
5) Cost of wages paid supervisors 
while their time is required for 
activities necessitated by the 
injury; 
6) Wage cost due to decreased 
output of injured worker after 
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7) Cost of learning period of new 
worker; 
8) Uninsured medical cost borne by 
the company; 
9) Cost of time spent by higher 
supervision and clerical workers 
on investigations or in the 
processing of compensation 
applications forms; 
10) Miscellaneous unusual costs. 
Laufer 
(1987a) 
Insured costs:  
1) Net insurance premium 
Uninsured costs:  
1) Costs due to labor lost time 
� Injured workers 
� Other workers 
� Replacement worker 
� Foreman 
� Clear-up and administration 
2) Costs due to complementary 
wages to the injured while absent 

















2) Net insurance premium 
Uninsured costs 
1) Lost labor 
2) Continuing payments to injured 
worker after accident 
3) Insurance costs 
4) Damage to equipment 
5) Legal costs  




1) Accident indemnity; 
2) Wages for the sick leave period 
minus accident insurance 
compensation for the same period; 
3) The fee to the state for labor 
protection and allowance for 
inflation; 
4) The maintenance fee of accident 
insurance.  
1:4.7 Finland Forestry  
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1) Accident investigation and report 
to insurance company; 
2) The production loss of other 
workers; 
3) Damage to machines and devices; 





1) Lost work time for the victim, 
other employees, foremen, and 
administrative personnel; 
2) Losses of current assets such as 
raw materials, intermediates, and 
finished products; 
3) Losses of fixed assets such as 
damage to machinery, lost 
transport capacity, etc. 
4) Outlays having shout-term 
effects, e.g., increased costs due 
to purchase of one-off services; 
5) Lost revenues and other indirect 
costs; 
6) Income from payment of 
indemnities on insurance 
policies; 
7) Other consequences, such as 
effects on insurance premiums; 
8) Utilization of health services, 
e.g., treatment costs, 
consultations, costs of health 
services, consumption of 
medicines, rehabilitation; 
9) Consumption of public and 
private services such as 
transportation, job training, 














1) Fix insurance costs; 
2) Variable insurance costs. 
Indirect costs: 





Canada Not specified. 
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4) Material damage 
5) Administrators’ time 
6) Production losses 
7) Other costs 
8) Intangible costs 
Hinze 
(1991) 
Direct costs:  
1) Costs reimbursed by Worker’s 
Compensation Insurance 
Indirect costs: 
1) Cost of injured worker: 
2) Cost of injured worker’s crew; 
3) Costs associated with obtaining 
medical help 
4) Costs of other crews 
5) Costs of equipment and material 
damage 
6) Costs of supervisory staff 














Costs to the firm: 
1) Time lost from work by an injured 
employee; 
2) Lost time by co-workers and 
management; 
3) Material damages; 
4) Replacement of injured worker. 
Costs to the public sector: 
1) Sickness pay; 
2) Rehabilitation; 
3) Health insurance; 
4) Medical treatment; 
5) Administration, police, court 
system; 
6) Loss of tax revenue. 
Costs to the injured person: 
1) Loss of income; 












1) Benefits paid to injured workers 
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1) WCI carriers’ overhead and profit; 
2) Claims costs; 
3) Other costs 
� Loss of productivity 
� Disruption of schedules 
� Administrative time for 
investigations and reports 
� Training of replacement 
personnel 
� Wages paid to the injured 
workers and others for time not 
worked 
� Cleanup and repair 
� Adverse publicity 




1) Insurance-related costs; 
2) Work-related costs; 











1) Increased premiums 
2) Investigation 
3) Liability and property damage 
4) Lost wages and benefits 
5) Medical payments 
6) Overheads 
7) Productivity loss 
8) Replacement 










1) Those paid by the Accident 
Rehabilitation, Compensation, 
and Insurance Corporation’s 
Employers’ Account 
Indirect costs: 
1) Indirect community costs; 
� Accident investigations by 
OSH 
� Social welfare benefits 
2) Indirect employer costs; 
� Productivity losses 
� Accident investigations 













� Legal penalties 
� Recruitment, selection, and 
training 
3) Indirect employee costs. 
� Health and medical services 
� Partial loss of earnings 
� Full loss of earnings 
Tang et al. 
(1997) 
Financial costs: 
1) Loss due to the injured person. 
2) Loss due to the injured person 
after resuming work 
3) Loss due to medical expenses 
4) Fines and legal expenses 
5) Loss of time of other employees 
6) Equipment or plant loss 
7) Loss due to damaged material or 
finished work 
8) Loss due to idle machinery or 
equipment 











1) Insurance premiums 
Uninsured costs: 
1) Cost of absentees time 
2) Cost of other person’s time  
3) Travel to hospital 
4) Replacement labour 
5) Machine breakdown 
6) Opportunity costs (Financial 
costs) 







2) Materials and components; 
3) External services 















1) Payments for hospital, physician, 
and allied health services 
2) Rehabilitation, nursing home 
care, home health care, medical 
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3) Insurance administrative costs 
for medical claims 
4) Payments for mental health 
treatment, police, fire, emergency 
transport, coroner services 
5) Property damage 
Indirect costs: 
1) Victim productivity losses which 
include wage losses and 
household production losses  
2) Administrative costs which 
include the cost of administering 
workers’ compensation wage 
replacement programs and sick 
leave. 
Quality of life costs 
1) Pain and suffering that victims and 
their families 
 
The various components of indirect costs originate from studies that have been 
focused on accident costs in industries other than construction (e.g., furniture, forestry, 
chemistry, cleaning service, financial service, and manufacturing). Nonetheless, as 
shown in Table 2.2, the components of indirect accident costs from various industries 
demonstrate strong similarities. Based on the literature review (see Table 2.2), a set of 
components of indirect accident costs in construction environment was identified. The 
indirect costs of accidents comprise the following 13 possible components:  
 
 Lost productivity due to the injured worker (e.g., Heinrich, 1931; Simonds and 
Grimaldi, 1956; Hinze, 1991); 
 Lost productivity due to crew of injured worker (e.g., Heinrich, 1931; Hinze, 
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1991; Monnery, 1999); 
 Lost productivity due to other workers in vicinity of accidents (e.g., Heinrich, 
1931; Laufer, 1987; Hinze, 1991); 
 Losses due to replacement of the injured worker (e.g., Laufer, 1987; Everett and 
Frank Jr., 1996; Monnery, 1999); 
 Lost productivity due to the investigation or inspections as a result of the injury 
(Simonds and Grimaldi, 1956; Head and Harcourt, 1997); 
 Cost of supervisory or staff effort (e.g., Heinrich, 1931; Simonds and Grimaldi, 
1956; Hinze, 1991); 
 Losses due to damaged equipment or plant, property, material or finished work 
due to the accident (e.g., Heinrich, 1931; Brody et al., 1990; Hinze, 1991); 
 Cost of transporting injured worker (e.g., Simonds and Grimaldi, 1956; Hinze, 
1991; Monnery, 1999); 
 Consumption of first-aid materials in this accident (Hinze, 1991; Head and 
Harcourt, 1997); 
 Additional work required as a result of the accident (e.g. cleaning, additional 
barriers and so on) (e.g., Simonds and Grimaldi, 1956; Laufer, 1987; Everett and 
Frank Jr., 1996); 
 Fines and legal expenses (Leopold and Leonard, 1987; Head and Harcourt, 1997); 
 Losses due to Stop Work Orders (SWO) issued to the project (disruption of 
schedules) (Brody et al., 1990; Everett and Frank Jr., 1996); 
 Additional benefits to the injured worker beyond the Work Compensation Act 
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(WCA) (Heinrich, 1931). 
 
2.4.3 Ratio between indirect costs and direct costs of accidents 
 
As indicated in Table 2.2, many studies which aimed at investigating the true accident 
cost came out with a ratio between indirect costs and direct costs of accidents. 
However, there is no generally accepted ratio between indirect and direct costs of 
accidents, as this ratio ranges from1:4.7 to 20.3:1 (see Table 2.2). Several reasons may 
explain the wide variety of this cost ratio.  
 
 Firstly, there exist different definitions and components of direct and indirect 
accident costs, or insured and uninsured accident costs.  
 Secondly, the direct or insured accident costs vary greatly with the different work 
injury compensation and insurance policies in different countries/regions.  
 Thirdly, since indirect costs represent those intangible or never enter the 
accounting system, the data collected in this category are not as reliable as those 
direct/insured costs. The accuracy of the data depends largely on the quality of 
the survey and estimation methods.  
 Finally, the studies listed in Table 2.2 were conducted in different industries such 
as construction, manufacturing, chemistry, and forestry. Industries differ 
regarding work characteristics and thus number and types of accidents 
(Rikhardsson and Impgaard, 2004). The nature of different production systems in 
different industries might explain part of the variation in the cost ratio. In short, 
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the scope of individual research was the major cause that leads to the wide range 
of the direct/insured and indirect/uninsured cost ratio in different studies.  
 
Even in a focused study such as that conducted by Hinze (1991), the ratio between 
direct and indirect costs does not hold constant for every individual project. Heinrich 
(1931), the pioneer in safety research also conceded that the 4:1 ratio between indirect 
and direct accident costs does not hold true for every individual plant. Many factors 
that are related to the characteristics of an individual project or a contractor have been 
identified to have impact on the ratio.  
 
2.4.3.1 Company size 
 
The impacts of company size on the size of total safety costs were demonstrated in the 
research by Rinefort (1976), who investigated and compared the quantitative effects 
of safety control activities on work injury costs in large-size, medium-size, and 
small-size companies. The results of this research indicated that the variation of the 
effects of safety control activities on work injury costs could partly be explained by 
differences in company size. The argument by Rikhardsson and Impgaard (2004) 
further illustrates the influences of company size on the accident costs: ‘In larger 
companies the Occupational Health and Safety department is a staff function manned 
with a number of specialists and secretaries and functions under numerous policies, 
rules and regulations. Thus, when an accident occurs in larger companies more formal 
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activities are initiated than in smaller companies. There are more people involved, 
there are more internal administrative processes that have to be complied with and 
more organisational levels have to be informed.’ (p. 179) 
 
2.4.3.2 Project size 
 
According to Hinze (1991), the cost ratios between direct and indirect costs tend to 
increase with the project size. ‘Larger projects generally employ greater numbers of 
workers resulting in work being performed in more crowded conditions. An injury 
would naturally be expected to have a broader indirect cost impact on a larger project. 
Larger projects are also associated with deeper hierarchy structures in which greater 
numbers of administrative and supervisory personnel become involved with injury 
reporting and accident investigations. It can be concluded that project size does have a 
significant role in influencing the cost ratios of injuries.’ (Hinze, 1991: p. 9-10) 
 
Rikhardsson and Impgaard (2004) found that production process vulnerability is 
considered as a very important determinant of occupational accident costs. They 
argued that if the employee is responsible for a key function in the production process 
or has key responsibilities and there is no immediate replacement available, then the 
accident costs are higher. Thus, it seems that the production process tends to be more 




2.4.3.3 Type of contract 
 
Hinze (1991) made a comparison of the cost ratios on different contract types such as 
lump sum contracts and cost reimbursable contracts and found that on medical case 
injuries, the cost ratios are significantly higher on cost reimbursable contracts. The 
essential differences between cost reimbursable contracts and lump sum contracts 
may explain some of the variations. It seems that injuries do not receive sufficient 
attention on lump sum projects. In fact, it may be argued that a poorly managed cost 
reimbursable contract provides an inherent incentive to increase costs.  
 
2.5 Economic approaches to safety management 
 
2.5.1 Loss control theory 
 
The control of losses due to the defects of safety management has been recognized as 
an important function of business management (Miller and Cox, 1997; Lingard and 
Rowlinson, 2005). Loss control has been defined as ‘a management system designed 
to reduce or eliminate all aspects of accidental loss that may lead to wastage of the 
organisation’s assets including manpower, materials, machinery, manufactured goods 
and money’ (Ridley and Channing, 1999, p. 9).  
 
Loss control management involves the application of sound management techniques 
to the identification and evaluation of the organisation’s risk exposure, and the 
economic control of losses within an organisation (Bird and Loftus, 1976; Ridley and 
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Channing, 1999). It is principally an economic approach to risk management (Lingard 
and Rowlinson, 2005). Ridley and Channing (1999) further pointed out that, with the 
increase of the emphasis on the economic argument, the loss control techniques or 
activities have become more closely allied to economic matters.  
 
The loss control theory stresses the importance of the selection of appropriate loss 
control activities based on effectiveness and economic feasibility and the 
implementation of the loss control programme within economic constraints (Bird and 
Loftus, 1976). It has prompted a growing interest in examining the economic 
feasibility of the expenditure on accident prevention as well as the effective allocation 
of resources within budget. The following two sections review the literature on the 
economic approaches and techniques to safety management.  
 
2.5.2 Economic evaluation of safety investments 
 
Various techniques and methods have been developed to justify the investments in 
accident prevention activities as well as the resource allocation within budget. 
Andreoni (1986) identified four categories of safety-related expenditure including the 
routine expenditure incurred before occupational injuries happen, the expenditure 
following the occurrence of an occupational injury, the expenditure associated with 
transferring the financial consequences of an occupational injury to an insurer, and the 
exceptional expenditure on prevention. Andreoni (1986) suggested that an 
organisation’s total safety expenditure, which is the sum of all of these costs in the 
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four categories, is an important part of organisational costs. More meaningful 
cost-benefit analysis can be undertaken to examine whether the expenditure on 
accident prevention is commensurate with the expenditure arising from occupational 
injuries (Andreoni, 1986).  
 
Table 2.3 lists the summary of prior research on economic evaluation of investments 
in safety control activities undertaken since 1990. These studies focused on resources 
allocation within fixed budget of safety activities and evaluation of the effectiveness 
or profitability of investments in accident prevention activities. The methods 
employed in those studies aimed at prioritizing the investments of safety interventions 
included cost-benefit analysis (Jervis and Collins, 2001), analytical hierarchy process 
method (Jervis and Collins, 2001), risk evaluation (Yoon and Moon, 2000), accident 
scenario generation (Kim et al., 2006), and multiobjective optimization (Kim et al., 
2006). In those studies aimed at justifying the investments in workplace safety, 
cost-benefit analysis was the most commonly used technique (Harms-Ringdahl, 1990; 
Lanoie and Tavenas, 1996, 1998). In order to facilitate the cost-benefit analysis of 
safety investments, an evaluation process (Riel and Imbeau, 1996), an accounting 
framework (Riel and Imbeau, 1996), and a Tool Kit for self evaluation were proposed 
(Amador-Rodezno, 2005). Although cost-benefit analysis has been recognized as a 
useful way to evaluate the investments in workplace safety, a salient limitation of 
applying this method, which lies in the difficulties in predicting the benefits of 
investments in safety, was also pointed out by many researchers (Rikhardsson and 
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Impgaard, 2004). Noticeably, most of the studies reviewed demonstrate the positive 
impacts of investments in certain safety interventions on the improvement of safety 
performance. 
 
Table 2.3: List and Summary of Previous Studies on Economic Evaluation of 
Investments in Safety Control Activities 






Safety work was divided into three categories, 
namely system investigation, implementation of 
measures, and the effect on the improved system. 
Costs and benefits of safety work were estimated to 
facilitate the cost-benefit evaluation. Results show 
that systematic safety work was economically 
beneficial in all case studies, and then the 










This paper described the analysis of quantifiable 
health and safety costs and the allocation procedure 
of insurance costs for a particular type of coverage 
mechanism in Canada. The evaluation process and 
the accounting framework proposed in this paper 
will help to perform cost-benefit evaluation of safety 












This paper present a rigorous econometric analysis 
to assess how many accidents have been prevented 
by the participatory ergonomics program so as to 
compute the direct and indirect costs avoided as a 
result of such accident reduction. The program was 









This paper provides a cost-benefit analysis of the 
passage from a mechanical to a manual handling 
system, which aimed at reducing workplace 
accidents, that took place in the early 1990s at a 
warehouse in Montreal. Results show that the 
demechanization of the handling system has indeed 













The paper proposes a new quantitative method of 
supporting business decision-making while 
investing safety related facility and service. This 
method suggests the priority of investments relevant 
to safety within limited budget, so most possible 
hazards can be removed or the company may not 
invest money for the acceptable hazards depending 










This paper quantitatively examines the relative 
benefits and resource costs associated with the 
major Voluntary Protection Programs (VPP) 
elements. To target limited resources for maximum 
impact, the analytical hierarchy process is used to 
rank the identified elements based on their 
benefit-to-cost ratio. Safety managers can then use 














This paper introduced a real options approach for 
decision making in the private sector. This approach 
provides an important alternative to the standard 
phrase that (marginal) benefits should equal 
(marginal) costs. When maintaining safety is the 
default activity, in the real options framework, the 
usual cost of a safety investments with irreversible 
consequences can be economically justified up to a 
multiple of the usual benefits (damages avoided) 
with the multiple to be determined by the particular 
problem. The result is an economic decision gage 
that determines if it is optimal to invest in safety 
even if the estimated costs significantly exceed the 












A Tool Kit (TK) was developed to enable managers 
and line workers in garment factories to 
self-diagnose plant and workstation hazards and to 
estimate the costs and benefits of investing in OSH 
as a way to improve productivity and 
competitiveness. This instrument integrates 
epidemiologic, risk assessment, clinic, engineering, 
and accountability issues. Through the application of 
the TK in industries, employers are now aware of 







Source Summary of Research Method 
Industrial 
Sector 
Kim et al. 
(2006) 
This paper developed a new systematic method of 
finding the most cost-risk-effective investments 
scenario set. The method uses the automatic 
accident scenario generation technique first to find a 
set of the most dangerous scenarios. Then it uses the 
multiobjective optimization method to decide the 














This study explored how senior financial executives 
or managers of medium-to-large companies perceive 
important workplace safety issues. The three 
top-rated safety priorities in resource allocation 
reported by the participants are overexertion, 
repetitive motion, and bodily reaction. A majority of 
participants believed that the indirect costs of 
accidents were higher than the direct costs. Money 
spent improving workplace safety was believed to 
have significant returns. The perceived top benefits 
of an effective workplace safety program were 
increased productivity, reduced cost, retention, and 






2.5.3 Safety costs/investments optimization 
 
Recognizing the potential of safety investments to reduce the risk of high injury cost, 
researchers become more concerned about the concept of “optimum safety 
investments”, as from an economic perspective there appears to be an optimal level of 
emphasis to be placed on safety (Hinze, 2000; HSE, 1993b). The concept of optimum 
safety investments states that a company would invest a certain amount of dollars in 
safety which will coincide with the minimal point of total safety costs (Diehl and 
Ayoub, 1980). Theoretical/hypothetical analyses (Brody et al., 1990; HSE, 1993b; 
Laufer, 1987a, b) and empirical investigations (Tang et al., 1997) have been 





Laufer (1987a, b) demonstrated the application of the concept of optimum safety 
investments through the hypothetical changes in the method of determining insurance 
premiums in Israel and in management’s perception of accident prevention costs. 
Figure 2.4 illustrates Laufer’s hypothetical analysis, which demonstrates the 
importance of changing management perceptions regarding prevention costs. In 
Laufer’s (1987a, b) hypothetical analysis, a hyperbole PC=a/FR was used to represent 
the function of the relationship between safety investments and safety performance, 
with PC = the accident prevention costs (investments) expressed as a percentage of 
the wage, and FR = accident frequency per 1000 workers.  
 
In Figure 2.4, situation (A) depicts the dependency of accident costs on accident 
frequency (insured and uninsured) when Social Security, which insures labor 
accidents, is alone in tying the premium to past safety level. Premiums for general 
liability and property damage handled by private firms remain unaffected by safety 
records. As far as prevention costs are concerned, management believes that, for 2.5% 
of labor costs, accident frequency will be reduced from the current Israeli average of 
140 to 100. 
 
In situation (B) private insurance companies relate premiums to safety records. 
Assuming research had improved the efficiency of prevention programs and was 
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followed by proper training of management, their perception of prevention costs 
should change. Management now believes that 2.5% of labor costs will reduce 
accident frequency substantially to 25. Applying the principle of optimum safety cost, 
Figure 2.4 illustrates how safety prevention costs changes from 2.5% to 1.4% and 




Figure 2.4: Hypothetical Projection of the Changes in Insurance Premium and 
Management’s Perception of Accident Costs (Source: Laufer, 1987b) 
 




the importance of indirect accident costs. They developed a graphical model showing 
the impact of indirect accidents cost (IC) on the overall OHS cost (OHSC), safety 
prevention cost (PC), and the degree of risk (see Figure 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7). Their 
analysis was also based on the hypothetical relationships among safety prevention 
cost, accident cost, and the degree of risk. Brody et al. (1990) postulated that 
employers are unable to perceive the totality of AC and that decision-making is 
therefore a function of “perceived reality” rather than “true reality” (Landy, 1985). 
Figure 2.5 depicts the perceived accident costs (without considering the indirect 
accident costs), prevention costs and optimum degree of risk, which coincides with 











Figure 2.5: Perceived Accident Costs, Prevention Costs and Optimum Degree of Risk 
























Figure 2.6: Increase in Fixed Insurance Costs, Prevention Costs and Optimum Degree 














Figure 2.7: Indirect Costs, Real OHS Costs and Increased Prevention Costs (Source: 

































PC has a negative slope since, as these are increased, the degree of risk declines. 
Perceived accident cost (ACp) is the sum of the fixed insurance costs (FIC) and 
variable insurance costs (VIC) and has a positive slope since the variable cost 
component is a direct function of the degree of risk. The OHSCp curve is the vertical 
sum of the PC and ACp curves. The point, M, on the OHSCp curve minimizes total 
health and safety costs with PC0 in prevention costs and AC0 as perceived AC at X 
degree of risk. Figure 2.6 describes the hypothetical impact of increase in fixed 
insurance costs on PC, ACp and OHSCp. Figure 2.7 demonstrates the effects of adding 
indirect costs (IC) to ACp. 
 
Laufer (1987a, b) and Brody et al. (1990)’s studies were carried out based on the 
hypothetical relationship among safety investments, accidents cost, and safety 
performance. The hypothetical analyses by Laufer (1987a, b) and Brody et al. (1990) 
shed light on the concept of “optimum safety costs”. As their studies were without the 
support of empirical evidence, there is a need for empirical examinations on optimum 
safety costs. This need was addressed by Tang et al. (1997) in their empirical research 
on safety cost optimization of building projects in Hong Kong. 
 
In Tang et al.’s (1997) study, a relationship was obtained between accident costs and 
safety performance (measured by accident occurrence index). Similarly, a relationship 
was found between the safety investments and the safety performance. Based on the 
two curves, a new curve was obtained to describe the relationship between the total 
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safety costs (the sum of safety investments and accident costs) and safety performance. 
As can be seen in Figure 2.8, the optimal level of safety investments of a building 
project could be determined. The optimal safety investments on a building project 
were found to be about 0.6% of the contract sum. The total cost to the contractor was 
found to be 0.82% of the same.  
 
 
Figure 2.8: Accident Costs, Safety Investments and Total Costs Curves (Source: Tang et 
al., 1997) 
 
Tang et al.’s (1997) empirical study adds valuable insight into the relationship among 
safety investments, accident costs, total safety costs, and safety performance. 
Functions and curves for the relationship between these factors were developed. 
Accident occurrence index LOW< >HIGH 
Y=0.0011e34.411x 
Y=0.0078e-13.478x 
0.0011e34.411x + 0.0078e-13.478x 














Although it quantified the minimal level of safety investments required for building 
projects in Hong Kong, some limitations of this study seem to be prominent. Much of 
the analysis in their research was based on speculation and assumption. For example, 
the exponential relationship between safety costs/investments and safety performance 
seems to be a “rule of thumb” relationship instead of any theoretically derived 
relationship. Thus, Tang et al.’s (1997) study lacked rigorous mathematical analysis 
on the relationships between safety investments, accident costs and safety 
performance.  
 
The optimal safety investments formula (presented as the percentage of contract sum) 
found by Tang et al. (1997) is a coarse measure because the formula is universal for 
any type of building project regardless of the characteristics of an individual project. 
The formula also cannot be tailored for an individual project, whereas studies have 
shown that the initial project hazard level and project/contractor safety culture level 
do have impacts on the safety performance. The functions describing the relationship 
among safety investments, overall safety costs, accident costs and safety performance 
obtained by Tang et al. (1997) failed to show the integration of the influences of 




A review of the accident causation theories reveals that the accidents could be 
somewhat prevented through management efforts. The safety performance of building 
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projects is associated with the level of management efforts in accidents prevention, 
the inherent project hazards and non-human related events. The management efforts 
could be in the form of physical input such as the investments in safety personnel, 
safety facilities and equipments, safety training, and other safety related activities, and 
cultural input such as the cultivation of safety culture in construction sites. The 
inherent project hazard is a natural part of the initial construction site conditions 
owing to the scope and location of the project. Non-human related events like natural 
disasters are beyond control and prediction.  
 
The review of the relationship between safety investments and safety performance 
shows that there is a popular assumption that higher level of safety investments tends 
to be associated with better safety performance. However, little empirical evidence 
was found to support this assumption. The relationship between safety investments 
and safety performance is still debatable among literature. It is still unclear whether 
their relationship is affected by other factors.  
 
The categorization of accident costs into direct and indirect costs or insured and 
uninsured costs implies that focus on the direct costs may fail to reveal the true losses 
to employers due to an accident. Many of the losses incurred by an accident are 
“hidden” and difficult to quantify. These “hidden” costs may be significant, and some 
may be particularly prominent in construction industry. Therefore, both direct and 
indirect costs of accidents need to be examined to reflect the true costs of accidents to 
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an employer.  
 
Studies have been done to examine the economic feasibility of the expenditure on 
accident prevention as well as the optimal level of safety investments. A review of 
these studies shows that the investments on certain safety interventions are profitable. 
Most of the studies which shed light on the principle of optimum safety costs were 
based on the hypothetical relationship among safety investments, accident costs, and 
safety performance without the support of empirical evidence. Tang et al.’s (1997) 
study appears to be the only empirical study on the optimization of safety investments 
of building projects. However, Tang et al.’s (1997) study failed to: (1) explain why 
safety performance was weakly related to safety performance; (2) develop rigorous 
mathematical models on the relationships among safety investments, accident costs 
and safety performance; and (3) integrate the impacts of project hazard level and 
safety culture level in the optimization of safety investments. More insights on these 

































This chapter presents the theoretical framework for this research. Synthesizing the 
research problems, identified knowledge gap and literature review, the research 
hypotheses are developed, and a conceptual framework is developed.  
 
 
3.2 Relationship between safety investments and safety performance 
 
3.2.1 Implications of accident causation theories 
 
Accident causation theories developed by many researchers (see Section 2.2) suggest 
that the level of OHS risk of building projects is associated with the inherent hazard 
level in the project and the level of human efforts in accidents prevention (Teo and 
Feng, 2011). Human endeavors could be in the form of physical input such as the 
investments in safety personnel, safety facilities and equipments, safety training, and 
other safety related activities, and cultural input such as the cultivation of safety 
culture in construction sites (see Sections 2.3 for a detailed discussion). Previous 
studies have examined the impacts of individual factors on safety performance, 
whereas no studies have been conducted to investigate the combined effects of the 
three factors namely safety investments, safety culture and project hazard. It is 
possible that safety performance of building projects is the result of the interactions of 
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safety investments, safety culture and project hazard. The effect of any factor on 
safety performance may vary with the changes of the other two factors.  
 
3.2.2 Risk compensation theory 
 
Although technological advances have made the world safer and healthier, researchers 
have noted that some safety interventions, which had clear objective safety benefits, 
had failed to achieve the forecast savings in lives and injuries (e.g., Adams, 1982; 
Evans, 1986; Sagberg et al., 1997). Adams (1982) examined the efficacy of seatbelt 
legislation through a comparative study of road accident fatality statistics from 18 
countries and found that there was no correlation between the passing of seat belt 
legislation and the total reductions in injuries or fatalities. Sagberg et al. (1997) 
investigated drivers’ responses to airbags and antilock brakes and found that drivers of 
cars with airbags and antilock brakes tend to compensate by closer following, more 
lane changes and a lower rate of seat-belt use, which accounted for the failure of 
airbags and antilock brakes to result in any measurable improvement in road safety. 
Shealy (2008) who studied skiing and snowboarding injuries for more than 30 years 
found that the usage of ski helmets did not reduce fatalities and helmeted skiers tend 
to go faster. These studies have suggested that individuals will react to environmental 
changes in a compensatory fashion so that riskier behaviours result from perceptions 
that the environment has become safer.  
 
Risk compensation theory states that individuals will behave less cautiously in 
situations where they feel "safer" or more protected (Peltzman, 1975). Peltzman (1975) 
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proposed such compensation mechanism to explain why some safety interventions 
have produced negligible results. According to Peltzman (1975), drivers 
simultaneously experience the competing demands of lower risks (i.e., lower 
probability of death from an accident) and what Peltzman calls ‘‘driving intensity’’ 
(i.e., arriving at the destination more quickly, thrills, etc.). When safety devices are 
added, or the use of them is mandated, the risks associated with higher driving 
intensities are essentially lowered, e.g., drivers face a lower probability of death with 
the use of seat belt. Peltzman (1975) found that, under safer environment, drivers tend 
to increase speed rather than enjoy the increased safety associated with driving at the 
same speed. Peltzman’s (1975) theory suggests that individuals tend to adjust their 
behaviours in response to perceived changes in risk (Stetzer and Hofmann, 1996).  
 
An associated theory is known as risk homeostasis, which was developed by Wilde 
(1982). Risk homeostasis theory had its genesis in highway and vehicle safety studies. 
Wilde (1982) defined the theory as the degree of risk-taking behaviour and the 
magnitude of loss, due to accident and lifestyle-dependent disease, being maintained 
over time unless there is a change in the target level or risk. Wilde (1982) further 
defined target risk as the level of risk a person chooses to accept to maximize the 
overall expected benefit from an activity. Wilde (1982) postulated that safety 
intervention feedback, together with anticipation, lead to adaptive behaviour that has a 
stabilizing effect on accident risk, even when the technology itself is safer.  
 
In the construction context, risk compensation theory (Peltzman, 1975) and risk 
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homeostasis theory (Wilde, 1982) have implications for the safety interventions. The 
effect of safety investments in physical protections and safety facilities, which aim to 
make the workplace safer, could be undermined by workers’ compensatory behaviours, 
especially when the project hazard level is low. This is because working in the 
environment with lower hazard level may reinforce workers’ perception that the 
environment is safer, which could lead to riskier behaviours of workers. The risk 
homeostasis theory (Wilde, 1982) suggests that the degree of risk-taking behaviour 
will be maintained over time unless there is a change in the target level or risk. The 
safety culture theory (see Section 2.3.2) implies that safety culture could impact upon 
workers’ perceptions of OSH risks and safety behaviours. Therefore, it is possible that 
the effect of safety investments on safety performance of building projects could be 
affected by safety culture and project hazard level. Thus, based on the accident 
causation theories (see Section 2.2), the risk compensation theory and the risk 
homeostasis theory, the first hypothesis and sub-hypotheses are set out. The factors 
and how they are related to each other are described in Figure 3.1. 
 
Hypothesis 1 – Safety performance of building projects is determined by the level of 
safety investments, safety culture level and project hazard level as 
well as the interactions among the three variables. 
 
Hypothesis 1.1 – Safety performance of building projects varies positively with the 
level of safety investments. 
Hypothesis 1.2 – Safety performance of building projects varies positively with the 
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level of safety culture. 
Hypothesis 1.3 – Safety performance of building projects varies inversely with the 
project hazard level. 
Hypothesis 1.4 – The effect of safety investments on safety performance varies with 
the project hazard level. 
Hypothesis 1.5 – The effect of safety investments on safety performance varies 
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3.3 Relationship between costs of accidents and frequency of accidents 
 
Based on the definition of accident (see Section 1.7.1), an accident is any unintended 
event which causes bodily injury to a person in the course of a person’s work. Various 
losses would be incurred by the injured worker(s) after the occurrence of an accident. 
The total costs of accidents to a building project are the sum of the losses incurred by 
all the accidents occurred in the project. The accident costs theories (see Section 2.4 
for a detailed discussion) suggest that the total costs of accidents to a building project 
are influenced by not only the frequency of accidents but also the severity of accidents 
of the project. From the definition and assessment of project hazard (see Section 
2.3.3), it is possible that higher level of project hazard (i.e. greater heights of building, 
more work in confined spaces, and so on) is associated with greater chance of severe 
accidents, which would incur more medical expenses, more compensation for the 
injured workers and longer period of absence of injured workers. Moreover, the 
components of indirect accident costs suggest that the indirect accident costs of 
building projects are likely to be influenced by project characteristics, e.g. project size, 
contractor size, project duration, and so on. For example, when an accident occurs in 
larger companies or larger projects, it is possible that more people would be involved 
and more internal administrative processes need to be complied with. Therefore, 
based on the accident costs theory, the concept of project hazard and the indirect 
accident costs theory, the second hypothesis and its sub-hypotheses are set out. The 






















Hypothesis 2 – The total accident costs of a building project vary with the accident 
frequency rate, project hazard level and project characteristics.  
 
Hypothesis 2.1 – The total accident costs of a building project vary positively with 
the accident frequency rate. 
Hypothesis 2.2 – The total accident costs of a building project vary positively with 
the project hazard level. 




Accident frequency rate 
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Hypothesis 2.4 – The effect of accident frequency rate on the total accident costs of a 
building project varies with the project hazard level.  
 
3.4 Financially optimum level of safety investments 
 
3.4.1 The law of diminishing marginal returns 
 
In economics, the “law of diminishing returns” states that as the amount of any one 
input is increased, holding all other inputs constant, the amount that output increases 
for each additional unit of the expanding input will generally decrease (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1997). The concept of diminishing returns can be traced back to the 
concerns of early economists such as Johann Heinrich von Thünen, Turgot, Thomas 
Malthus and David Ricardo. Malthus and Ricardo, who lived in 19th century England, 
were worried about that land, a factor of production in limited supply, would lead to 
diminishing returns. In the famous treatise, An Essay on the Principle of Population, 
Malthus (1798) analyzed population growth and noted the potential for populations to 
increase rapidly, and often faster than the food supply available to them. To give a 
mathematical perspective to his observations, Malthus (1798) proposed the idea that 
population, if unchecked, increases at a geometric rate (i.e. 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, etc.), 
whereas the food-supply grows at an arithmetic rate (i.e. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 etc.). In order to 
increase output from agriculture, farmers would have to farm less fertile land or farm 
with more intensive production methods. In both cases, the returns from agriculture 
would diminish over time, causing Malthus and Ricardo to predict population would 
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outstrip the capacity of land to produce, causing a Malthusian catastrophe (Johns and 
Fair, 1999, p790). The law of diminishing returns, first thought to apply only to 
agriculture, was later accepted as an economic law underlying all productive 
enterprise (Spillman and Lang, 1924). This principle implies that the marginal 
physical product of an input will fall with increasing investment of other inputs, as the 
system involved approaches perfection, market saturation or natural environment 
limits of one or another kind.  
 
Based on the law of diminishing returns, given a certain level of cultural inputs in 
activities to improve safety performance and a certain level of inherent hazard level of 
the project, each additional unit of physical inputs are supposed to yield less and less 
output (improvement of safety performance). Figure 3.3 proposed by Lingard and 
Rowlinson (2005) shows that the law of diminishing marginal returns applies to 
prevention or risk reduction expenditure (safety investments). When the physical 
input is small (and the culture level and hazard level are fixed), small increments in 
the physical input add substantially to output as the investments are allocated to 
specialized tasks. Eventually, however, the law of diminishing returns applies. When 
there are too many investments in activities to improve safety performance, part of the 
investments may become ineffective, and the marginal product of safety investments 
falls. In this situation, as suggested by Lingard and Rowlinson (2005), some 
judgement as to the acceptability of the risk is required and some investments may be 













Figure 3.3: Safety Investments and Risk Exposure (Source: Lingard and Rowlinson, 
2005, p190) 
 
3.4.2 The principle of optimum total safety costs 
 
A basic assumption of most economic analysis of firm behaviour is that a firm acts so 
as to maximize its profits by setting out where marginal costs equal marginal revenue 
(e.g., Menger, 1871; Marshall, 1890; Varian, 1992). Hirshleifer (1980) wrote, 
‘According to the classical formulation, the aim of the firm as a decision-making 
agent is to maximize (economic) profit’ (p. 265). Economists (e.g., Albrecht, 1983; 
Varian, 1992) have defined economic profit as the difference between the revenue a 
firm receives and the costs that it incurs. Given a certain output, one fundamental way 
to achieve profit maximization would be minimizing the costs of the actions taken to 
produce such an output. The total safety costs of a building project include safety 
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investments and accident costs. If the output of a building project remains constant, 
the marginal cost of production will be increased when the total safety costs rise. Thus, 
an underlying motive to drive safety investments of building projects is to reduce 
production or operating costs for the sake of profits (Grimaldi and Simonds, 1975).  
 
According to Hopkins (1995), in Australia, economic rationalism has informed many 
policies of deregulation of workplace rations and occupational health and safety. 
Economic rationalism, which was firstly used by Watson (1979), reflects the notion 
that if markets are left to operate freely with minimal government interference, 
optimal outcomes will be achieved. ‘Safety pays’ is regularly used by government as a 
way of motivating employers to attend to occupational health and safety (Hopkins, 
1999). The UK HSE (1993b) seems to embrace an economic rationalist perspective in 
suggesting that it is possible to identify a level of OHS risk that represents the 
optimum economic level of prevention and incident costs (Lingard and Rowlinson, 
2005). Hinze (2000) suggests that from an economic perspective, three appears to be 
an optimal level of emphasis to be placed on safety. The economically optimal level 
of safety investments is the point at which the cost benefits from improving OHS are 
just equal to the additional costs incurred (Lingard and Rowlinson, 2005), which is 
referred to as the principle of optimum safety costs (Diehl and Ayoub, 1980). The 
economically optimal level of safety investments imply that a company would invest 
a certain amount of dollars in safety which will coincide with the minimal point of 




The above analysis implies that economic theories may apply to workplace safety 
management. The law of diminishing marginal returns, the principle of profit 
maximization, and the economic rationalism suggest that it is possible to achieve 
financially optimum outcomes for occupational safety and health management. Thus, 
a proposition states that the financially optimum level of safety investments is 
determined by the minimization of total safety costs. 
 
3.5 Theoretical framework 
 
The main hypotheses and their sub-hypotheses developed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 are 
integrated into a theoretical framework for this study. As shown in Figure 3.4, this 
theoretical framework describes how the various factors are related to each other.  
 
Figure 3.4 shows that safety performance is related to safety investments, safety 
culture level and project hazard level as well as the interactions among the three 
variables (Hypothesis 1). From literature review (see Section 2.3.1), seven 
components of safety investments were identified. They are: (1) staffing cost; (2) 
training cost; (3) safety equipments and facilities cost; (4) safety inspections and 
meetings cost; (5) safety promotion cost; (6) safety incentive cost; and (7) safety 
innovation cost. More details can be found in Section 4.3.1.3 which presents the 









































Total safety costs Safety investments Accident costs 




Safety inspections and 
meetings 
Safety incentives 
Lump sum compensation 
Medical expenses 
Medical leave wages 
Insurance premium 
Lost productivity due to the 
injured worker 
Lost productivity due to crew 
of injured worker 
Lost productivity due to 
other workers in vicinity 
Losses due to replacement of 
the injured worker 
Lost productivity due to 
investigation or inspection 
Costs of supervisory or staff 
effort 
Uninsured property damage 
Fines and legal expenses 
First-aid materials 
Transportation costs 




Scaffolding & ladder, 
Falsework, Roofing, Crane, 
Machinery & tools, 
Prefabricated frames 
erection, Welding & cutting 
work, Contaminated site, 
Confined space 




Safety culture level 
Communication & Feedback 
Supervisory Environment 
Supportive Environment 
Personal Risk Appreciation 
Training & Competence level 
Safety Rules & Procedures 
Workers' Involvement 
Appraisal of work hazards Work pressure 
Financially optimum level of safety investments 
Safety promotion 
Innovation for safety 
Project size,  
Contractor size,  
Project duration, 
Project type, 
and so on 
Project 
characteristics 
Minimization of total safety costs 
Additional work incurred 
Losses due to SWO 
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Eleven hazardous trades of building projects were identified to assess the project 
hazard level (see Section 2.3.3). These hazardous trades include: (1) demolition; (2) 
excavation; (3) scaffolding & ladder; (4) falsework; (5) roofing; (6) crane; (7) 
machinery & tools; (8) prefabricated frames erection; (9) welding & cutting work; (10) 
contaminated site; and (11) work in confined space. More details can be found in 
Section 4.3.1.5 which presents the measurement of project hazard level. 
 
Ten dimensions were identified to assess the level of safety culture of building 
projects (see Section 2.3.2). They are: (1) management commitment; (2) 
communication and feedback; (3) supervisory environment; (4) supportive 
environment; (5) work pressure; (6) personal risk appreciation; (7) training and 
competence level; (8) safety rules and procedures; (9) workers’ involvement; and (10) 
appraisal of work hazards. More details can be found in Section 4.3.1.4 which 
presents the measurement of safety culture. 
 
Figure 3.4 also shows that accident costs of building projects are related to safety 
performance, project hazard level and project characteristics (Hypothesis 2). Project 
characteristics include project size, contractor size, project duration, project type, and 
so on. A review of studies on accident costs (see Section 2.4) shows that the total 
accident costs comprise the direct accident costs and indirect accident costs. The 
direct accident costs comprise insurance premium, medical leave wages (not covered 
by insurance policy), medical expenses (not covered by insurance policy), and lump 
sum compensation (not covered by insurance policy) (see Section 2.4.1). More details 
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can be found in Section 4.3.1.2 which presents the measurement of accident costs. 
The following cost items were identified to measure the indirect accident costs of 
building projects: 
 
 Lost productivity due to the injured worker; 
 Lost productivity due to crew of injured worker; 
 Lost productivity due to other workers in vicinity of accidents; 
 Losses due to replacement of the injured worker; 
 Lost productivity due to the investigation or inspections as a result of the injury; 
 Cost of supervisory or staff effort; 
 Losses due to damaged equipment or plant, property, material or finished work 
due to the accident; 
 Cost of transporting injured worker; 
 Consumption of first-aid materials in this accident; 
 Additional work required as a result of the accident (e.g. cleaning, additional 
barriers and so on); 
 Fines and legal expenses; 
 Losses due to Stop Work Orders (SWO) issued to the project (disruption of 
schedules); and 





Lastly, Figure 3.4 shows that the financially optimum level of safety investments is 
determined by minimization of total safety costs (refer to the proposition in Section 
3.4.2). The total safety costs are the sum of safety investments and accident costs of 
building projects. Please refer to Section 3.4.2 for detailed explanation of the 




In this chapter, two main hypotheses and their sub-hypotheses were postulated. Based 
on the accident causation theories, the risk compensation theory and the risk 
homeostasis theory, the first main hypothesis postulates that safety performance of 
building projects is determined by safety investments, safety culture and project 
hazard level as well as their interactions. Based on the accident costs theory, the 
concept and measurement of project hazard and the indirect accident costs theory, the 
second main hypothesis postulates that the total accident costs of a building project 
are impacted by the accident frequency rate, project hazard level and project 
characteristics. Based on the law of diminishing marginal returns, the principle of 
profit maximization, and the economic rationalism, a proposition states that the 
economically optimum level of safety investments is determined by minimization of 
total safety costs. A theoretical framework was developed to integrate all the 





























CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the research methodology of this study. Section 4.2 describes 
the research design, sampling method, and sample size. Section 4.3 focuses on the 
data collection method, measurement of research variables, development of data 
collection instrument, pilot study and process of data collection. Section 4.4 discusses 
the methods of data analysis and model validation. Section 4.5 reports the 
characteristics of the sample including the response rate, profile of projects, and 
profile of respondents.  
 
4.2 Research philosophy and research design 
 
 
In research design, the methodological approaches in finding solutions to the research 
problem are defined. Creswell’s (2003) research design framework provided a 
guideline to aid the design of an appropriate research approach for this study. 
Creswell (2003) proposed that three elements should be defined in the research design: 
philosophical assumptions about knowledge claims; general procedures of research; 
and the detailed procedures of data collection, analysis and writing. Thus, in defining 
an appropriate research strategy for this study, three questions were addressed: (1) 
what knowledge claims are made? (2) what approaches of inquiry are appropriate? 
and (3) what methods of data collection and analysis are required?  
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4.2.1 Methodological paradigms 
 
Research is underpinned by the researcher’s perceived assumptions of the world, and 
the means by which the world may be well understood (e.g., Remenyi et al., 1998; 
Trochim, 2000). Paradigms provide a conceptual framework through which to view 
the world (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006). There are traditionally two contrasting 
paradigms to research: induction and deduction. The deductive reasoning tends to 
proceed from the general statement to the specific statement, while inductive 
reasoning tends to go from the specific example to the general statement (Fellows and 
Liu, 2008). Trochim (2000) notes that the deductive approach involves the processes 
of identifying theories, generating hypotheses, and making observations to test the 
hypotheses for confirmation; whilst the inductive approach involves the activities of 
making specific observations, discovering patterns, and generating general 
conclusions or theories.  
 
The distinctive ontological (i.e. whether the object of investigation is the product of 
consciousness or whether it exists independently) and epistemological (i.e. what our 
grounds of knowledge are) perspectives that the two research paradigms represent 
provides a useful framework for discussing the philosophical assumptions that 
underpin various research designs (Remenyi et al. 1998; Bryman and Bell 2003). 
From the epistemological and ontological perspectives, deductive research represents 
the positivist and objectivist perspectives to enquiry, symptomatic of a deterministic 
philosophy (Remenyi et al. 1998). A prominent feature is that the researcher is 
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supposed to maintain objectivity throughout the investigation so that the research is 
devoid of bias from personal values. The induction paradigm represents the 
interpretivist and constructivist approaches to enquiry, with emphasis on generation of 
multiple meanings (Remenyi et al. 1998).  
 
Different methodological paradigms imply different research approaches and methods. 
Deduction is widely used in ‘natural sciences’ and emphasizes the use of ‘natural 
sciences’ methods, mainly quantitative methods; whilst induction is most likely to use 
qualitative methods (Dainty 2008; Fellows and Liu 2008). Quantitative approaches 
adopt ‘scientific method’ in which initial study of theory and literature yields precise 
aims and objectives with proposition(s) and hypotheses to be tested (Fellows and Liu 
2008). Qualitative approaches involve research in which an exploration of the subject 
is undertaken without prior formulations (Fellows and Liu 2008). The use of either 
quantitative or qualitative approaches, which are underpinned by the positivist and 
interpretivist worldviews, has generated a lot of debates across various disciplines, 
which indicate that none of the single approaches may be claimed to be absolutely 
perfect or adequate, as each has specific strengths and weaknesses, and advantages 
and disadvantages (e.g. Patton 1980; Trochim 2000; Mangan et al. 2004; Kumar 
2005). ‘The measurement and analysis of the variables about which information is 





4.2.2 Towards a research strategy for this study 
 
Knowledge claim addresses the philosophical assumptions relating to how to learn 
and what will be learnt during the inquiry. This requires being explicit about claims of 
what knowledge is (ontology), how we know it (epistemology), what values go into it 
(praxiology) and how to express it (rhetoric), enabling the processes for studying it 
(methodology) to be clearly defined (Creswell, 2003). This study aims to investigate 
the financially optimum level of safety investments for building projects by studying 
the relationships between safety investments, accident costs and safety performance 
(see Section 1.4). The phenomenon under study is amenable to the objectivist view of 
the social world since the relationships between safety investments, accident costs and 
safety performance are assumed to undeniably exist and be independent of the 
researcher. The information needed to shed light on the financial aspects of 
construction safety is mainly objective and quantitative. Thus the ontological position 
with regards to the phenomena of this study was objectivism/realism. A positivistic 
approach was adopted to achieve the research aims. The philosophical stance assumes 
that the research is independent of and neither affects nor is affected by the subject of 
the research. Using the positivistic approach, ‘the researcher is unbiased (i.e., neutral 
and devoid of personal opinion and unsupported views) when applying accepted 
research techniques and focus on the means or mechanisms of how the social world 
works, not on ends, values, or normative goals’ (Neuman, 2003).  
 
From the perspective of objectives of a research study, research can be classified as 
exploratory, descriptive, correlational, or explanatory (Kumar 2005). Exploratory 
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research aims to investigate phenomena and identify variables and generate 
hypotheses for further research (Fellows and Liu 2008). It is usually carried out with 
the objective either to explore an area where little is known or to investigate the 
possibilities of undertaking a particular research study (Kumar 2005). Descriptive 
research seeks to systematically describe all the elements of a phenomenon, process or 
system, or describe attitudes towards an issue (Kumar 2005; Fellows and Liu 2008). It 
is often used as the next step to exploratory research to construct paradigms that offer 
a more complete theoretical picture through either qualitative or quantitative data 
(Saunders et al. 2003; Sekaran 2003). The main emphasis in a correlational research 
study is to discover or establish the existence of a relationship/ association/ 
interdependence between two or more aspects of a situation. Explanatory research 
attempts to clarify why and how there is a relationship between two aspects of a 
situation or phenomenon (Kumar 2005; Fellows and Liu 2008).  
 
The objectives of this study indicate that this study contains elements of correlational 
(e.g. it sought to explore the relationships between safety investments, accident costs 
and safety performance) and explanatory (e.g. it sought to explain how safety 
investments impact on the safety performance of building projects) research. The 
objectives and hypotheses imply that: (1) this study aims to quantify the variation in a 
phenomenon (i.e., the financial aspects of workplace health and safety); (2) the 
information is gathered using predominantly quantitative variables (e.g., safety 
investments, accident costs, safety performance, etc.); and (3) the analysis is geared to 
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ascertain the magnitude of the variation. The aim of this research and the 
epistemological and ontological implications for the research strategy therefore 
favoured the use of quantitative approach to achieve the research aims. The 
appropriateness of the use of a positivist paradigm and its concomitant use of 
quantitative approaches in this study was further reinforced by the apparent 
dominance of the positivist paradigm and quantitative research approaches in 
construction management research, albeit the view that the feasibility of totally 
objective and accurate observation are being increasingly challenged (Smyth and 
Morris 2007; Dainty 2008; Fellows and Liu 2008). For example, Dainty’s (2008) 
examination of the papers published by Construction Management and Economics 
(volume 24) throughout 2006 revealed that 71% (76) used quantitative methods, while 
only 8.4% (9) employed qualitative methods with a further 11.2% (12) using mixed 
methods.  
 
4.2.3 Research approaches 
 
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, quantitative research approaches are considered as 
appropriate for this study. Three main study designs are commonly employed in 
conducting quantitative research: experimental; quasi or semi-experimental; and 
non-experimental (Kumar 2005).  
 
In true/classical experiments, the researchers have direct control over the research 
environment through randomization and manipulation (Kerlinger, 1973). They may 
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manipulate and control selected independent variables to determine their individual 
effects or combined effects on the dependent variable. Through the high degree of 
control of extraneous variables in true experiments, cause-effect relationship can be 
established. ‘However, the high level of control needed to assure internal validity 
often results in very restrictive conditions which make true experiments appear 
artificial and, thus, lack external validity’ (Tuuli 2009, pp.122). Babbie (1992) noted 
that experimental designs are suitable for research involving relatively limited and 
well defined concepts and propositions. In Quasi-experimental research, the 
researcher has little or no control over the allocation of the treatments or other factors 
being investigated. The key difference between experimental design and 
Quasi-experimental design is the lack of random assignment (Dooley, 2001). Without 
random assignment, participants do not have the same chance of being assigned to a 
given treatment condition, thus the researcher has less control over the independent 
variables than in experimental design. However, quasi-experiments may achieve 
higher external validity than true experiments by using subjects in their natural 
settings.  
 
Both experimental design and Quasi-experimental design were considered 
inappropriate for this study for the following reasons: 
 
 Since construction projects generally cost millions of dollars, and they are often 




 Parties’ interactions in a construction process are complex and difficult to model 
in the laboratory.  
 Because of complexities involved in the interactions of psychological factors, 
environmental factors, and behavioural factors in safety issues, a study of this 
nature would require real life investigation rather than laboratory experiments.  
 
Non-experimental research does not allow the researcher to manipulate and control 
over the selected independent variable(s) to determine its/their effect(s) on the 
dependent variable(s). According to Kerlinger (1973), non-experimental design is the 
only way to study many real world organisational phenomena. There are five common 
types of non-experimental research designs, namely case studies, surveys, correlation 
or regression, comparisons, and historical designs. Generally, case studies are more 
appropriate for in-depth understanding of particular instances; surveys are used to 
obtain broad population characteristics and reasons for certain actions or preferences; 
correlation or regression analysis is used when experimental control is difficult or 
impossible; comparative research seeks to explain similarities and differences 
between two or more groups; and historical research seeks to explain the past to 
understand or draw lessons for the present and future (Tan, 2004).  
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the desirable level of safety investments in 
building projects by studying the relationships between safety investments, safety 
performance and accidents costs of building projects. Based on the hypotheses 
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presented in Chapter 3, this study seeks to establish the underlying associations 
between variables, e.g., the relationships between safety performance, project hazard 
level, safety investments and safety culture, the relationships between safety 
performance and accident costs, the relationships between safety performance and 
total safety costs, and so on.  
 
According to Tan (2004), a more flexible way of examining the relationships between 
variables is to use correlation or regression analysis. ‘Correlation analysis 
investigates associations among variables, and a regression model specifies the 
relation between independent and dependent variables’ (Tan, 2004, p129). Tharenou 
et al. (2007, p.47) summarized the circumstances that are most suitable for the use of 
correlation or regression research design. These circumstances include: 
 
 to test a theory that includes not just the independent variables and dependent 
variables, but also perhaps mediator variables or moderator variables;  
 to test the hypotheses/research questions on a large sample of people; 
 to examine real-life settings and use people facing those situations every day; 
 to examine the extent to which the dependent variable and each independent 
variable are related; 
 to generalize the findings – therefore, a large sample is chosen to be 
representative of a particular and predefined population; 
 to test questions when there is a solid literature base (i.e., theory, empirical 
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studies) from which to choose the variables to measure in the survey; and  
 to assess the effects of several variables (e.g., independent variables) while taking 
into account other variables (e.g., controls such as individuals’ demographics, or 
organisational characteristics). 
 
Based on the aim of this study and the circumstances for the use of 
regression/correlation design summarized by Tharenou et al. (2007), a 
regression/correlation design is considered to be appropriate for this study. This is 
because, in a regression/correlation research design, many different types of 
relationships can be assessed (Tharenou et al., 2007), e.g., relationship between 
dependent and independent variables, interrelationship between independent variables, 
inclusion of mediator variables which intervene between the independent and 
dependent variables (see Section 4.4.4), inclusion of moderator variables which 
moderates the strength and/or direction of relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables (see Section 4.4.3), and so on.  
 
In formulating the research design, it is critically important to accurately identify the 
unit of analysis, such as the individual or the group (Fellows and Liu, 2008). Fellows 
and Liu (2008) further noted that ‘Failure to do so may result in two errors of logic: 
the ecological fallacy and reductionism.’ The unit of analysis in this study is defined 
as a constructor’s project. Safety investments and accident costs are confined to those 
incurred by building contractors (including main contractors and subcontractors) 
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within the project. Consultant and client projects were not targeted in the research 
design. For the contractor’s project in this context, typical members include: project 
manager/director, site manager, site engineer, site quantity surveyor, planning 
engineer, safety manager, safety officer, safety supervisor, foreman, etc. The unit of 
analysis has implications for the determination of sampling method, which will be 
discussed in Section 4.3.3. 
 
4.3 Data collection 
 
4.3.1 Development of data collection instrument 
 
Based on the theoretical framework presented in Section 3.5, there are six major 
variables in this study. They are safety performance, safety investments, accident costs, 
safety culture, project hazard level, and project characteristics. Among these variables, 
some can be directly observed or well documented; while some are unobservable 
variables (latent variables) which must be inferred from measurable or observable 
indicators (manifest variables). Each research variable needs to be well defined and 
operationalized before the data collection instrument is developed.  
 
4.3.1.1 Safety performance 
 
There are various measures of safety performance for construction projects. They are 
generally classified as reactive measures (after the event) and proactive measures 
(Cooper and Phillips, 2004). Typical examples of reactive measures are to calculate 
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the incident rate and accident rate of recordable injuries, loss-time injuries, first aid 
injuries, etc. (Hinze and Godfrey, 2003). The incidence/accident rate of injuries is the 
measure most frequently employed as an industry standard. Some researchers argue 
that the reduction in accident and incident rates provides the best results measure of 
the safety performance(Clarke, 1998), and accident or injury data of various forms 
have been used in a number of studies (Tang et al., 1997; Mearns et al., 2003; 
Niskanen, 1994; O'Toole, 2002; Silva et al., 2004; Vredenburgh, 2002; Zohar, 2000). 
The attraction of using the reactive indicators is that they provide a tool enabling the 
safety performance of one organisation to be compared with another organisation or 
across the industry. The information about recorded injuries can also be used by 
management to gain insights about accident causation provided an accident 
investigation is conducted (Hinze and Godfrey, 2003). Despite this, the reactive 
measures are criticized for their focus on the past records and negative aspects of 
safety performance (i.e. system failure) (Hinze and Godfrey, 2003; Cooper and 
Phillips, 2004; Holt, 2005). As noted by Holt (2005), ‘because the numbers of 
recorded incidents and injuries are relatively low in most organisations, they tend to 
produce a limited amount of information about risk and there is a temptation to 
believe that all is well’ (p. 14).  
 
Many researchers advocates the use of proactive measures (e.g. jobsite safety 
inspections, behaviour-based worker observations and worker safety perception 
surveys), which focus on current safety activities to ascertain system success rather 
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than system failure (Hinze and Godfrey, 2003; Cooper and Phillips, 2004; Holt, 2005). 
For instance jobsite safety inspections can be made on jobsites to assess physical 
working conditions and also to evaluate worker safety behaviour. They can be very 
helpful in giving information that can provide direction for improving jobsite 
conditions and worker behaviour. The weakness of jobsite safety inspections lies in 
the consistency with which the data are actually collected. The results of inspections 
cannot be compared between different inspectors unless all the inspectors are trained 
to consistently assess the nature of physical conditions and worker behaviour (Hinze 
and Godfrey 2003). Worker safety perception surveys can be used to provide 
information that tends to be an overall indication of the success (or failure) of 
management to instil a safety consciousness on the jobsite. Weaknesses of using 
worker safety perception surveys may include that they tend to be difficult to 
administer, that they may not be conducted as often as might be warranted, and that 
the data can also be difficult to analyze (Hinze and Godfrey, 2003). The 
behaviour-based worker observation which is derived from behavioural safety is 
thought to be one of the most useful proactive indicators of current safety 
performance (Reber et al., 1989; Cooper and Phillips, 2004). They can be 
implemented in many ways, among which the most common way is for a worker to 
function as an observer of another worker. The advantage of the observed percent safe 
is that it offers a method of measuring the potential for harm, independent of the 
accident record. Disadvantages may include the need to change safety climate for both 
management and workforce to adopt this method, and employee suspicion of hidden 
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motives for the observations (Holt, 2005).  
 
In general, there is no single measure of safety performance can be said to be superior 
to others. The choice of safety performance measures or indicators relies upon the 
purpose of measuring and resources availability. The reactive measures are most 
suitable to be used for the evaluation of past safety efforts or for the purpose of 
comparison; while the proactive measures can be used to indicate whether the current 
systems or efforts are working properly (Hinze and Godfrey, 2003; Holt, 2005). The 
proactive safety performance measures are not suitable to be used in this study 
because this study collected data from completed building projects. The accident rates 
were adopted by this study to measure safety performance of building projects. This is 
because: (1) the purpose and design of this research indicate that the accident rates 
enable the comparison of safety performance among different building projects; (2) 
because the report of incidence is required by law in Singapore, the records of injuries 
are available for all building projects operated in Singapore; and (3) In Singapore, 
there are standard formulas for calculating frequency and severity rates of accidents, 
which are used by government (e.g. MOM) to produce statistical information or 
reports relating to WSH issues across all industries. In Singapore, both “Accident 
Frequency Rate” (AFR) and “Accident Severity Rate” (ASR) are used by Ministry of 
Manpower (MOM) to measure workplace safety performance. The formulas for 




AFR =    Total No. of Accidents       X 1,000,000 
Total No. of Man-hours Worked 
 
ASR = Total No. of Man-days Lost to Accidents X 1,000,000 
Total No. of Man-hours Worked 
 





Man-days Lost to the i th Workplace accident), where n is the total number of 
accidents in a project.  
 
4.3.1.2 Accident costs 
 
Based on the literature review (see Section 2.4), accident costs are the sum of the 
direct costs and indirect costs. The direct costs of accidents tend to be those associated 
with the treatment of the injury and any unique compensation offered to workers as a 
consequence of being injured (Hinze, 1997). In Singapore, the direct accident costs 
are typically the costs covered by Work Injury Compensation Act (MOM, 2008b). 
Thus, the direct costs of accidents are the sum of the following four components: 
 
 Insured costs (DC1). The accident costs covered by the insurance policy were 
measured by the insurance premium paid by contractors; 
 Medical leave wages (DC2) (not covered by insurance policy): as measured 




 Medical expenses (DC3) (not covered by insurance policy): as measured by 
the medical expenses that were not covered by insurance policy; and 
 Lump sum compensation for Permanent Incapacity (PI) or death (DC4) 
(not covered by insurance policy): as measured by the compensation for PI or 
death that was not covered by insurance policy. 
 
Although different definitions exist for the indirect costs of accidents, in general they 
are regarded as consisting of all the costs that are not covered by worker’s 
compensation insurance (Hinze, 1991). In this study, the indirect accident costs are 
those costs that are not covered by Work Injury Compensation Act of Singapore. 
Based on the literature review, 13 costs items were identified to be indirectly related 
to the occurrence of the accidents.  
 
 Lost productivity due to the injured worker (IC1): as measured by lost 
labor time on the day of injury, lost labor time due to follow-up treatment, and 
lost labor time due to reduced efficiency after resuming work; 
 Lost productivity due to the crew of injured worker (IC2): as measured by 
lost labor time due to assisting injured worker and reduced crew productivity 
due to working shorthanded; 
 Lost productivity due to other workers in vicinity of accident (IC3): as 
measured by lost labor time due to watching events and discussing accidents; 
 Losses due to replacement of the injured worker (IC4): as measured by 
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reduced efficiency of replacement worker and the costs incurred by the 
recruitment, selection, and training of new workers to temporarily or 
permanently replace work accident victims; 
 Lost productivity due to investigations or inspections as a result of the 
accident (IC5): as measured by the lost labor time due to interruption of 
production caused by accident investigation and safety inspection; 
 Cost of supervisory or staff effort (IC6): as measured by lost staff time due 
to assisting injured worker, investigating accident, preparing reports, and 
accompanying the media, project owner, and/or regulatory inspector; 
 Damaged equipment or plant, property, material or finished work due to 
the accident (IC7): as measured by the costs of replacing or repairing 
damaged materials and/or equipments, the costs of reconstruction of the 
damaged work, the productive time lost (interruption of production), and 
others; 
 Costs of transportation (IC8): as measured by the costs of transporting 
injured worker; 
 Consumption of first-aid materials (IC9): as measured by the value of 
first-aid materials consumed in the accident; 
 Additional work required as a result of the accident (IC10): as measured 
by the labor time used to clean the site, set up the additional barriers and so 
on;  
 Fines and legal expenses (IC11): as measured by the fines and legal costs 
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imposed by OSHA or court systems due to the accident; 
 Losses due to Stop Work Orders (SWO) (IC12): as measured by the wages 
paid to workers during the period of Stop Work and the liquidated damages 
due to the Stop Work; and  
 Additional benefits to the injured worker beyond the Work 
Compensation Act (IC13): as measured by extra financial assistance or other 
welfare provided by contractors.  
 
The total accident costs (TAC) are the sum of direct accident costs (DAC) and indirect 
accident costs (IAC). Three dimensionless quantities, the total accident costs ratio 
(TACR), the direct accident costs ratio (DACR) and the indirect accident costs ratio 
(IACR) were used to measure the level of TAC, DAC and IAC respectively and 
enable the comparison among projects of different sizes. TACR, DACR, and IACR 
were therefore defined as follows: 
 
TACR = Total Accident Costs (TAC) X 100% 
            Contract Sum 
 
DACR = Direct Accident Costs (DAC) X 100% 
            Contract Sum 
 
IACR = lndirect Accident Costs (IAC) X 100% 
            Contract Sum 
 








iIC  where DCi is the i
th 
direct cost item and ICi is the ith indirect cost item.  
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4.3.1.3 Safety investments 
 
Based on the literature review, safety investments comprise expenses for all kinds of 
accident prevention activities which were undertaken by the contractor’s project 
organisation (including subcontractors). Those safety investments made by the 
contractor at the company level were allocated to individual projects; and these 
investments were also considered as part of the project’s overall safety investments. 
The safety investments made by the other parties of the project (e.g., consultant and 
client) except for the contractors and subcontractors are not within the scope of this 
study. 
 
The tangible part of safety investments consists of dollars spent on the accident 
prevention activities. There is, however, another part of safety investments, namely 
intangible safety investments, taking the form of time invested in the accident 
prevention activities, e.g. the time invested in safety training and orientation, the time 
invested in emergency response drills, the time invested in safety meetings and 
inspections, and other activities (Teo and Feng, 2011). This part of safety investments 
is always unobservable, and therefore tend to be neglected by practitioners (Teo and 
Feng, 2011). With consideration of both tangible and intangible parts, safety 




 Staffing costs (C1). The safety staffing costs are measured by the salaries paid to 
safety personnel, such as safety managers, safety officers, safety coordinators, 
safety supervisors, lifting supervisors, administration support to safety personnel, 
and others. The safety staffing costs incurred at both project level and company 
level was collected. For those safety staffing costs incurred by head office (e.g., 
safety director, safety coordinator, administrative support to safety personnel, 
etc.), the respondents were requested to estimate the salaries of safety personnel 
on pro rata according to the number of projects supervised in the same period. As 
some of the safety personnel (e.g., director, administrative support, etc.) may be 
involved in other tasks besides safety related work (e.g. environmental work), the 
interviewees were required to estimate the percentage of time spent on safety 
work of the project for each safety personnel.  
 
 Safety equipments and facilities costs (C2). Safety equipments and facilities 
include Personal Protective Equipments (PPEs), safety fences, safety barricades, 
and any other facilities that have to do with the provision of safety on building 
sites. The costs of safety equipments and facilities include the purchase of 
equipments, materials, machines, and tools, and the costs of manpower for the 
installation and maintenance of these facilities.  
 
 Compulsory training costs (C3). Safety training costs comprise costs of 
compulsory safety training courses and costs of in-house safety training and 
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orientation sessions. Compulsory safety training courses include safety training 
courses for project managers, safety training courses for foremen and supervisors, 
safety training courses for workers, and safety training courses for 
operators/signalmen. The costs of compulsory safety training costs are measured 
by the dollars paid for the external training institutes (e.g. BCA Academy and 
NTUC Learning Hub).  
 
 In-house safety training costs (C4). In-house safety training activities consist of 
safety orientation before work commences each day, emergency response and 
drills for various possible situations, briefing on first-aid facilities, first aiders, 
and first-aid procedures, briefing on major hazards on site, safety workshops for 
supervisors and above, safety seminars and exhibitions, and demonstrations of 
safe work procedures and first-aid drills, and other in-house training activities. 
The costs of the in-house safety training activities are measured by the lost 
productivity due to the participation in these activities. Thus the interviewees 
were required to provide the information about the total number of participants, 
average hourly wages of the participants, and duration and frequency of each 
in-house training activity to facilitate the estimation of the costs of in-house 
safety training activities. 
 
 Safety inspections and meetings costs (C5). Generally, safety inspections and 
safety meetings do not involve direct monetary expenditures, nevertheless, the 
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inspections and meetings always consume the productive time of the participants 
and may cause the interruption of some ongoing construction work. Therefore, 
the level of investments in safety inspections and safety meetings could be 
measured by the lost productivity due to the participation in the inspections and 
meetings and the interruption of ongoing construction work.  
 
 Safety incentives and promotions costs (C6). Safety incentives and promotions 
costs include the expenditures on the printing of pamphlets and posters, the 
production of safety advertising boards and banners, the organizing of safety 
campaigns, financial support for safety committees activities, the monetary 
rewarding of workers, management staff or subcontractors who achieve a good 
safety standard of work, and so on.  
 
 Safety Innovation costs (C7). Innovation for safety refers to the use of new 
technologies, methods, procedures, or tools in order to improve safety 
performance of the project. The costs of safety innovation are measured by 
estimating the direct investments in obtaining the innovations (e.g. purchase of 
new tools or technologies, costs of R&D, and training costs) and possible 
increased production costs or lost productivities incurred by the use of these 
innovations.  
 
Close examination of these components could reveal that some components are 
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determined by external industry or government regulations and some are determined 
by internal company or project OSH policy. Thus, safety investments could further be 
classified into two types, namely basic safety investments and voluntary safety 









Figure 4.1: Components of Safety Investment 
 
 Basic safety investments (BSI) are required by industry or government regulations 
and construction process on minimal safety standards. As a compulsory part of 
safety investments for any individual building projects in Singapore, BSI consists 
of those costs incurred by safety personnel, safety equipments and facilities, and 
compulsory safety training courses.  
 
 Voluntary safety investments (VSI) are generally determined by individual 
companies or projects. This type of safety investments is incurred by the 
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Compulsory safety training (C3) 
In-house training (C4) 
Inspections and meetings (C5) 
Incentives and promotions (C6) 
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orientation, safety inspections and meetings, safety incentives and promotions, 
and innovative technologies, methods and tools designed for safety (4 “I” 
activities). 
 
A dimensionless quantity, the Total Safety Investments Ratio (TSIR) was used to 
enable the comparison of the level of safety investments among projects of different 
sizes. TSIR is therefore defined as follows: 
 
TSIR = Total Safety Investments X 100% 
         Contract Sum 
 




iC , where Ci is the i
th safety investment 
component.  
 
Similarly, two dimensionless quantities, Basic Safety Investments Ratio (BSIR) and 
Voluntary Safety Investments Ratio (VSIR) were used to enable the comparison of the 
level of BSI and VSI among projects of different sizes respectively. BSIR and VSIR 
are therefore defined as follows: 
 
BSIR = Basic Safety Investments X 100% 
            Contract Sum 
 
VSIR = Voluntary Safety Investments X 100% 








iC , where Ci is the i
th safety investment 








4.3.1.4 Safety culture 
 
As discussed in Section 2.3.2, in order to determine the level of safety culture of an 
organisation, there is a variety of quantitative and qualitative data collection tools 
available that can be used to assess the safety culture, among which the safety climate 
survey is constantly utilized as a reliable indicator of the overall safety culture (e.g., 
O’Toole, 2002; Cox and Cheyne, 2000; Lee and Harrison, 2000; Teo and Feng 2009). 
Given the numerous definitions of safety culture and safety climate that have been 
proposed in the literature, it is not surprising that there is little consensus as to the 
factor structure of the safety climate questionnaire (Flin et al., 2000; Mohamed, 2002; 
Toole, 2002; Mearns et al., 2003). Table 4.1 lists the factor structure that has been 
found in previous safety culture/climate studies. The numerous inconsistencies and 
often idiosyncratic labelling of these factors creates difficulty in reconciling the 
variety of organizational indicators identified in previous studies, nonetheless, a closer 
examination of these various reports suggests that there are ten important factors of 
the safety climate questionnaire in construction environment. They include: 
management commitment, communication and feedback, supervisory environment, 
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supportive environment, work pressure, personal appreciation of risk, training and 
competence level, safety rules and procedures, workers’ involvement, and appraisal of 
work hazards.  
 
The comprehensiveness of the above constituents was determined by the extensive 
review of the factor structure that has been found in previous safety culture/climate 
studies (see Table 4.1). The parsimony and adequacy of the theory were checked to 
further justify the choice of these ten factors. Parsimony requires a theory to be stated 
in the most economical way possible without oversimplifying the phenomena of 
interest (Fawcett, 2005). The question to be asked when evaluating the parsimony of 
the constituents is that ‘are the constituents stated clearly and concisely’ (Fawcett, 
2005). Based on the literature review, these constituents clarify rather than obscure the 
concept of safety climate. In the following paragraph, the contents of the ten 
constituents are clearly stated. Adequacy requires the assertions made by the theory to 
be congruent with empirical evidence (Fawcett, 2005). The extent to which the 
constituents of safety climate questionnaire meet the criterion of adequacy was 
determined by means of examining the empirical data to determine the extent of their 
congruence with the theory. Mohamed (2002) used structural equation modeling to 
demonstrate that the ten constituents of safety climate are congruent with empirical 
evidence. Other related studies (e.g., Zohar, 1980; Fang et al., 2006) also provided 
empirical evidence that the ten factors are important in achieving a positive safety 
climate in construction site environments. 
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Table 4.1: Review of Safety Culture and Climate Indicators 
Author(s) Indicators  
Zohar (1980) � Importance of safety training programs;  
� Management attitudes towards safety;  
� Effects of safe conduct on promotion;  
� Level of risk at work place;  
� Effects of required work pace on safety;  
� Status of safety officer;  
� Effects of safe conduct on social status;  
� Status of safety committee. 
Cox and Cox (1991) � Personal scepticism;  
� Safeness of work environment;  
� Individual responsibility;  
� Effectiveness of arrangement for safety;  
� Personal immunity. 
Dedobbeleer and 
Beland (1991) 
� Management commitment;  
� Risk/involvement. 
Ostrom et al. (1993) � Safety awareness;  
� Teamwork;  
� Pride and commitment;  
� Excellence;  
� Honesty;  
� Communications;  
� Leadership and supervision;  
� Innovation;  
� Training;  
� Customer relations;  
� Procedure compliance;  
� Safety effectiveness;  
� Facilities. 
Niskanen (1994) � Work pressure;  
� Supervision;  
� Work value;  
� Responsibility. 
Coyle and Sleeman 
(1995) 
� Maintenance and management issues;  
� Company policy;  
� Accountability;  
� Training and management issues;  
� Work environment;  
� Policy and procedures;  
� Personal authority;  
� Training and enforcement of policy. 
Lee (1996) � Safety procedures: confidence in the safety procedures, safety 
rules, personal understanding of safety rules, perceived clarity 
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of safety rules, permit to work system, confidence in the 
effectiveness of PTW, general support for PTW, and perceived 
need for PTW;  
� Risks; Personal caution over risks, perceived level of risks at 
work, perceived control of risks in the plant, personal interest in 
job, job satisfaction, contentment with job, satisfaction with 
work relationships, and satisfaction with rewards for good 
work;  
� Participation/ownership: Self-participation in safety procedures, 
perceived source of safety suggestions, perceived source of 
safety actions, and perceived personal control over safety;  
� Design: satisfaction with design of plant, training, satisfaction 
with training selection, and satisfaction with staff suitability. 
HSE (1999) � Organizational commitment and communication; 
� Line management commitment; 
� Supervisor’s role; 
� Personal role; 
� Workmates’ influence; 
� Competence; 
� Risk taking behavior and contributory influences; 
� Obstacles to safe behavior;  
� Permit to work; and  
� Reporting of accidents and near misses 
Glendon and 
Litherland (2001) 
� Communication and support;  
� Adequacy of procedures;  
� Work pressure;  
� Personal protective equipment;  
� Relationships;  
� Health and safety rules. 
Mohamed (2002) � Commitment; Communication;  
� Health and safety rules and procedures;  
� Supportive environment;  
� Supervisory environment;  
� Workers’ involvement;  
� Personal appreciation of risk;  
� Appraisal of work hazards;  
� Work pressure;  
� Competence. 
Itoh, Andersen and 
Seki (2003) 
� Motivation;  
� Satisfaction with own competence;  
� Safety awareness of operation;  
� Morale;  
� Satisfaction with manual and checklists;  
� Satisfaction with management system;  
129 
 
� Trust in management. 
Wiegmann et al. 
(2004) 
� Organizational commitment; 
� Management involvement; 
� Employee empowerment; 
� Reward systems; 
� Reporting systems. 
Fang et al. (2006) � Health and safety attitude and management commitment;  
� Health and safety consultation and training;  
� Supervisor’s and workmate’s roles;  
� Risk taking behaviour;  
� Health and safety resources;  
� Appraisal of health and safety procedure and work risk;  
� Improper health and safety procedure;  
� Worker’s involvement;  
� Workmate’s influence;  
� Competence. 
Teo and Fang (2006) � Communication & Feedback;  
� Supervisory Environment & Supportive Environment;  
� Health and Safety Rules & Procedures;  
� Training Program & Competence Level;  
� Health and Safety Investments;  
� Workers' Involvement & Work Pressure;  
� Personal Risk Appreciation & Appraisal of Work Hazards;  
� IT Intelligence. 
 
 Management commitment (SC1). Management commitment stresses the role of 
management (including upper management and project management) in 
promoting safety. The greater the level of management commitment toward safety, 
the more positive the safety culture will be (e.g. Zohar, 1980; Mohamed,2002; 
Fang et al., 2006). Management commitment was measured with four scale items, 
which were derived from a variety of previous studies (e.g. Zohar, 1980; 
Mohamed, 2002; Teo et al., 2004). A sample item is ‘Top management considers 




 Communication and feedback (SC2). Both management communication and 
employee feedback are critical for suggesting safety improvements and reporting 
near misses as well as unsafe conditions and practices (Simon and Piquard, 1991). 
The more effective the organizational communication dealing with safety issues, 
the more positive the safety culture will be (e.g. Ostrom et al., 1993; 
Mohamed,2002; Fang et al., 2006). Communication and feedback was measured 
with five scale items drawn from a variety of previous studies (e.g. Zohar, 1980; 
Mohamed, 2002; Teo et al., 2004). A sample item is ‘Management clearly 
communicates safety issues to all levels within the organisation’.  
 
 Supervisory environment (SC3). The success of a safety management system 
program relies not only upon the management commitment, but also upon the 
ability of supervisory personnel to ensure that the program is carried out during 
daily operations. The more safety aware and relationship oriented the supervisors, 
the more positive the safety culture will be (e.g. Niskanen, 1994; Mohamed,2002; 
Fang et al., 2006). Supervisory environment was measured with five scale items 
drawn from a variety of previous studies (e.g. Zohar, 1980; Mohamed, 2002; Teo 
et al., 2004). A sample item is ‘Site management and supervisors see themselves 
as safety role models for all workers’. 
 
 Supportive environment (SC4). Supportive environment refers to the degree of 
trust and support within a group of workers, confidence that people have in 
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working relationships with co-workers, and general morale. The higher the level 
of support given by co-workers, the more positive the safety climate will be (e.g. 
Glendon and Litherland, 2001; Mohamed,2002; Fang et al., 2006). Supportive 
environment was measured with five scale items drawn from a variety of previous 
studies (e.g. Zohar, 1980; Mohamed, 2002; Teo et al., 2004). A sample item is ‘As 
a group, workers maintain good working relationships’. 
 
 Work pressure (SC5). Work pressure refers to the degree to which employees feel 
under pressure to complete work, and the amount of time to plan and carry out the 
construction work. The higher the perception of valuing expediency (e.g. 
productivity) over safety, the less positive the safety culture will be (e.g. Glendon 
and Litherland, 2001; Mohamed,2002; Fang et al., 2006). Work pressure was 
measured with four scale items drawn from a variety of previous studies (e.g. 
Zohar, 1980; Mohamed, 2002; Teo et al., 2004). A sample item is ‘Workers 
always work under a great deal of tension, and not given enough time to get the 
job done safety’.  
 
 Personal appreciation of risk (SC6). Attitudes toward safety have been found to 
be associated with personal perception of risks and individuals’ willingness to 
take risks. The higher the level of workers’ willingness to take risk, the less 
positive the safety culture will be (e.g. HSE, 1999; Mohamed,2002; Fang et al., 
2006). Personal appreciation of risk was measured with four scale items drawn 
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from a variety of previous studies (e.g. Zohar, 1980; Mohamed, 2002; Teo et al., 
2004). A sample item is ‘Workers have the right to refuse to work in unsafe and 
unhealthy conditions’. 
 
 Training and competence level (SC7). Training and competence level addresses 
the general level of workers’ qualifications, knowledge, and skills, with 
associated aspects related to selection and training. The greater one’s experience 
and knowledge of safety issues and the more trainings received by workers, the 
more positive the safety culture will be (e.g. Zohar, 1980; Mohamed,2002; Fang 
et al., 2006). Training and competence level was measured with seven scale items 
drawn from a variety of previous studies (e.g. Zohar, 1980; Mohamed, 2002; Teo 
et al., 2004). A sample item is ‘There is adequate safety training to site 
management team, such as supervisors and project management team members’. 
 
 Safety rules and procedures (SC8). Rules and procedures are the core component 
of safety management systems. The more comprehensive of safety rules and 
procedures and the better the perception of safety rules and procedures, the more 
positive the safety culture will be (e.g. Coyle and Sleeman, 1995; Mohamed,2002; 
Fang et al., 2006). Safety rules and procedures were measured with eight scale 
items drawn from a variety of previous studies (e.g. Zohar, 1980; Mohamed, 2002; 
Teo et al., 2004). A sample item is ‘Permit-To-Work (PTW) systems are 
established and implemented in your project’. 
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 Workers’ involvement (SC9). Workers’ involvement addresses the extent to which 
the workers are involved in safety activities, such as safety inspections, accident 
investigations, developing safety interventions and policies, reporting injuries and 
potentially hazardous situation, etc. The higher the level of workers’ involvement 
in safety matters, the more positive the safety culture will be (e.g. Dedobbeleer 
and Beland, 1991; Mohamed,2002; Fang et al., 2006). Workers’ involvement was 
measured with four scale items drawn from a variety of previous studies (e.g. 
Zohar, 1980; Mohamed, 2002; Teo et al., 2004). A sample item is ‘Workers play 
an active role in identifying site hazards’. 
 
 Appraisal of work hazards (SC10). Workplace hazards are defined as tangible 
factors that may pose risks for possible injuries or ailments. The better the 
implementation of a well established hazards analysis and risk assessment system, 
the more positive the safety culture will be (e.g. Lee, 1996; Mohamed,2002; Fang 
et al., 2006). Appraisal of work hazards was measured with four scale items 
drawn from a variety of previous studies (e.g. Zohar, 1980; Mohamed, 2002; Teo 
et al., 2004). A sample item is ‘Potential risks and consequences are identified 
prior to execution’. 
 
The ten indicators and their respective attributes were listed in the questionnaire (see 
Appendix 1). All the scale items in the questionnaire were anchored with the 
statement ‘Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree (1 = strongly disagree, 
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3 = neutral, and 5 = strongly agree) with each of the following statements based on 
the safety practices in your project by circling your responses using the following 
scale’. To derive the overall score of safety culture level for a given project, the 
weights of all safety culture indicators and their measurement items need to be 
determined. Jia et al. (1997) note that the choice of a weighting method depends on 
one’s knowledge of the underlying distributions of true weights. However, it appears 
that no research has been done to examine the weights or relative importance of safety 
culture indicators. This aspect may deserve further exploration in future studies. In 
such situation, the equal weights method, which requires minimal knowledge of the 
decision maker’s priorities and minimal input from the decision maker, was employed. 
Jia et al. (1997) suggest that, if one has no information about the true weights, the 
expected value of the weights distribution is the equal weights vector defined by wi = 
1/m, where i = 1, 2, …, m and m is the total number of attributes. This method was 
popularized by an influential article by Dawes and Corrigan (1974), who argued that 
this method often produced decisions nearly as good as those based on optimal (e.g., 
least squares) attribute weights. The equal weights method was also successfully 
applied in the construction literature (e.g. Mohamed, 2002; Imriyas et al. 2007a, 
2007b, 2007c; Teo and Feng, 2010; Teo and Feng 2011). By using the equal weights 
method, a dimensionless quantity, Safety Culture Index (SCI), was developed to 


























where ni = number of scale items for ith indicator; Aij = jth attribute score of ith 
indicator.  
 
4.3.1.5 Project hazard level 
 
The level of project hazard was assessed by Project Hazard Index (PHI). The 
framework for estimating PHI developed by Imriyas et al. (2006) was adopted to 
develop the questionnaire for this study. As discussed in the literature review (see 
Section 2.3.3), there are eleven hazardous activities in this framework.  
 
• Hazard contributed by demolition works (H1). The level of hazard contributed by 
demolition works was deduced by three scale items. A sample item is ‘Volume/size 
of demolition’.  
 
• Hazard contributed by excavation works (H2). The level of hazard contributed by 
excavation works was deduced by five scale items. A sample item is ‘Excavation 
configuration (depth, width and length)’. 
 
• Hazard contributed by scaffolding and ladder use (H3). The level of hazard 
contributed by scaffolding and ladder use was deduced by three scale items. A 
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sample item is ‘Height of the scaffold/ladder that is to be used’. 
 
• Hazard contributed by false works (H4). The level of hazard contributed by false 
works (temporary structure) was deduced by two scale items. A sample item is 
‘Volume of temporary structures involved in the project’. 
 
• Hazard contributed by roof works (H5). The level of hazard contributed by roof 
works was deduced by two scale items. A sample item is ‘Height of the roof’. 
 
• Hazard contributed by erection works (H6). The level of hazard contributed by 
erection works was deduced by three scale items. A sample item is ‘Height of 
erection work’. 
 
• Hazard contributed by crane use (H7). The level of hazard contributed by crane 
use was deduced by four scale items. A sample item is ‘Operating platform’. 
 
• Hazard contributed by machinery and tools use (H8). The level of hazard 
contributed by machinery and tools use was deduced by five scale items. A sample 
item is ‘Operating platform of plant and machinery (i.e. slope, etc.)’. 
 
• Hazard contributed by works on contaminated sites (H9). The level of hazard 
contributed by works on contaminated sites was deduced by three scale items. A 
sample item is ‘Duration of work on contaminated site’. 
 
• Hazard contributed by welding and cutting works (H10). The level of hazard 
contributed by welding and cutting works was deduced by two scale items. A 
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sample item is ‘The volume of welding & cutting works’. 
 
• Hazard contributed by works in confined spaces (H11). The level of hazard 
contributed by works in confined spaces was deduced by four scale items. A 
sample item is ‘The volume of confined space works’. 
 
The eleven hazardous activities in building projects and their respective attributes for 
assessing each activity’s hazards were listed in the questionnaire (see Appendix 1). 
However, not every hazardous trade may be applicable to a given project. Thus, 
applicable trades need to be selected and rated. All the scale items in the questionnaire 
were anchored with the statement ‘Please rate the level of hazard posed by the 
following parameters in various works of this project. Please tick your responses 
below using the following scale: 1 = very low; 2 = low; 3 = ordinary level; 4 = high; 
and 5 = very high’. Similar to the assessment of safety culture, there appears to be no 
prior knowledge regarding the weights of individual hazardous activities and scale 
items. Thus, the equal weights method (see section 4.3.1.4) was also applied to 











Where: m is the number of applicable hazard activities; and 0<m≤11. 
 















Where ni = number of hazard attributes for ith hazard activities; ASij = jth hazard 
attribute score of ith hazard activities.  
 
4.3.1.6 Project characteristics 
 
 Project size. Project size was measured by the contract sum of the project 
(quantitative factor); 
 
 Company size. Company size was measured by the BCA grade of the company 
(quantitative factor); 
 
 Project type. All the building projects are classified into 5 types, such as 
commercial building, residential building, office building, industrial building, and 
others (qualitative factor); 
 
 Complexity of project management. The complexity of project management was 
measured by the percentage of work completed by subcontractors (in terms of 
contract value) (quantitative factor).  
 
4.3.1.7 Data collection instrument 
 
A data collection instrument was developed by defining and operationalizing the 
research variables (see Section 4.3.1). A sample data collection instrument is given in 
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Appendix 1. The instrument is divided into the following seven sections:  
 
 Section A: Project and contractor information. In this section, interviewees were 
asked to provide the information about characteristics of the project and 
contractor, such as total man-hours, contract sum, project type, project duration, 
type of owner for the project, BCA Grade of the contractor, and so on.  
 
 Section B: Safety performance. The objective of this section is to measure the 
safety performance of the project. Information about the number of fatal deceased 
workers, number of injured workers who are permanently disabled, number of 
injured workers who are temporarily disabled (with more than 3 days of medical 
care), number of minor injuries (with 3 or less medical care), and number of 
man-days lost due to accidents were collected in this section.  
 
 Section C: Safety investments. This section aims to collect costs information 
about safety control activities in the project. The interviewees were required to 
review the historical records about the costs information of the 7 major safety 
investments components and their subcomponents or provide their estimation 
whenever there was no record available.  
 
 Section D: Accident costs. This section aims to collect information about the 
costs incurred by the accidents. For the direct accident costs, the interviewees 
were required to review the historical record about the accidents occurred in the 
project, while, for the indirect accident costs, they were requested to review the 
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documents if any, or provide their estimation based on the questions raised in this 
section. This section was designed for the filling of just one accident. For more 
than one accident, the interviewees were requested to photocopy this section for 
other accidents occurred in this project.  
 
 Section E: Project hazard level. The objective of this section is to assess the level 
of physical hazard level of the project. The interviewees were required to rate the 
level of hazard posed by each of the attributes in various works of the project on a 
5-point Likert-type scale between 1 = ‘very low’, 3 = ‘ordinary level’, and 5 = 
‘very high’.  
 
 Section F: Safety culture of the project. This section scrutinizes the safety culture 
level of the project by assessing each of the indicators of safety culture. 
Interviewees were required to indicate to what extent they agree or disagree with 
each of the statements found in this section based on the safety practices in this 
project on a 5-point Likert-type scale between 1 = ‘strongly disagree’, 3 = 
‘neutral’, and 5 = ‘strongly agree’.  
 
 Section G: Personal information. Questions such as the name of the 
interviewee(s) (optional), contact number, designation, and years of working 
experience in construction industry were set out in this section.  
 
The selection of the 5-point scale with each scale point labeled is due to the following 
reasons: (1) odd numbered scale can provide a midpoint option which is required in 
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this instrument to allow respondents to reflect a neutral position; while even 
numbered scales may affect outcomes by discriminating the answers into two 
distinctive categories, e.g. agree or disagree, and low or high, as there is no neutral 
option; (2) 5-point scale exhibits superior discrimination and reliability, and appears 
to produce more accurate than others. This is because, although 7-10 point scales may 
seem to gather more discriminating information, there is debate whether respondents 
actually discriminate carefully enough when filling out a questionnaire to make these 
scales valuable. Moreover, 2 and 3 point scales offer little discriminative value and 
cannot provide satisfactory data; and (3) defining each scale point instead of only 
anchoring the end points is used in this questionnaire as the former enables 
respondents to attach the same word to a numerical value, avoiding potential risks of 
misinterpretation of scale definitions by different respondents (Online materials, 
Pearson NCS, 2007; Li, 2007). 
 
4.3.2 Data collection methods 
 
After determining the type of research design and developing the data collection 
instrument, the next step in the research process is to select the appropriate data 
collection methods. Several methods can be used to collect primary data for 
non-experimental quantitative research, such as interviews, questionnaires and 







Interviewing is a commonly used method of collecting information from people. It 
refers to any person-to-person interaction between two or more individuals with a 
specific purpose in mind (Kumar, 2005). According to the degree of flexibility, 
interviews can be: unstructured; semi-structured; and structured (Fellows and Liu, 
2008). In unstructured interviews, the interviewer introduces the topic briefly and then 
records the replies of the respondent; whilst in structured interviews, the interviewer 
administers a questionnaire by asking questions and recording responses. 
Semi-structured interviews fill the spectrum between the two extremes. The strength 
of unstructured interviews is the almost complete freedom they provide in terms of 
content and structure. It is suitable for use in situations where either in-depth 
information is needed or little is known about the area. One major disadvantage of 
unstructured interview lies in the freedom of questions asked by interviewers and 
information obtained from interviewees, which can introduce investigator bias into the 
study. Another main weakness of using unstructured interviews is that the 
comparability of questions asked and responses obtained may become a problem. A 
main advantage of the structured interview, however, is that it provides uniform 
information, which assures the comparability of data. Also, structured interviewing 
requires fewer interviewing skills than does unstructured or semi-structured interview 






A questionnaire is a written list of questions, the answers to which are recorded by 
respondents (Kumar, 2005). Questionnaire may be administered by post/email/web to 
respondents, groups or particular individuals, or to individuals personally by the 
researcher (Fellows and Liu, 2008). ‘The only difference between an interview 
schedule and a questionnaire is that in the former it is the interviewer who asks the 
questions and records the respondent’s replies on an interview schedule, and in the 
latter replies are recorded by the respondents themselves’ (Kumar, 2005, p. 126). This 
distinction is important in accounting for the respective strengths and weaknesses of 
the two methods.  
 
4.3.2.3 Archival records 
 
Archival records are another useful source of data collection, often taking the form of 
computer files and records (Kumar, 2005). Examples of archival records include (Yin, 
2009): public use files (e.g. census and other statistical data made available by 
government); service records (e.g. those showing the number of clients served over a 
given period of time); organisational records (e.g. budget and WSH records); personal 
records; maps and charts of the geographical characteristics of a place; and survey 
data (e.g. data previously collected about a site’s employees, residents, or participants). 
The strengths of archival data include: stable; unobtrusive; exact; broad coverage; and 
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precise and usually quantitative (Yin, 2009). The major weakness of the archival data 
lies in the accessibility of such data due to privacy reasons. Unlike documentary 
evidence, Yin (2009) noted that the usefulness of these archival records will vary from 
case to case. For some studies, the records can be so important that they can become 
the object of extensive retrieval and quantitative analysis; while in other studies, they 
may be of only passing relevance (Yin, 2009). Yin (2009, p. 106) further stresses that 
‘most archival records were produced for a specific purpose and a specific audience 
other than the study, and these conditions must be fully appreciated in interpreting the 
usefulness and accuracy of the records’. 
 
4.3.2.4 Multiple sources of data 
 
The choice of a method depends upon the purpose of the study, the type of data 
required, the resources available and the skills of the researcher. Yin (2009) noted that 
no single source has a complete advantage over all the others. The various sources are 
highly complementary, and a good study will therefore want to use as many sources as 
possible (Fellows and Liu 2008; Yin 2009). For this study, a combination of 
techniques, such as interviews, questionnaires and archival records was employed to 
collect information. As suggested by Eisenhardt (1989), it is hoped that the use of 
multiple sources of data collection will both strengthen the grounding of theory and 




The information about project and contractor characteristics (Section A of data 
collection instrument), project safety outcomes (Section B of data collection 
instrument), safety investments (Section C of data collection instrument) and accident 
costs (Section D of data collection instrument) was collected using structured 
interviews with accompanied by collection of archival data. Questionnaires were used 
to assess the project hazard level (Section E of data collection instrument) and safety 
culture level (Section F of data collection instrument). Some other documentation and 
archival records outside the interviewed projects were used to cross-verify the 
accuracy or trustworthiness of the data collected. The sources of such information 
may include various websites of the government (BCA, MOM), safety training 
providers (e.g., NTUC Learning Hub, BCA Academy, Singapore Contractors 
Associations, etc.), individual companies, WSH Council, Singapore Contractors 
Association, etc.  
 
4.3.3 Sampling  
 
Sampling is the process of selecting a sample from the sampling population to provide 
a practical means of enabling the data collection and processing components of 
research to be carried out whilst ensuring that the sample is representative (Fellows 
and Liu, 2008). The unit of analysis (see Section 4.2.3) implies that the target unit for 
sampling was the contractor project organisation. While organisations were sampled, 
the individuals in the contractor project teams were the ultimate target source of the 
information required. As there is no known population of the target organisations, a 
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list of general building contractors who were registered with the Building 
Construction Authority (BCA) of Singapore was used as the start point to build a 
comprehensive sampling frame for this study. The contractors on BCA’s list are those 
considered by BCA as having sufficient resources, experiences and technical expertise 
to undertake contracts of the nature and size defined by the BCA’s registration heads 
and grades. The grades A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2, and C3 under Construction Work 
Heads CW 01 – General Building category are classified based on the tendering limit 
as shown in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2: Tendering Limits of General Building Contractors 
 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 C3 
Tendering Limit (S$ million) 
1 Jul 09 to 31 Dec 09  
unlimited 85.0 50.0 15.0 5.0 1.5 0.75 
Tendering Limit (S$ million) 
1 Jan 10 to 30 Jun 10  
unlimited 85.0 40.0 13.0 4.0 1.3 0.65 
Tendering Limit (S$ million) 
1 Jul 10 to 30 Jun 11  
unlimited 85.0 40.0 13.0 4.0 1.3 0.65 
(Source: BCA, 2010) 
 
In this study, 234 general building contractors belonging to the grades A1, A2, B1, 
and B2 under Construction Work Heads CW 01 – General Building category were 
selected for the data collection. The contractors belonging to the C1, C2, and C3 
categories (with terdering limit of S$5 million and below) were excluded from the 
sampling frame of this study. It is because, according to practices of Singapore 
construction industry, small general building contractors (C1, C2, and C3) usually 
perform as sub-contractors of building projects and it is not possible to acquire 
complete information about the whole building project from sub-contractors (Teo and 
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Feng, 2010).  
 
Since the sampling frame is naturally stratified by BCA Grade, stratified sampling 
method was adopted for this study. To ensure the representativeness, samples from 
homogeneous strata were randomly selected. In the first stage, 50 per cent of 
contractors under each BCA Grade were randomly selected from the sampling frame, 
and, in total, 117 building contractors were randomly selected from the sampling 
frame (see Table 4.3). Contact information of the selected contractors was collected 
mainly through personal contacts of the researcher, or by searching their websites if 
personal contacts with the contractors were unavailable. Good personal contacts with 
potential data providers tend to establish trust and confidence in the researcher, ease 
the data collection process and increase the response rate (Eriksson and Laan, 2007; 
Fellows and Liu, 2008). As noted by Fellows and Liu (2008, p. 29), ‘trust and 
confidence are important considerations in data collection – the more sensitive the 
data, the more trust in the researcher which is required by the provider’. All these 
randomly selected contractors were contacted via telephone or Email to request their 
participation in this study.  
 
Table 4.3: Sample of Contractors Stratified by BCA Grade 
BCA Grade A1 A2 B1 B2 Total 
Population 35 27 57 115 234 
Sample (50%) 18 14 28 57 117 
 
In the second stage, one to three projects from each contractor that was ready to 
participate in this study were selected as part of the sample based on the inclusion 
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criteria. The criteria to select projects for this study include: (1) the projects should 
have been completed within the past three years; and (2) the safety personnel or the 
project managers of the projects, such as safety managers, safety officers or project 
managers, must be willing to participate in this study.  
 
4.3.4 Determination of sample size 
 
The major data analysis methods used in this study are multiple regression analysis 
and correlation analysis (see Section 4.4). The methods used to determine the sample 
size for multiple regression analysis are different from those used to determine the 
sample size for hypotheses tests because providing evidence that a parameter is not 
equal to some specific value is a fundamentally different task than accurately 
estimating the parameter (Algina and Olejnik, 2000). Maxwell (2000) argued that 
sample size would almost certainly have to be much larger for obtaining a useful 
prediction equation than for testing the statistical significance of the multiple 
correlation coefficients.  
 
Miller and Kunce (1973) suggested that the minimal sample size to predictor ratio 
was 10 to 1 when using Multiple Linear Regression. Knofczynski and Mundfrom 
(2008) examined the methods to determine sample size when using Multiple Linear 
Regression for prediction. In Knofczynski and Mundfrom’s (2008) research, 
minimum sample sizes were determined based on the Squared Population Multiple 




According to hypothesis 1 of this study (see Section 3.2), safety performance of 
building projects may be predicted by safety investments, safety culture and project 
hazard level. The maximum number of independent variables in hypothesis 1 was 3. 
Hypothesis 2 (see Section 3.3) postulates that the total accident costs of building 
projects may be predicted by accident frequency rate, project characteristics and 
project hazard level. The maximum number of independent variables in hypothesis 2 
was also 3. Thus, the maximum number of independent variables in both hypotheses 
was estimated at 3 and the Squared Population Multiple Correlation Coefficients were 
estimated to be at medium level. According to the results of Knofczynski and 
Mundfrom’s (2008) research, in order to derive a good prediction level, the 
recommended minimum sample size to predictor ratio was 13:1, i.e., the minimum 
sample size for this particular study was 39 (being 13 * 3). This sample size to 
predictor ratio is higher than the ratio of 10:1 suggested by Miller and Kunce (1973). 
Therefore, a sample size of 39 would be expected to yield reliable results. 
 
4.3.5 Pilot study 
 
Before conducting the interviews, a pilot study was conducted with the following 
purposes: (1) to test the reliability of the data collection instrument; (2) to assure that 
the wording and text of the questionnaire is clear and understandable; (3) to validate 
the content of constructs and measures and identify if something unique to 
Singapore’s construction context was not considered in the data collection instrument; 
(4) to test the feasibility of data collection method; and (5) to obtain a reliable 
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estimate of the anticipated completion time and valuable data collection experiences. 
 
The data collection instruments were tested personally by the researcher so that the 
respondents can be observed and questioned if necessary. This pilot study was 
conducted by means of structured interviews using the initially designed data 
collection instrument. The interviewees comprised three project managers and two 
safety officers from five different completed building projects in Singapore. The three 
project managers had good personal contacts with the researcher, and they had 
recommended the other two interviewees based on the researcher’s requirement. The 
good personal contacts enabled trust and confidence to be established between the 
interviewees and the researcher, by which the researcher may obtain more reliable 
feedback from the interviewees. All the three project managers have more than 15 
years of experience in construction industry, and both the two safety officers are 
registered Workplace Safety and Health Officers (WSHO) with MOM and have more 
than 10 years of experience in construction safety. This indicates that all the 
interviewees have adequate recognition and knowledge of WSH issues in Singapore’s 
construction context.  
 
The pilot study was divided into two phases. In the first phase, a softcopy of the 
initially designed instrument was sent via Email to the three interviewees that had 
good personal contacts with the researcher. They were required to go through the 
instrument carefully and provide their comments regarding the following questions: (1) 
are the wordings and organisations of questions clear and understandable? (2) are the 
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items, measures, indicators and statements compatible with Singapore’s construction 
context? (3) are there any other potential questions that are unique to Singapore’s 
construction context to be added to the instrument? (4) are all the information required 
in the instrument available for your project? and (5) are there any other comments on 
the instrument?  
 
Based on the feedback from the three respondents, some changes were made to the 
initially designed instrument: (1) some wordings of the instrument were changed to 
avoid confusion; (2) total number of injured workers was further categorized as 
number of fatal deceased workers, number of injured workers who are permanently 
disabled, number of injured workers who are temporarily disabled (more than 3 days 
of medical care), and number of minor injuries (i.e., three or less days lost); (3) the 
types of compulsory formal training courses were amended; (4) the compensations to 
the injured workers was further categorized into compensations covered by insurance 
policy and those not covered by insurance policy due to the underreporting issue in 
some of Singapore’s construction firms; and (5) a question about language barriers 
was added to the safety culture assessment form under the dimension of supportive 
environment to reflect the multi-language working environment in Singapore’s 
construction sites. 
 
In the second phase, five structured interviews were conducted using the revised 
instrument. During each interview session, the interviewee was requested to answer 
152 
 
all questions in the instrument and rate the attributes in the project hazard and safety 
culture assessment forms (Sections E and F). The results of the interviews show that 
all the information required in the instrument can be obtained through interviews and 
checking the archival records of the project. The wordings and text of the instrument 
were further checked during the five structured interviews. Two further amendments 
were made to the instrument: (1) to reflect the true cost of safety staffing, a question 
about the percentage of time spent on safety work was added to the instrument; and (2) 
the costs of safety facilities were further categorized into material/equipment cost and 
manpower cost. Also, a reliable estimate of the anticipated completion time (roughly 2 
hours), and, more importantly, valuable experiences were obtained to enable 
subsequent interviews to be conducted more effectively and efficiently.   
 
4.3.6 Data collection procedure 
 
Before the interviews and questionnaires were carried out, a key contact person for 
each target project was recommended by the contractor. This key contact person 
served as the link between the researcher and the potential sources of information or 
questionnaire respondents. The key contact person also enabled possible follow-ups if 
there was any unclear or missing information. In this context, typical targets as key 
contact persons included project managers/directors and project safety 
managers/officers. The next step was to conduct face-to-face interviews upon being 
granted the opportunity to interview the project managers/directors or safety 
managers/officers. Project managers/directors are the first choice of interviewees as 
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they have deeper and broader understanding of the projects’ WSH strategies and 
performance. Also, they are the most likely persons to get access to the archival 
records of the projects. The second choice is the project safety managers/officers, who 
are in charge of the WSH issues of the projects.  
 
The interviewees were requested to recall or review the archival records of the project, 
or provide their estimation whenever the records were unavailable to complete 
Section A (project and contractor information), B (safety performance), C (safety 
investments) and D (accident costs) of the data collection instrument. In general, the 
face-to-face project interviews took 1.5 to 2.5 hours to conduct depending on the 
number of accidents occurred in the project and the availability of records of the 
information. During the interview, the interviewees were requested to show the 
evidence or records of the information to be collected. Such evidence include: WSH 
statistics of the company and project; safety inspection records; safety audit report; 
project WSH plan; company and project organisational chart; insurance policy 
document; project master schedule; internal safety management systems; safety 
training records; name cards; company brochures; etc.  
 
In most cases, the project manager/director or safety manager/officer did not answer 
all the questions by himself/herself. He/she had to consult other project personnel 
such as quantity surveyors and safety supervisors, or the personnel in the head office 
who was in charge of WSH issues during the interview. Archival records, usually in 
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the form of computer records, were also checked to ensure the accuracy of 
information. Sometimes, the interviewer did not obtain all the answers of the 
interview questions during the interview session due to the tight schedule of the 
interviewees or the unavailability of some data. In such situation, a follow-up 
face-to-face interview or telephone interview was scheduled to obtain the answers of 
all the interview questions. Upon completion of each interview session, the 
interviewees were provided with a copy of the recorded answers, and were requested 
to review and confirm the answers and also give their feedback on their answers (if 
any) via Email. This is to provide a chance to cross-verify the accuracy of the data 
collected with the respondents.   
 
For each of the interviewed projects, in order to enhance the data validity, three 
members of site management staff, such as project managers/directors, 
construction/site managers, site engineers, safety managers/officers, and safety 
supervisors were requested to complete the Section E (project hazard level) and F 
(safety culture of the project) of the data collection instrument. The questionnaires 
were directly handed over to the three respondents, who were requested to fill out 
Sections E and F before eyes. The averages of PHI value and SCI value derived from 
the three questionnaires were used to gauge the project hazard level and safety culture 
level respectively. The sample size of three observers is considered adequate for 
providing valid assessment of project hazard level and project safety culture level, 
following the triangulation of observers, which presents that information about a 
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single phenomenon should be collected from at least three different observers 
(Hamersley and Atkinson, 1983; Neuman, 2005). 
 
In order to encourage the potential respondents to participate in this study, some 
measures were also taken during the data collection process: (1) ensuring that 
providers of data cannot be traced from the output of the research by not requiring 
them to provide their names and addresses (anonymity); (2) confidentiality was 
assured verbally and confirmed in writing in the formal letter of invitation for 
participation, which contains an explanation of the research, the purpose of work, type 
of information required, etc. and (3) promising that outcomes of the research will be 
shared with the data providers.  
 
To further check the accuracy or trustworthiness of the data collected, some additional 
measures were taken: 
 
• Reviewing the WSH regulations, WSH annual reports and WSH statistics 
published in the website of MOM and WSH Council of Singapore. These 
regulations and statistics may provide a good indication of the basic safety 
requirements and overall level of safety performance by industry.  
 
• Reviewing the various lists of past WSH Awards/Competitions winners published 




• Reviewing the list of contractors with Demerit Points, the list of factories and 
work-sites issued with Stop Work Orders and the list of offenders convicted under 
WSHA, which were published in the Website of MOM. This information was used 
to check those cases which reported poor safety performance, Stop Work Orders, 
and fines.  
 
• Reviewing the statistical information of labour market that was published in the 
MOM website. Such information include average wages/salaries by industry, 
hours worked and percentage of foreign workers.  
 
• Inspecting the websites of major safety courses providers (e.g., NTUC Learning 
Hub, BCA Academy, Singapore Contractors Associations, etc.) in Singapore to 
check the rates of various formal safety training courses. 
 
• Searching the websites of the interviewed companies for relevant information, 
such as safety and health performance, corporate culture, company size and 
business scope, organisational chart, major projects, etc. 
 
• Conducting informal conversations with the workers or staff of the interviewed 
projects and the industrial practitioners with whom the researcher has good 
contact. 
 
The information obtained through the above ways was used to compare with the data 
collected through the interviews and archival records to identify the abnormal data or 
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cases before they were processed and analysed.  
 
4.3.7 Validity and reliability issues 
 
4.3.7.1 Validity and reliability of data collection instrument 
 
Validity and reliability are the main issues concerning all the academic research. 
Without adequately taking into account the validity and reliability of the data 
collection instrument, no matter how scientific and robust data analysis methods are 
used, the results and conclusions would be questionable. In terms of measurement 
procedures, ‘Validity is defined as the degree to which the researcher has measured 
what he has set out to measure’ (Smith 1991, p.106). There are three common types of 
validity: face and content validity, concurrent and predictive validity, and construct 
validity (Kumar, 2005). Face and contend validity refers to the degree to which the 
instrument reflects a specific domain of the content. Specifically, face validity is the 
establishment of a logical link between each question or item on the scale and an 
objective; whilst content validity refers to how well the items and questions cover the 
full range of the issue or attitude being measured. One of the main advantages of face 
and contend validity is that it is easy to apply. Concurrent and predictive validity 
Predictive validity is judged by the degree to which an instrument can forecast an 
outcome. Concurrent validity is judged by how well an instrument compares with a 
second assessment concurrently done. Construct validity is determined by 
ascertaining the contribution of each construct to the total variance observed in a 
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phenomenon. It is based on statistical procedures. In the research design and data 
collection stage, the validity of the research instrument is assured by taking the 
following precautions: 
 
• The instrument used to assess project hazard level and safety culture level in this 
study has gained its adequate content validity with solid theoretical support, as the 
design and selection of measurement items are based on an extensive literature 
review. Each construct of safety culture and project hazard was measured by at 
least two scale items, which follows the principle of triangulation. The items for 
measuring the costs of accident prevention activities, direct costs of accidents and 
indirect costs of accidents were also derived from an extensive literature review, in 
which these items have been judged to be valid with adequate theoretical supports 
(refer to Section 4.3.1 for details).  
 
• In addition to theoretical support mentioned above, a pilot study was carried out to 
pre-test the data collection instrument. An initially-designed instrument was tested 
during the pilot study. The comments from the five interviewees add content 
validity to the instrument in the context of Singapore’s building construction 
industry through adding and revising items that were pertinent to Singapore 
context and deleting those that did not fit Singapore context. This is to assure that 
the content of each construct captures all the domains of the construct and is well 




Reliability refers to the degree of consistency and stability in an instrument. ‘A scale 
or test is reliable to the extent that repeat measurements made by it under constant 
conditions will give the same result’ (Moser and kalton, 1989, p.353). As noted by 
Kumar (2005, p.157), in the social sciences, however, ‘it is impossible to have a 
research tool which is 100 per cent accurate, not only because a research instrument 
cannot be so but also because it is impossible to control the factors affecting 
reliability’. These factors may include the following: (1) the wordings of questions; (2) 
the physical setting; (3) the respondent’s mood; (4) the nature of interaction; and (5) 
the regression effect of an instrument. Most of these factors are uncontrollable actions 
of the respondents, which are beyond the control of the study. In this regard, some 
precautions, such as pre-testing the instrument in the pilot study, asking the 
respondents to fill out the questionnaire in front of the researcher’s eyes, etc. were 
carried out to mitigate the potential threats of these factors and establish the reliability 
of the instrument.  
 
Furthermore, the validity and reliability of the data collection instrument and methods 
were also well established in the form of publications of research papers, which are 
subjected to peer review. Peer review provides an opportunity for independent judges 
to question various aspects of the research, e.g. arguments, methodology, methods, 
interpretations and conclusions (Xiao, 2002). So far, a refereed conference paper and 
three refereed journal papers which were related to this research and used the data 
collection instrument developed for this research have been published. The acceptance 
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of these papers for publication after going through a rigorous peer review process 
provides a strong indication that the data collection instrument and data collection 
methods are valid and reliable.  
 
4.3.7.2 Potential threats to the validity of research 
 
Although it is difficult to eliminate or control all potential threats to the validity of the 
study (e.g., some uncontrollable actions of respondents were beyond the control of the 
study), this study adopted a proactive attitude to first identify the potential threats of 
bias, and then carry out precautions to mitigate them as far as possible throughout the 
research lifecycle. The following potential threats in the research design and data 
collection stage are identified and dealt with: 
 
• Accuracy/trustworthiness of data collected. To ensure the accuracy of the data 
collected and maintain the integrity of research, the following precautions were 
adopted: (1) careful selection of appropriate respondents (i.e., only project 
managers/directors and project safety managers/officers were selected as the key 
contact persons/interviewees of each selected project); (2) data sources 
triangulation (e.g., structured interviews, company website, company brochures, 
computer records, government website, informal conversations, insurance policy 
documents, internal safety management systems documentation, internal safety 
inspections records, safety audit records, etc.); (3) assessors triangulation (i.e., 
three respondents were requested to assess the level of safety culture and project 
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hazard); (4) adequate transparency (i.e., this research has provided adequate 
transparency for potential replication to enhance the reliability of the results); and 
(5) Respondent cross-verification of the data (i.e., after the completion of each 
interview session, the interviewees were requested to review and confirm the 
answers and also give feedback (if any) on the data collection). 
 
• Errors by the respondents or interviewees (e.g., forgetting, seriousness, 
embarrassment, misunderstanding, or lying) (Neuman, 2003). Although this type 
of threats is largely beyond the control of the research, they were mitigated by 
carrying out the following precautions: (1) allowing anonymity; (2) ensuring 
confidentiality; (3) ensuring clarity of questions through pilot study; (4) asking 
respondents to complete the questionnaire in front of the researcher’s eyes; (5) 
using multiple respondents (i.e., three observers were requested to complete 
Sections E and F of the data collection instrument); and (6) cross-checking the 
accuracy of the data collected using multiple sources (i.e., the accuracy of the data 
collected via interviewers’ recollection were checked by reviewing relevant 
archival data). 
 
• Unintentional errors or sloppiness of the interviewer (e.g., contacting the wrong 
respondent, misreading a question, omitting questions, reading questions in the 
wrong order, recording the wrong answer to a question, or misunderstanding the 
respondent) (Neuman, 2003). The precautions to mitigate the influence of this 
type of bias include: (1) obtaining enough interview experiences by conducting 
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pilot studies to enable the subsequent interviews to be smoothly conducted; (2) 
allowing the interviewees to have a copy of the interview questions during the 
interviews; and (3) requesting the interviewees to cross check the recorded 
answers. 
 
• Intentional subversion by the interviewer (e.g., purposeful alteration of answers, 
omission or rewording of questions, or choice of an alternative respondent) 
(Neuman, 2003). This type of potential errors was strictly eliminated by 
conducting all the interviews personally by the researcher in this research. No 
other interviewers were employed in this research.  
 
• Influence on the answer due to the long duration of the interviews. To mitigate this 
threat, the following 3 measures were undertaken: (1) a substantial amount of 
careful pre-planning was undertaken to ensure the smoothness of the whole 
process of interviews; (2) a suitable time for interview was scheduled to allow 
enough time to complete the interview questions; and (3) a follow-up interview 
was scheduled once the interview questions were not completed in one session 
due to the tight schedule of the interviewees or the availability of information.  
 
4.4 Data analysis methods 
 
4.4.1 Correlation analysis 
 
Correlation refers to the relationship between two continuous variables 
(co-relationships) (McQueen and Knussen, 2006). The relationship between two 
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variables can be measured using a correlation coefficient. There are many types of 
correlation coefficients, among which the Pearson correlation coefficient (r) is 
perhaps the one most commonly used in management research (Tharenou et al., 2007). 
Pearson correlation coefficient can be used to measure the direction and strength of 
the linear relationship between continuous variables (Kline, 2005). The Pearson 
correlation coefficient ranges from -1 through 0 to 1, where 1 represents a perfect 
positive linear association, 0 represents no linear association, and -1 represents a 
perfect negative linear association. The direction of the correlation is positive when 
both variables increase together, but it is negative when one variable increases as the 
other decreases. Weak relationship will be indicated by values closer to zero.  
 
Bivariate correlation analysis can be used to answer simple research 
questions/hypotheses concerning two variables. However, it cannot be used to answer 
more complex research questions/hypotheses, such as the non-linear relationship 
between two variables, the mediation and moderation effects, and the relationships 
among three or more variables. Regression analyses are required for these purposes 
and discussed in the subsequent sections.  
 
4.4.2 Regression analysis 
 
Regression analysis is a statistical technique for investigating and modeling the 
relationship between variables (Montgomery et al., 2006). It is one of the most widely 
used techniques for analyzing multifactor data (Montgomery et al., 2006). Regression 
modeling, either in linear forms or in more sophisticated forms (such as nonlinear), 
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has been widely used as a tool to interpret and change a set of data into the forms of 
information that can be used for several purposes, from simple statistical inferences to 
complex prediction models (Lu, 2005; Montgomery et al., 2006).  
 
4.4.2.1 Regression modelling 
 
Simple linear regression is a model with a single independent variable x that has a 
relationship with an independent variable y that is a straight line. This simple linear 
regression model is given in Eq. 4.1. 
 
y = β0 +β1 • x + ε…………………………………………………………..…….(Eq. 4.1) 
 
Where the interceptβ0 and the slopeβ1 are unknown constants andεis a random 
error component.  
 
Multiple regression is employed when there are more than one independent variables. 
It uses several independent variables (x1, x2, …, xn), called the predictor variables, to 
assess the extent of their relationship simultaneously with a single dependent variable 
(y), the criterion variable (Tharenou et al., 2007). The multiple regression model is 
given in Eq. 4.2. 
y = β0 +β1 • x1 +β2 • x2 + … +βn • xn +ε……………………………………(Eq. 4.2) 
 
Where the interceptβ0 and the slopes (β1, β2 ,…, βn) are unknown constants and




The well-known least square was used to derive the regression parameters for the 
initial models (Jia, 2006). The main reason for the popularity of the ordinary least 
squares could be explained through its easy calculation (low computational costs and 
its intuitive plausibility) in most cases (Jia, 2006). The statistical theory which is used 
to develop the least square model has been well-developed and provides useful 
guidelines to interpret the results of regression analysis. There are several methods 
such as the t-test, the F-test, and the prediction intervals developed to evaluate and 
examine the accuracy of the models (Jia, 2006). 
 
The assumptions underlying regression analysis need to be tested. This is because the 
complexity of the relationships, owing to the typical use of a large number of 
variables, makes the potential distortions and biases more potent when the 
assumptions are violated (Hair et al., 1998). Hair et al. (1998) suggest that the 
researcher must be aware of any assumption violations and the implications they may 
have for the estimation process or the interpretation of the results. Analysis to ensure 
that the research is meeting the basic assumptions of multiple regression analysis 
involves two steps: (1) testing the individual dependent and independent variables, 
and (2) testing the overall relationship after model estimation.  
 
In the initial stage, the three assumptions to be addressed for the individual variables 
are linearity, constant variance, and normality (Hair et al., 1998; Witte and Witte, 
2007). Firstly, in the tests of linearity, Witte and Witte (2007) suggests that research 
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needs to worry about violating the assumption of linearity only ‘when the scatterplot 
for the original correlation analysis reveals an obviously bent or curvilinear dot 
cluster’ (p. 164). Secondly, the assumption of constant variance states that the dots in 
the original scatterplot will be dispersed equally about all segments of the regression 
line. Witte and Witte (2007) notes that researcher needs to worry about violating this 
assumption ‘only when the scatterplot reveals a dramatically different type of dot 
cluster’ (p. 164). Finally, perhaps the most frequently encountered assumption 
violation is nonnormality of the independent or dependent variables or both (Hair et 
al., 1998). Hair et al. (1998) further suggests that the original variables may be 
preferred for the comparability in the interpretation phase as regression analysis has 
been shown to be quite robust even when the normality assumption is violated.  
 
In the stage of evaluating the estimated equation, the assumptions to be examined are 
linearity, homoscedasticity, independence of the residuals, and normality of residuals 
(Hair et al., 1998). The first assumption, linearity, will be assessed through an analysis 
of residuals and partial regression plots. If no apparent nonlinear pattern is exhibited, 
the assumption of linearity is deemed to be met. The next assumption deals with the 
constancy of the residuals across values of the independent variables, which can be 
tested through examination of the residuals plots. The third assumption deals with the 
effect of carryover from one observation to another, thus making the residual not 
independent. Again, the residuals can be plotted to see whether a pattern emerges. The 
final assumption is normality of the error term of the variate with a visual examination 
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of the normal probability plots of the residuals. If the values fall along the diagonal 
with no substantial or systematic departures, the residuals are considered to represent 
a normal distribution (Hair et al., 1998).  
 
4.4.2.2 Determination of functional form 
 
As the relationship between the dependent variable and independent variable may not 
always be linear, the functional form for their relationship needs to be determined (or 
approximated) through a limited amount of experimentations. According to Crown 
(1998), a common approach is to estimate linear, log-log (for double log), and 
exponential versions of the model and then to choose the “best” one. This approach 
was also used in this study to choose among the alternative model specifications.  
 
 Basic linear functional form  
 
Firstly, consider the basic linear equation (Eq. 4.3) specifying the relationship 
between the dependent variable (y) and the independent variable (x) in a population: 
 
y = β0 +β1 • x + ε………………………………………………………..(Eq. 4.3) 
Where the population interceptβ0 and the population slopeβ1 are unknown constants 
andεis a random error component in the population.  
 
Based on the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, it is possible that the relationship 
between the dependent variable (y) and the independent variable (x) is affected by 
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other variables (m1, m2… mn). This implies that both the population intercept β0 and 
the population slopeβ1 are likely to be dependent on the value of other variables (m1, 
m2… mn). Thus,  
 
β0  =α0 +α1 • m1 +α2 • m2 + … +αn • mn ………………………….….. (Eq. 4.4) 
β1 = γ0 + γ1 • m1 + γ2 • m2 + … + γn • mn ………………………………..….. (Eq. 4.5) 
 
where m1, m2… mn represent the variables influencing the relationship between the 
dependent variable (y) and the independent variable (x), the intercepts (α0 and γ0) and 
the slopes (α1, α2, …, αn) and (γ1, γ2, …, γn) are unknown constants.  
 
Eq. 4.3, Eq. 4.4, and Eq. 4.5 can be combined by substituting (α0 +α1 • m1 +α2 • m2 
+ … +αn • mn) forβ0 and (γ0 + γ1 • m1 + γ2 • m2 + … + γn • mn) forβ1, then 
 
y = (α0+α1•m1 +α2•m2+ … +αn • mn) + (γ0+γ1 •m1 + γ2 •m2 +…+ γn • mn)• x +ε 
 = α0+α1•m1 +α2•m2+ … +αn • mn + γ0•x+γ1 •m1 •x+ γ2 •m2 •x +…+ γn • mn•x +ε 
   ……………………………………………………………………..…… (Eq. 4.6) 
Eq. 4.6 is the linear model for the relationship between the dependent variable (y) and 
the independent variable (x).  
 
 Log-log functional form  
 
Secondly, the log-log functional form was considered. The basic relationship between 
169 
 
the dependent variable (y) and the independent variable (x) was posited as Eq. 4.7. 
 
y = 𝑒𝛽0 • 𝑥𝛽1 • 𝑒𝜀 ………………………………….……………………… (Eq. 4.7) 
 
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides yields the linear estimating equation: 
 
lny =β0 +β1 • lnx + ε……………………………...……………………. (Eq. 4.8) 
 
Where the population interceptβ0 and the population slopeβ1 are unknown constants 
andεis a random error component in the population. 
 
Based on the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, it is possible that the relationship 
between the dependent variable (y) and the independent variable (x) is affected by 
other variables (m1, m2… mn). This implies that both the population intercept β0 and 
the population slopeβ1 are likely to be dependent on the value of other variables (m1, 
m2… mn). Thus,  
 
β0  =α0 +α1 • m1 +α2 • m2 + … +αn • mn ………………………….….. (Eq. 4.9) 
β1 = γ0 + γ1 • m1 + γ2 • m2 + … + γn • mn ……………………………….….. (Eq. 4.10) 
 
where m1, m2… mn represent the variables influencing the relationship between the 
dependent variable (y) and the independent variable (x), the intercepts (α0 and γ0) and 




Eq. 4.8, Eq. 4.9, and Eq. 4.10 can be combined by substituting (α0 +α1 • m1 +α2 • 
m2 + … +αn • mn) forβ0 and (γ0 + γ1 • m1 + γ2 • m2 + … + γn • mn) forβ1, then 
 
lny = (α0 +α1 • m1 +α2 • m2 + … +αn • mn)  + (γ0 + γ1 • m1 + γ2 • m2 + … + γn • 
mn)  • lnx + ε 
   = α0 +α1 • m1 +α2 • m2 + … +αn • mn + γ0 • lnx+ γ1 • m1• lnx + γ2 • m2• lnx 
+ … + γn • mn• lnx + ε……………………...………………………. (Eq. 4.11) 
 
Eq. 4.11 is the log-log model for the relationship between the dependent variable (y) 
and the independent variable (x).  
 
 Exponential function form  
 
Finally, the exponential functional form was considered. The basic relationship 
between the dependent variable (y) and the independent variable (x) was posited as Eq. 
4.12. 
 
y = 𝑒𝛽0 • 𝑒𝛽1•𝑥 • 𝑒𝜀 ……………………………………………………… (Eq. 4.12) 
 
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides yields the linear estimating equation: 
 




Where the population interceptβ0 and the population slopeβ1 are unknown constants 
andεis a random error component in the population. 
 
Based on the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, it is possible that the relationship 
between the dependent variable (y) and the independent variable (x) is affected by 
other variables (m1, m2… mn). This implies that both the population intercept β0 and 
the population slopeβ1 are likely to be dependent on the value of other variables (m1, 
m2… mn). Thus,  
 
β0  =α0 +α1 • m1 +α2 • m2 + … +αn • mn …………………………….. (Eq. 4.14) 
β1 = γ0 + γ1 • m1 + γ2 • m2 + … + γn • mn ………………………………….. (Eq. 4.15) 
 
where m1, m2… mn represent the variables influencing the relationship between the 
dependent variable (y) and the independent variable (x), the intercepts (α0 and γ0) and 
the slopes (α1, α2, …, αn) and (γ1, γ2, …, γn) are unknown constants.  
 
Eq. 4.13, Eq. 4.14, and Eq. 4.15 can be combined by substituting (α0 +α1 • m1 +α2 
• m2 + … +αn • mn) forβ0 and (γ0 + γ1 • m1 + γ2 • m2 + … + γn • mn) forβ1, then 
 
lny = (α0 +α1 • m1 +α2 • m2 + … +αn • mn)  + (γ0 + γ1 • m1 + γ2 • m2 + … + γn • 
mn)  • x + ε 
   = α0 +α1 • m1 +α2 • m2 + … +αn • mn  + γ0 • x + γ1 • m1 • x + γ2 • m2 • x + … 




Eq. 4.16 is the exponential model for the relationship between the dependent variable 
(y) and the independent variable (x).  
 
As suggested by Jaccard et al. (1990), to overcome the threat of multicollinearity in 
interactive models and facilitate the explanations of the regression coefficients, x, y, 
and (m1, m2… mn) need to be centered (prior to forming the multiplicative term) by 
subtracting the mean variable value from each score of the variables. Such an additive 
transformation will tend to yield low correlations between the product term and the 
component parts of the term (Jaccard et al., 1990).  
 
To choose the appropriate functional form among the alternative model specifications, 
several criteria were suggested by Crown (1998). The first criterion is whether the 
models have statistically significant coefficients with the expected signs as suggested 
by theories. The second criterion is how well each of the models satisfies the 
assumptions underlying the regression model. This is because the complexity of the 
relationships makes the potential distortions and bias more potent when the 
assumptions are violated. For example, models with normal (or nearly normal) error 
distributions are preferred to those whose error distributions are not normal, 
everything else being equal. The third criterion is how well the functional form fits the 
underlying theories. The fourth criterion is that it is generally best to choose the model 
that requires the fewest additional assumptions. In addition, it is tempting to also use 
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the adjusted R2 of the different models as a basis for comparison. Higher R2 means 
more of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent 
variables. The model with higher adjusted R2 is always preferred than those with 
lower adjusted R2. However, the comparison of the adjusted R2 of the different models 
must be used with caution if the dependent variables of the models are inconsistent 
with one another.  
 
4.4.3 Moderation analysis 
 
In this study, it was hypothesized that the relationship between the level of safety 
investments and safety performance is affected by the level of safety culture and 
project hazard level (see Section 3.2). To test whether a third variable affects the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables, moderated regression 
analysis can be used (Tharenou et al., 2007).  
 
A moderator is a variable that affects the direction and or strength of the relation 
between an independent or predictor variable and a dependent variable (Baron and 
Kenny, 1986; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2000). The moderators interact with the 
independent variables to predict the dependent variable (Tharenou et al., 2007). The 
moderated effect (or interaction effect) of two independent variables in determining a 
dependent variable is said to occur when the partial effect of one depends on the value 




Tharenou et al. (2007) summarized the process of conducting moderated regression 
analysis. The first step is to calculate the interaction term between the independent 
variable and the moderator variable by multiplying the two variables together. This is 
called a product term and represents the interaction effect. To avoid multicollinearity, 
the independent and moderator variables need to be transformed by either centering or 
converting them to standardized (z) scores (z-scores are by definition centered). By 
multiplying the two (centered or standardized) scores together, it is possible to 
determine whether their systematic variation is related to the change in the dependent 
variable. An interaction (moderator) effect is indicated if the product term is 
statistically significant, with the independent and moderator variables also included in 
the equation.  
 
The moderator model (see Baron and Kenny, 1986) is described in Figure 4.2. There 
are three paths leading to the dependent variable: the impact of the independent 
variable (x) on the dependent variable (y) (path a); the impact of the moderator 
variable (m) on the dependent variable (y) (path b); and the impact of the interaction 
of the independent variable and the moderator variable (x • m) on the dependent 
variable (y) (path c). The regression model postulates that y is a linear function of x, m 
and the interaction of x and m (x • m) (Eq. 4.17). 
 




Where the interceptβ0 and the slopes (β1, β2 , β3) are unknown constants and ε 







Figure 4.2: The Moderated Regression Model (source: Baron and Kenny, 1986) 
 
Aiken and West (1991) and Cohen et al. (2003) suggested that, to facilitate the 
interpretation the moderation effects (interaction effects), the regression of y on x can 
be plotted on three values of m: the mean value of m; a low value of m; and a high 
value of m. Cohen et al. (2003) recommend a convenient set of values to choose: the 
mean of m (m mean), one standard deviation below the mean of m (m low), and one 
standard deviation above the mean of m (m high). Thus, three simple regression lines 
for y on x at three values of m can be plotted and compared with each other.  
 
4.4.4 Mediation analysis 
 
The purpose of mediation analysis is to examine whether an independent variable 
leads to another variable (the mediator), which then transmits the effects of the 
independent variable to the dependent variable (Baron and Kenny, 1986). A variable 
may be said to function as a mediator to the extent that it accounts for the relation 
c 
b 
a Independent variable (x) 
Moderator (m) 
Product (x • m) 
Dependent variable (y) 
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between the predictor and the criterion (Baron and kenny, 1986). The mediator is an 
intervening variable between a predictor and an outcome or dependent variable 
(Woodworth, 1928). Mediator variable explains how effects of a variable on another 
variable occur (Tharenou et al., 2007). An example of the use of mediation analysis in 
the context of construction is presented by Lingard and Francis (2005), who tested 
whether work–family conflict mediated the relationship between job stressors and 
burnout among male construction professionals, managers and administrators.  
 
There are two types of mediation, namely complete mediation and partial mediation. 
In complete mediation, the independent variable affects the dependent variable only 
indirectly through the mediator, whereas in partial mediation the independent variable 
has both a direct effect on the dependent variable and an indirect effect on the 
dependent variable, the latter being transmitted by the mediator (James and Brett, 
1984). Partial mediation indicates that only part of the total effect of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable is due to mediation by the mediator.  
 
The mediation model (see Baron and Kenny, 1986) is presented in Figure 4.3. 
According to Tharenou et al. (2007), the most common way for testing mediation is to 
use multiple regression. As suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986), three steps need to 
be carried out to test the mediation effect using regression methods.  
 
 Step 1: Regress the mediator on the dependent variable (Figure 4.3, path a), 
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because they need to be related (statistically significant) if the mediator really 






Figure 4.3: The Mediation Model (Source: Baron and Kenny, 1986) 
 
 Step 2: Regress the dependent variable on the independent variable (Figure 4.3, 
path c), because they need to be related (statistically significant) if the 
independent variable could have its influence mediated by another variable. 
 
 Step 3: Add the mediator to this last equation (Figure 4.3, path b). To test this, run 
a regression analysis with both the independent variable and the mediator 
predicting the dependent variable. If the mediator completely transmits the effect 
of the independent variable on the dependent variable, the regression coefficient 
for the independent variable now is no longer statistically significant, because all 
of its effect is removed by going through the mediator variable. It is possible to 
have a partial mediator effect, where the regression coefficient for the 
independent variable goes down in magnitude, but is still statistically significant 




Independent variable (IV) 
Mediator  
Dependent variable (DV) 
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In summary, mediation can be said to occur when: (1) the IV significantly affects the 
mediator; (2) the IV significantly affects the DV in the absence of the mediator; (3) 
the mediator has a significant unique effect on the DV; and (4) the effect of the IV on 
the DV shrinks upon the addition of the mediator to the model (Baron and Kenny, 
1986). 
 
The amount of mediation, which is called the indirect effect, is defined as the 
reduction of the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. To 
determine the significance of the indirect effect, the Sobel test first proposed by Sobel 
(1982) was highly recommended (MacKinnon et al., 2002). The formula for the Sobel 
test was drawn from MacKinnon and Dwyer (1993) and described as below (Eq. 
4.18):  
 
Z-value = a • b / SQRT (b2 • sa2 + a2 • sb2)………………..………………….. (Eq. 4.18) 
 
where a = raw (unstandardized) regression coefficient for the association between 
independent variable and mediator; 
sa = standard error of a; 
b = raw coefficient for the association between the mediator and the 
dependent variable (when the independent variable is also a predictor of 
the dependent variable); and 




4.4.5 Validation methods of regression model 
 
Before a regression model is used, Snee (1977) suggested that some assessment of its 
validity should be made. Model validation aims to determine if the model will 
function successfully in its intended operating environment (Montgomery et al., 
2006).  
 
According to Montgomery et al. (2006) and Fox (1997), an effective method of 
validating a regression model with respect to its prediction performance is to set aside 
some of the original data and use these observations to investigate the model’s 
predictive performance, which is called data splitting (Snee, 1977; Montgomery et al., 
2006) or cross-validation (Stone, 1974; Fox, 1997). Data splitting /cross-validation 
simulates the collection of new data by randomly dividing the original data into two 
parts – the first part to be used for model formulation and the second for model 
validation, which are also called estimation data and prediction data by Snee (1977). 
In a typical cross-validation, the estimation data and prediction data must cross-over 
in successive rounds such that each data point has a chance of being validated against 
(Michaelsen, 1987; Montgomery et al., 2006).  
 
Cross-validation may be done in several ways, e.g., k-fold cross-validation, 
leave-one-out cross-validation, and repeated k-fold cross-validation (Kohavi, 1995). 
Michaelsen (1987) recommended the leave-one-out cross-validation, which is 
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equivalent to the predicted-residual-sum-of-squares (PRESS) procedure as described 
by some researchers (e.g. Weisberg, 1985; Montgomery et al., 2006; Snee, 1977) as 
the best method for a smaller number of observations. Leave-one-out cross-validation 
(LOOCV) or PRESS procedure uses a special form of data splitting to obtain a 
measure of model prediction accuracy. Each observation is left out at a time and 
predicted by a model developed from the remaining (n-1) observations. In this way, 
the model is developed on a dataset that has almost as many degrees of freedom as the 
original and independent predictions are made for each data point (Michaelsen, 1987). 
The predictive performance estimation obtained using LOOCV or PRESS procedure 
is known to be almost unbiased (Efron, 1983), and therefore it was used in this study 
to validate the regression models. The procedures for conducting LOOCV are given 
below. 
 
a) Omit an observation (yi) and develop the model from the remaining 46 
observations; 
 
b) Use the model developed from (a) to predict the omitted observation (ŷ(i)); 
 
c) Repeat steps (a) and (b), each time omitting a different observation (y1, y2, …, y47) 
from calibration; 
 
d) Aggregate the predictions from the various steps (b) into a single “predicted” series 
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(ŷ(1), ŷ(2), …, ŷ(47)); 
e) Compare the aggregated predictions (ŷ(i), i = 1, 2, …, 47) with the original 
observations (yi, i = 1, 2, …, 47) and compute the PRESS statistic, which is defined 
as Eq. 4.19 (Montgomery et al., 2006). 
 
  PRESS =  ∑ [yi − y�(i)]2𝑛𝑖=1 …………………………………………….. (Eq. 4.19) 
 
where yi is the ith observed value, ŷ(i) is the predicted value of the ith response 
based on all observations except the ith one.  
 
f) Compare R2 from the least square fit for all 47 observations and the R2 – like 
statistic for prediction, which is defined as Eq. 4.20 (Montgomery et al., 2006). 
 
  Rprediction2 =  1 − PRESSSST ……………………………………………..….. (Eq. 4.20) 
 
where SST is the Total Sum of Squares. R2prediction measures in an approximate sense 
how much of the variability in new observations the model might be expected to 
explain (Montgomery et al., 2006).  
 
From the above procedures and the definitions of LOOCV /PRESS, it would initially 
seem that calculating the PRESS statistic requires fitting n different regressions. 
Nevertheless, according to Montgomery et al. (2006), it is possible to calculate 
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PRESS statistic from the results of a single least-squares fit to all n observations. A 
simple formula for computing PRESS statistic is given in Eq. 4.21 (Montgomery et al., 
2006). 
 PRESS =  ∑ ( ei
1−hii
)2𝑛𝑖=1 ………………………………………………………. (Eq. 4.21) 
 
where ei is the ordinary residual from a least-squares fit to all n observations, and hii = 




This chapter presented the information regarding research design, data collection 
methods, data analysis methods and data sample characteristics. It explained that a 
quantitative research approach and a regression/correlation research design are 
suitable to be adopted in this study. Multiple data collection techniques, such as 
structured interviews, archival data and questionnaire were used to collect data for this 
study. The data collection instrument is a specially designed questionnaire. 
Correlation and regression analyses were adopted as the main data analysis methods. 































This chapter reports the analysis of data collected. The raw data were presented using 
descriptive statistics and graphical techniques (e.g. Scattergram and Histogram). The 
data were then analyzed using correlation, regression and optimization techniques. 
Section 5.2 reports the main features of the sample and the data collected. Section 5.3 
addresses objective 1 (i.e., to examine the effects of safety investments on safety 
performance of building projects) and objective 2 (i.e., to develop a model for 
determining safety performance of building projects) of this study. Hypothesis 1 (i.e., 
safety performance of building projects is determined by safety investments, safety 
culture and project hazard level as well as their interactions) and its sub-hypotheses 
are also tested in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 analyzes the costs of accidents to building 
contractors (objective 3 of this study) and tests hypotheses 2 and its sub-hypotheses. 
Section 5.5 addresses objective 4 (i.e., to study the optimization of safety investments 
for building projects). In this section, the curves of voluntary safety investments 
(VSIR curve), total accident costs (TACR curve), and total controllable safety costs 
(TCCR curve) are plotted under different project conditions. The financially optimum 
level of voluntary safety investments is quantified with three levels of safety culture 








Out of 117 contractors contacted (see Section 4.3.3), 23 participated in this study 
representing a response rate of 20 per cent. The distribution of the 23 contractors is 
shown in Table 5.1. The response rate ranges from 14 per cent to 29 per cent among 
different BCA grades. Table 5.1 shows that the response rate of large contractors 
(grade A1 and A2) is higher than that of smaller contractors (grade B1 and B2). The 
grade B2 contractors have the lowest response rate (14%) among the four grades. The 
relatively lower response rate in grade B1 and B2 contractors may be attributed to the 
fact that a considerable part of their contracts are subcontracts, especially for B2 
contractors (Teo and Feng, 2011). Thus, it is possible that there were no building 
projects having been completed by some small companies as the main contractor 
within the past three years (Teo and Feng, 2011).  
 
Table 5.1: Distribution of Contractors 
BCA Grade A1 A2 B1 B2 Total 
Population  35 27 57 115 234 
Sampling frame 18 14 28 57 117 
Sample contractors 5 4 6 8 23 
Response rate* 28% 29% 21% 14% 20% 
*Rounding-off error may have occurred. 
 
5.2.2 Profile of projects 
 
The 23 contractors provided information of 47 completed building projects. The 
distributions of the sample projects are shown in Table 5.2. The types of the projects 
comprise commercial building (10.6%), residential building (63.8%), office building 
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(12.8%) and industrial building (12.8%). The contract sum of most projects (83%) 
ranges from SGD 10 million to SGD 100 million. Eighty-three per cent of the projects 
are from private sector, and 17 per cent are from public sector. The sample projects 
are evenly distributed among the four BCA grades. The profile of the projects 
suggests that the data were collected from a wide range of building projects with a 
focus on residential (63.8%), middle-size (83%) and private building projects (83%). 
 
Table 5.2: Characteristics of Sample  















Total  47 100% 
Project Size (Singapore Dollars) 
 
Up to $10 
mil 
5 10.6% 
> $10 mil ≤ 
$50 mil 
29 61.7% 
> $50 mil ≤ 
$100 mil 
10 21.3% 
> $100 mil 3 6.4% 
Total  47 100% 
Type of Client 
 
Private 39 83.0% 
Public 8 17.0% 
































Up to $10 
mil 
> $10 mil ≤ 
$50 mil 
> $50 mil ≤ 
$100 mil 



















Type of Client 
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Profile Number Percent* Histogram 
Height of Building 
 
Up to 5 
stories 
16 34.0% 
> 5 ≤ 10 
stories 
13 27.7% 






Total  47 100% 
Firm’s BCA grade 
 
A1 12 25.5% 
A2 12 25.5% 
B1 11 23.4% 
B2 12 25.5% 
Total  47 100% 
*Rounding-off error may have occurred. 
 
5.2.3 Profile of respondents 
 
As shown in Table 5.3, the interviewees /key contact persons of involved projects 
consist of 42 project managers and 5 safety officers. Each of the interviewees /key 
contact persons provided the information of one completed building project. The 47 
interviewees /key contact persons came from the 23 sample contractors. Out of the 23 
contractors, 5 provided 1 interviewee; 12 provided 2 interviewees; and 6 provided 3 
interviewees. Most of the interviewees or key contact persons were project 
managers/directors, and had more than 10 years of experience in construction industry. 
The average working experience of the interviewees or key contact persons was 13 
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> 5 ≤ 10 
stories 



























Table 5.3: Profile of Interviewees /Key Contact persons 









Total  47 100% 
Years of experience in construction industry 
Up to 5 years 0 0 
 
> 5 ≤ 10 years 9 19.1% 
> 10 ≤ 15 years 27 57.5% 
More than 15 
years 
11 23.4% 
Total  47 100% 
*Rounding-off error may have occurred. 
 
As stated in Section 4.3.6, for each of the interviewed projects, in order to enhance the 
data validity, three members of site management staff, such as project 
managers/directors, construction/site managers, site engineers, safety 
managers/officers, and safety supervisors were requested to complete the Section E 
(project hazard level) and F (safety culture of the project) of the data collection 
instrument. The questionnaires were directly handed over to the three respondents, 
who were requested to fill out Sections E and F before eyes. A total of 141 site 
management staff members responded to the questionnaire. The profile of these 
questionnaire respondents was described in Table 5.4, which shows that over 70 per 
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Table 5.4: Profile of Questionnaire Respondents 












Site engineer 33 23.4% 
Safety supervisor 20 14.2% 
Others  2 1.4% 
Total  141 100% 
Years of experience in construction industry 
Up to 5 years 39 27.7% 
 
> 5 ≤ 10 years 55 39.0% 
> 10 ≤ 15 years 32 22.7% 
More than 15 
years 
15 10.6% 
Total  141 100% 
*Rounding-off error may have occurred. 
 
5.2.4 Characteristics of data 
 
Before inferential statistical analyses were carried out, the characteristics of data 
collected was illustrated through descriptive statistics and graphical techniques, such 
as the frequency histogram, box plots, scattergrams, etc.  
 
5.2.4.1 Contract value 
 
The descriptive statistics for contract value are presented in Table 5.5. The contract 
values of the 47 sample projects range from SGD 7 million to SGD 245 million with a 
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shape of the distributions of the contract values, the frequencies of values are plotted 
in Figure 5.1, which indicates a marked positively skewed (Skewness > 2 * Std. Error) 
distribution of these data.  
 
Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics (Contract Value S$ mil) 
  Statistics Std. Error 
N (Valid / Missing) 47 / 0  
Mean 41.38 6.31 
Median 26.00  
Std. Deviation 43.24  
Variance 1869.34  
Skewness 2.86 0.35 
Kurtosis 10.48 0.68 
Range 238.00  
Minimum 7.00  











5. 2.4.2 Firm’s BCA grade 
 
The descriptive statistics for firm’s BCA grade are presented in Table 5.6 and the 
frequencies of values are plotted in Figure 5.2. Figure 5.2 shows that the sample 
projects are almost evenly distributed among different BCA grades and the shape 
indicates a normally distributed data (Skewness < 2 * Std. Error).  
 
Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics (Firm’s BCA Grade) 
  Statistics Std. Error 
N (Valid / Missing) 47 / 0  
Mean 2.49 0.166 
Median 2.00  
Std. Deviation 1.14  
Variance 1.299  
Skewness 0.027 0.35 
Kurtosis -1.40 0.68 
Range 3  
Minimum 1  
Maximum 4  
 
 




5. 2.4.3 Duration of project 
 
Table 5.7 reports the descriptive statistics for the data about the duration of projects. 
The duration of the 47 sample projects ranges from 14 months to 39 months with a 
mean value of 25.51 months and a standard deviation of 7.49. Figure 5.3 shows that 
these data can be viewed as approximately normal distribution (Skewness < 2 * Std. 
Error). 
 
Table 5.7: Descriptive Statistics (Duration of Project) 
  Statistics Std. Error 
N (Valid Missing) 47 / 0  
Mean 25.51 1.09 
Median 24  
Std. Deviation 7.49  
Variance 56.04  
Skewness 0.21 0.35 
Kurtosis -1.32 0.68 
Range 25  
Minimum 14  
Maximum 39  
 
 




5. 2.4.4 Height of building 
 
Table 5.8 reports the descriptive statistics for the data about the height of building. 
The height of building of the 47 sample projects ranges from 2 storeys to 28 storeys 
with a mean value of 10.1 storeys and a standard deviation of 6.72. The histogram 
(see Figure 5.4) indicates a positive skew for these data (Skewness > 2 * Std. Error).  
 
Table 5.8: Descriptive Statistics (Height of Building) 
  Statistics Std. Error 
N (Valid / Missing) 47 / 0  
Mean 10.1 0.98 
Median 9.00  
Std. Deviation 6.72  
Variance 45.14  
Skewness 0.91 0.35 
Kurtosis -0.003 0.68 
Range 26  
Minimum 2  
Maximum 28  
 
 




5. 2.4.5 Percentage of work completed by subcontractors 
 
Table 5.9 reports the descriptive statistics for the data about the percentage of work 
completed by subcontractors. This percentage ranges from 30 per cent to 95 per cent 
with a mean percentage of 61.28 per cent and a standard deviation of 16.99. The 
histogram (see Figure 5.5) indicates an approximately normal distribution for these 
data (Skewness < 2 * Std. Error). 
 
Table 5.9: Descriptive Statistics (Percentage of Work Completed by Subcontractors) 
  Statistics Std. Error 
N (Valid / Missing) 47 / 0  
Mean 61.28 2.48 
Median 60.00  
Std. Deviation 16.99  
Variance 288.55  
Skewness 0.12 0.35 
Kurtosis -1.00 0.68 
Range 65.00  
Minimum 30.00  
Maximum 95.00  
 
 




5. 2.4.6 Accident severity rate (ASR) 
 
Table 5.10 reports the descriptive statistics for the data about ASR. The ASR of 
sample projects ranges from 6.1 to 2888.2 with a mean value of 342.94 and a standard 
deviation of 489.56. The histogram (see Figure 5.6) indicates a large positive skew for 
these data (Skewness > 2 * Std. Error).  
 
Table 5.10: Descriptive Statistics (ASR) 
  Statistics Std. Error 
N (Valid / Missing) 47 / 0  
Mean 342.94 71.41 
Median 217.30  
Std. Deviation 489.56  
Variance 239666.26  
Skewness 3.70 0.35 
Kurtosis 16.58 0.68 
Range 2882.1  
Minimum 6.10  
Maximum 2888.20  
 
 




5. 2.4.7 Accident frequency rate (AFR) 
 
Table 5.11 reports the descriptive statistics for the data about AFR. The AFR of 
sample projects ranges from 1.53 to 58.33 with a mean value of 21.10 and a standard 
deviation of 12.53. The histogram (see Figure 5.7) indicates a positive skew for these 
data (Skewness > 2 * Std. Error).  
 
Table 5.11: Descriptive Statistics (AFR) 
  Statistics Std. Error 
N (Valid / Missing) 47 / 0  
Mean 21.10 1.83 
Median 19.28  
Std. Deviation 12.53  
Variance 156.90  
Skewness 0.99 0.35 
Kurtosis 0.96 0.68 
Range 56.80  
Minimum 1.53  
Maximum 58.33  
 
 




5. 2.4.8 Total safety investments ratio (TSIR) 
 
Table 5.12 reports the descriptive statistics for the data about total safety investments 
ratio. The total safety investments of sample projects account for 1.62%-3.00% of 
total contract sum with a mean percentage of 2.05% and a standard deviation of 
0.27%. Figure 5.8 indicates a positive skew for these data (Skewness >2 * Std. Error).  
 
Table 5.12: Descriptive Statistics (TSIR) 
  Statistics Std. Error 
N 
Valid 47  
Missing 0  
Mean 2.05 0.04 
Median 2.03  
Std. Deviation 0.27  
Variance 0.074  
Skewness 0.97 0.35 
Kurtosis 2.04 0.68 
Range 1.38  
Minimum 1.62  
Maximum 3.00  
 
 




5. 2.4.9 Basic safety investments ratio (BSIR) 
 
Table 5.13 reports the descriptive statistics for the data about basic safety investments 
ratio. The basic safety investments of sample projects account for 1.20%-2.22% of 
total contract sum with a mean percentage of 1.59% and a standard deviation of 
0.20%. The histogram (see Figure 5.9) indicates an approximate normal distribution 
for these data (Skewness < 2 * Std. Error).  
 
Table 5.13: Descriptive Statistics (BSIR) 
  Statistics Std. Error 
N (Valid / Missing) 47 / 0  
Mean 1.59 0.03 
Median 1.58  
Std. Deviation 0.20  
Variance 0.04  
Skewness 0.66 0.35 
Kurtosis 1.142 0.68 
Range 1.02  
Minimum 1.20  
Maximum 2.22  
 
 




5. 2.4.10 Voluntary safety investments ratio (VSIR) 
 
Table 5.14 reports the descriptive statistics for the data about voluntary safety 
investments ratio. The voluntary safety investments of sample projects account for 
0.30%-0.78% of total contract sum with a mean percentage of 0.46% and a standard 
deviation of 0.11%. The histogram (see Figure 5.10) indicates a marked positive skew 
for these data (Skewness > 2 * Std. Error).  
 
Table 5.14: Descriptive Statistics (VSIR) 
  Statistics Std. Error 
N (Valid /Missing) 47 /0  
Mean 0.46 0.17 
Median 0.44  
Std. Deviation 0.11  
Variance 0.01  
Skewness 1.05 0.35 
Kurtosis 0.79 0.68 
Range 0.48  
Minimum 0.30  
Maximum 0.78  
 
 




5.2.4.11 Project hazard index (PHI) 
 
Table 5.15 reports the descriptive statistics for the data about project hazard index. 
The PHI of sample projects ranges from 1.63 to 4.03 with a mean value of 2.90 and a 
standard deviation of 0.54. The histogram (see Figure 5.11) indicates an 
approximately normal distribution for these data (Skewness < 2 * Std. Error).  
 
Table 5.15: Descriptive Statistics (PHI) 
  Statistics Std. Error 
N 
Valid 47  
Missing 0  
Mean 2.90 0.08 
Median 2.81  
Std. Deviation 0.54  
Variance 0.29  
Skewness 0.14 0.35 
Kurtosis -0.42 0.68 
Range 2.40  
Minimum 1.63  
Maximum 4.03  
 
 




5.2.4.12 Safety culture index (SCI) 
 
Table 5.16 reports the descriptive statistics for the data about safety culture index. The 
SCI of sample projects ranges from 3.25 to 4.02 with a mean value of 3.58 and a 
standard deviation of 0.18. The histogram (see Figure 5.12) indicates an 
approximately normal distribution for these data (Skewness < 2 * Std. Error).  
 
Table 5.16: Descriptive Statistics (SCI) 
  Statistics Std. Error 
N (Valid /Missing) 47 /0  
Mean 3.58 0.03 
Median 3.59  
Std. Deviation 0.18  
Variance 0.03  
Skewness 0.20 0.35 
Kurtosis -0.24 0.68 
Range 0.77  
Minimum 3.25  
Maximum 4.02  
 
 




5.2.4.13 Total accident costs ratio (TACR) 
 
Table 5.17 reports the descriptive statistics for the data about total accident costs ratio. 
The total accident costs of sample projects ranges from 0.12% of contract sum to 0.83% 
of contract sum with a mean value of 0.25% of contract sum and a standard deviation 
of 0.14%. The histogram (see Figure 5.13) indicates quite a large positive skew for 
these data (Skewness > 2 * Std. Error).  
 
Table 5.17: Descriptive Statistics (TACR) 
  Statistics Std. Error 
N (Valid /Missing) 47 /0  
Mean 0.25 0.02 
Median 0.2  
Std. Deviation 0.14  
Variance 0.02  
Skewness 2.37 0.35 
Kurtosis 6.07 0.68 
Range 0.71  
Minimum 0.12  
Maximum 0.83  
 
 




The descriptive statistics and the histograms indicate that some variables (e.g. 
Duration of project, firm’s BCA grade, percentage of work completed by 
subcontractors, BSIR, SCI and PHI) have approximately normal distribution; while 
some may not have normal distribution (e.g. Contract value, height of building, ASR, 
AFR, TSIR, VSIR and TACR). Data transformation may be necessary when the 
variables that are not normally distributed are used to perform some types of statistical 
analyses which make the assumption of normally distributed data. Moreover, the 
interpretation of the statistical results deserves meticulous cautions (Dancey and 
Reidy, 2004). 
 
5.3 Factors influencing safety performance of building projects 
 
5.3.1 Bivariate correlations 
 
Bivariate correlation analysis (see Section 4.4.1) was conducted to identify the factors 
influencing safety performance (measured by AFR and ASR) of building projects. 
Although the descriptive statistics indicate that some variables (e.g. ASR, AFR, TSIR 
and VSIR) do not have normal distributions, Moore (2000) suggests that, with a 
sample size greater 40, the statistical inference is quite robust in Pearson correlations. 
Thus, no data transformation was conducted. Figure 5.14 presents the bivariate 
correlation coefficients, distributions of variables, and scatter plot which may indicate 
some relationships between variables. Figure 5.14 shows that Accident Severity Rate 
(ASR) is significantly (p<0.05) correlated with Safety Culture Index (SCI) (r=-0.46) 
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and Project Hazard Index (PHI) (r=0.363). Accident Frequency Rate (AFR) is 
significantly (p<0.05) correlated with Total Safety Investments Ratio (TSIR) 
(r=-0.436), Basic Safety Investments Ratio (BSIR) (r=-0.282), Voluntary Safety 
Investments Ratio (VSIR) (r=-0.539), and SCI (r=-0.439). This result shows that the 
two safety performance indicators (AFR and ASR) are correlated with different sets of 
variables. The specific effects of variables on the two safety performance indicators 
are analyzed in Sections 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4 and 5.3.5. The relationship between AFR 
and ASR is analyzed in Section 5.3.6. A further discussion about the two safety 
performance indicators is provided in Section 6.2. 
 
The results (see Figure 5.14) also show that the correlation between Voluntary Safety 
Investments Ratio (VSIR) and AFR (r = -0.539, p = 0.000) is much stronger than the 
correlation between Basic Safety Investments Ratio (BSIR) and AFR (r = -0.282, p = 
0.045). It is possible that different types of safety investments play different roles in 
determining safety performance of building projects. The effects of basic safety 
investments and voluntary safety investments on safety performance are analyzed in 
Section 5.3.3 and Section 5.3.4, respectively. Further discussions about the basic 
safety investments and voluntary safety investments are provided in Section 6.3 and 






Figure 5.14: Correlations and Scatterplot Matrix 
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Moreover, SCI was found to be positively correlated with VSIR (r = 0.347, p < 0.05) 
and TSIR (r = 0.316, p < 0.05), while no significant (p > 0.05) relationship was found 
between BSIR and SCI (r = 0.23). As shown in Figure 5.14, AFR is significantly 
(p<0.05) correlated with TSIR (r=-0.436), VSIR (r=-0.539) and SCI (r=-0.439). It is 
possible that the increase in total safety investments or voluntary safety investments 
leads to the improvement of safety culture, which then transmits the effects of total 
safety investments or voluntary safety investments to the safety performance. The 
effects of TSIR and VSIR on AFR are likely to be mediated by SCI. The mediated 
effects of TSIR and VSIR on AFR are tested in Section 5.3.2 and Section 5.3.4, 
respectively.  
 
5.3.2 Effects of total safety investments on safety performance 
 
This section examines the effects of total safety investments on safety performance of 
building projects. In this study, it was hypothesized that the effect of safety 
investments on safety performance varies with the level of safety culture and project 
hazard level (see hypothesis 1.4 and hypothesis 1.5 in Section 3.2). Moderated 
regression analysis (see Section 4.4.3) was used to test whether safety culture level 
and project hazard level modify the relationship between total safety investments and 
AFR; and the results are reported in Section 5.3.2.1.  
 
As discussed in the previous section (Section 5.3.1), the effects of total safety 
investments on safety performance are likely to be mediated by safety culture level. 
The mediation effects were tested using the regression methods suggested by Baron 
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and Kenny (1986) (see Section 4.4.4); and the results are presented in Section 5.3.2.2.  
 
Based on the results of bivariate correlation analysis (see Section 5.3.1), TSIR was 
significantly correlated with AFR, while no significant relationship was found 
between TSIR and ASR. Thus, AFR was used as the safety performance indicator 
when testing the moderation effects and mediation effects of total safety investments 
to safety performance. 
 
Before the regression analyses are performed, the basic assumptions (refer to Section 
4.4.2 for details) underlying regression analysis were checked. As shown in Figure 
5.14, the scatterplot matrix contains the scatterplot for all the metric variables in the 
data set. Examination of the scatterplots (Figure 5.14) does not reveal either apparent 
nonlinear relationships or a dramatically different type of dot cluster. The histograms 
of the variables (refer to Figures 5.7, 5.8, 5.11 and 5.12) indicate that the variables 
PHI and SCI have an approximate normal distribution, whilst variables AFR and 
TSIR exhibit positively skewed distribution. As regression analysis has been shown to 
be quite robust even when the normality assumptions are violated, then the original 
variables may be preferred for the comparability in the interpretation phase (Hair et 
al., 1998). Thus, transformations are not deemed necessary.  
 
The scatter plots were used to explore the potential patterns of the relationships 
between TSIR and AFR. To explore whether the patterns are different under different 
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project hazard and safety culture conditions, five scattergrams are presented: (1) 
plotting the scatters using all cases (Figure 5.15); (2) plotting the scatters under higher 
project hazard level (i.e. when PHI >mean = 2.90) (see Figure 5.16); (3) plotting the 
scatters under lower project hazard level (i.e. when PHI ≤ 2.90) (see Figure 5.17); (4) 
plotting the scatters under higher safety culture level (i.e. when SCI > mean= 3.58) 
(see Figure 5.18); and (5) plotting the scatters under lower safety culture level (i.e. 
when SCI ≤ 3.58) (see Figure 5.19).  
 
 





Figure 5.16: Plotting AFR on TSIR (when PHI >2.90) 
 
 






Figure 5.18: Plotting AFR on TSIR (when SCI > 3.58) 
 
 





From the Figures 5.15, 5.16, 5.17, 5.18 and 5.19, a general negative tendency of the 
relationship between AFR and TSIR is indicated. Furthermore, it seems that the 
relationship between TSIR and AFR does not show significant differences under 
different project hazard levels; while this relationship looks different under different 
safety culture levels. Section 5.3.2.1 uses the moderation and mediation analyses to 
further explore the potential relationship between AFR and TSIR.  
 
5.3.2.1 Test of the moderated effects of total safety investments on safety performance 
 
According to Aguinis (1995), to test whether a third variable affects the relationship 
between the dependent variable and the independent variable(s), moderated regression 
analysis can be used. The process of conducting the moderated regression analysis 
and the moderated regression model were presented in Section 4.4.3. The regression 
model for testing whether PHI affects the relationship between TSIR and AFR posits 
that AFR is a linear function of TSIR, PHI, and the interaction of TSIR and PHI 
(TSIR * PHI) (Eq. 5.1).  
 
AFR =β0 +β1 • TSIR +β2 • PHI+β3 • TSIR • PHI +ε…………………….. (Eq. 5.1) 
 
Where the interceptβ0 and the slopes (β1, β2, and β3) are unknown constants, ε 
is a random error component. 
 
The results of regression analysis are presented in Table 5.18 and Table 5.19. Table 
5.19 shows that the effect of TSIR on AFR is significant (p<0.01). The regression 
coefficients for TSIR and PHI reflect conditional relationships: the regression 
213 
 
coefficient for TSIR reflects the influence of TSIR on AFR when PHI is at the mean 
level (centred PHI = 0), and the coefficient for PHI reflects the effect of PHI on AFR 
when TSIR equals its mean value (centred TSIR = 0).  
 
Table 5.18: Model Summary (Regress AFR on TSIR, PHI and TSIR * PHI) 
Model Summary  
R 0.511 
R2 0.262 
Adjusted R2  0.210 
Standard Error of the Estimate 11.13 
F 5.077 
Sig. 0.004 
R2 Contribution of the Product Term 0.044 
Durbin-Watson 2.059 
 
Table 5.19: Model Coefficients (Regress AFR on TSIR, PHI and TSIR*PHI) 
Model B           Std. Error t Sig. 
Constant 21.17 1.62 13.03 0.000 
Centered TSIR -18.82 6.11 -3.08 0.004 
Centered PHI 3.16 3.06 1.03 0.306 
Product term -21.17 13.16 -1.60 0.115 
 
From Table 5.19, the effect of the TSIR * PHI product variable on AFR is not 
significant (p>0.05) and, as can be seen in Table 5.18, the product variable only 
explains 4.4% of the variance in AFR. Thus, the relationship between the level of 
TSIR and AFR is not significantly moderated by project hazard level.  
 
A moderated regression model was also developed to test whether the effect of TSIR 
on AFR is moderated by SCI. The results of moderation analysis are presented Tables 
5.20 and 5.21. Table 5.21 shows that the interaction between TSIR and SCI 
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(TSIR*SCI) does not significantly affect AFR, which means that the effect of total 
safety investments on accident frequency rate is not moderated by the safety culture 
level of the project.  
 
Table 5.20: Model Summary (Regress AFR on TSIR, SCI and TSIR* SCI) 
Model Summary  
R 0.567 
R2 0.321 
Adjusted R2 0.274 
Standard Error of the Estimate 10.67 
F 6.8 
Sig. 0.001 
R2 Contribution of the Product Term 0.031 
 
Table 5.21: Model Coefficients (Regress AFR on TSIR, SCI and TSIR *SCI) 
Model B           Std. Error t Sig. 
Constant 21.76 1.62 13.37 0.000 
Centered TSIR -11.03 6.79 -1.62 0.111 
Centered SCI -24.84 9.35 -2.65 0.011 
Product term -44.65 31.71 -1.41 0.166 
 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that, in this model, the effect of TSIR on AFR is no 
longer significant (p>0.05) with the effects of SCI and their interaction term on AFR 
being partialled out. This finding may further support the assumption (see Section 
5.3.1) that the effects of total safety investments on safety performance are mediated 
by safety culture level.  
 
In the next section, the mediated regression analysis was carried out to test whether 
there is a mediated effect of TSIR on AFR.  
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5.3.2.2 Test of the mediated effects of total safety investments on safety performance 
 
Following the standard or hierarchical regression method suggested by Baron and 
Kenny (1986) (see Section 4.4.4), to test whether the effect of TSIR (independent 
variable) to AFR (dependent variable) is mediated/transmitted by SCI (mediator), 
three steps were carried out.  
 
 Regress SCI on TSIR (path a, Figure 4.3 in Section 4.4.4), because they need to 
be related (statistically significant) if safety culture really does mediate TSIR. 
 Regress AFR on TSIR (path c, Figure 4.3 in Section 4.4.4), because they need to 
be related (statistically significant) if TSIR could have its influence mediated by 
another variable. 
 Regress AFR on both TSIR and SCI (path b, Figure 4.3 in Section 4.4.4). If safety 
culture transmits the effect of TSIR on AFR, the regression coefficient for TSIR 
now is significantly reduced, because its effect is removed by going through the 
mediator variable. 
 
The results of regression analysis for path a (regress SCI on TSIR) are presented in 
Tables 5.22 and 5.23. The relationship between SCI and TSIR is expressed by means 
of the following equation (Eq. 5.2):  
 
SCI = 3.155 + 0.208 • TSIR + ε …………………………………………...(Eq. 5.2) 
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where ε is the residual term. The effect of TSIR on SCI is significant (β=0.316, 
p<0.05).  
 
Table 5.22 Model Summary (Regress SCI on TSIR) 
Model Summary  
R 0.316 
R2 0.1 
Adjusted R2 0.08 










 B Std. Error β   
Constant 3.155 0.192  16.403 0.000 
TSIR 0.208 0.063 0.316 2.238 0.030 
 
Tables 5.24 and 5.25 show the results of regressing AFR on TSIR (path c). The 
regression equation is expressed as follows (Eq. 5.3): 
 
AFR = 62.394 – 20.1 • TSIR + e ……………...…………………………….(Eq. 5.3) 
 
where e is the residual term. TSIR is significantly related to AFR (β=-0.436, p<0.01).  
 
Table 5.24: Model Summary (Regress AFR on TSIR) 
Model Summary  
R 0.436 
R2 0.19 
Adjusted R2 0.172 






Table 5.25 Model Coefficients (Regress AFR on TSIR) 
 Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
 B Std. Error β 
Constant 62.394 12.831  4.863 0.000 
TSIR -20.100 6.193 -0.436 -3.246 0.002 
 
For the last step, SCI was added to the Eq. 5.3. A regression analysis with both SCI 
and TSIR for predicting AFR was conducted and the results are presented in Tables 
5.26 and 5.27. The regression equation is then expressed as follows (Eq.5.4): 
 
AFR =136.672 – 15.208 • TSIR – 23.544 • SCI + ε ……………….……(Eq. 5.4) 
 
where ε is the residual term. It was found that, in this equation, although both the 
effects of SCI (β=-0.335, p<0.05) and TSIR (β=-0.330, p<0.05) on AFR were 
significant, the effect of TSIR on AFR shrank upon the addition of SCI to the model. 
Based on the conditions in which mediation can be said to occur (see Section 4.4.4), it 
could be inferred that the effects of TSIR to AFR are partially mediated by SCI. 
 
Table 5.26 Model Summary (Regress AFR on TSIR and SCI) 
Model Summary  
R 0.539 
R2 0.291 
Adjusted R2 0.258 







Table 5.27 Model Coefficients (Regress AFR on TSIR and SCI) 




 B Std. Error β   
Constant 136.672 32.075  4.261 0.000 
TSIR -15.208 6.177 -0.330 -2.462 0.018 
SCI -23.544 9.410 -0.335 -2.502 0.016 
 
Furthermore, Sobel Test (see Section 4.4.4) was carried out to determine the 
significance of the indirect effect by the mediator (SCI). The result of the Sobel Test 
presented in Table 5.28 shows that the mediated/indirect effects by SCI are significant 
(p<0.05). Based on the results of Baron and Kenny (1986) method and Sobel Test, it 
could be concluded that the effects of TSIR on AFR are partially transmitted by SCI. 
There are both direct and indirect effects of total safety investments to AFR. 
 
Table 5.28 Results of Sobel Test (Mediated effect of TSIR on AFR) 
Input Results 
a b sa sb Test statistic Std. Error p-value 
0.208 -23.544 0.063 9.41 -1.994 2.456 0.046 
 
In summary, accident frequency rate of building projects was found to be negatively 
related to the level of total safety investments. The relationship between the level of 
total safety investments and accident frequency rate is not moderated by project 
hazard level. As there is no correlation between TSIR and PHI (see Figure 5.14), the 
effects of total safety investments to accident frequency rate are not mediated project 




As for project safety culture, the results also show that it does not moderate the effects 
of total safety investments on accident frequency rate. Nonetheless, the results of 
mediation analysis indicate that variations in levels of total safety investments account 
for variations in the levels of safety culture and that variations in the levels of safety 
culture account for variations in the accident frequency rate. Both direct and indirect 
effects between the level of total safety investments and accident frequency rate were 
detected. Total safety investment was found to have its impact on accident frequency 
rate by partially going through the mediator, safety culture. In-depth discussions about 
these results were developed in Section 6.3. 
 
5.3.3 Effects of basic safety investments on safety performance 
 
Having examined the effects of total safety investments on safety performance, this 
section examines the effects of basic safety investments on safety performance of 
building projects.  
 
The results of bivariate correlation analysis (see Figure 5.14 in Section 5.3.1) show 
that BSIR is negatively correlated to AFR (r = -0.282, p < 0.05), while it has no 
significant (p > 0.05) correlation with ASR (r = -0.099). Moderated regression 
analysis (see Section 4.4.3) was used to test whether the effect of basic safety 
investments on AFR is moderated by safety culture level (see Section 5.3.3.1) and 
project hazard level (see Section 5.3.3.2) of building projects. As shown in Figure 
5.14 (see Section 5.3.1), BSIR has no significant (p > 0.05) correlations with SCI (r = 
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0.23) and PHI (r = -0.007). This result indicates that the effect of BSIR to AFR is not 
mediated by SCI and PHI. Thus, mediation analysis was not conducted in this section.  
 
Before the regression analysis was performed, the assumptions (refer to Section 4.4.2 
for details) of linearity, homoscedasticity and normality are checked by visually 
examining the scatterplots (see Figure 5.14) and histograms (see Figures 5.7, 5.9, 5.11 
and 5.12). The examination of scatterplots (see Figure 5.14) did not reveal any 
apparent violations of linearity and homoscedasticity assumptions. The histograms of 
AFR (see Figure 5.7), BSIR (see Figure 5.9), SCI (see Figure 5.12) and PHI (see 
Figure 5.11) indicate that BSIR, SCI and PHI meet the assumption of normality, while 
AFR shows a positively skewed distribution. However, for the comparability in the 
interpretation phase and robustness of the regression techniques, transformations are 
not deemed necessary.  
 
The scatter plots were used to explore the patterns of the relationships between BSIR 
and AFR. To explore whether the patterns are different under different project hazard 
and safety culture conditions, five scattergrams are presented: (1) plotting the scatters 
using all cases (Figure 5.20); (2) plotting the scatters under higher project hazard level 
(i.e. when PHI >mean = 2.90) (see Figure 5.21); (3) plotting the scatters under lower 
project hazard level (i.e. when PHI ≤ 2.90) (see Figure 5.22); (4) plotting the scatters 
under higher safety culture level (i.e. when SCI > mean= 3.58) (see Figure 5.23); and 
(5) plotting the scatters under lower safety culture level (i.e. when SCI ≤ 3.58) (see 
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Figure 5.24).  
 
Figure 5.20: Plotting AFR on BSIR (All Cases) 
 
 





Figure 5.22: Plotting AFR on BSIR (when PHI ≤ 2.90) 
 
 





Figure 5.24: Plotting AFR on BSIR (when SCI ≤ 3.58) 
 
From the Figures 5.20, 5.21, 5.22, 5.23 and 5.24, a general negative tendency of the 
relationship between AFR and BSIR is indicated. Furthermore, by visually examining 
the estimated relationship between AFR and BSIR under different PHI and SCI levels, 
the slope of estimated lines looks different under different project hazard and safety 
culture levels. The effect of BSIR on AFR seems stronger when SCI and PHI are 
higher. The following sections (Sections 5.3.3.1 and 5.3.3.2) use the moderation 
analysis to further explore the potential relationship between AFR and BSIR.  
 
5.3.3.1 Moderated effects (interaction effects) of basic safety investments and safety 
culture on AFR 
 
Following the procedures for running the moderated regression analysis that have 
been described in Section 4.4.3, the moderated regression model postulates that AFR 
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is a linear function of BSIR, SCI, and the interaction of BSIR and SCI (BSIR * SCI) 
(Eq. 5.5).  
 
AFR =β0 +β1 • BSIR +β2 • SCI+β3 • BSIR • SCI +ε…………………….. (Eq. 5.5) 
 
Where the interceptβ0 and the slopes (β1, β2 , β3) are unknown constants, ε is 
a random error component. 
 
The results of regression analysis are presented in Tables 5.29 and 5.30. It was shown 
that the interaction term between BSI and SCI (BSI * SCI) has a significant effect on 
AFR (p < 0.05). The R2 contribution of the interactive effect on AFR is 6.3%.  
 
Table 5.29: Model Summary (Regress AFR on BSIR, SCI and BSIR *SCI) 
Model Summary  
R 0.539 
R2 0.29 
Adjusted R2 0.24 
Standard Error of the Estimate 10.92 
F 5.85 
Sig. 0.002 
R2 Contribution of the Product Term 0.063 
 
Table 5.30: Model Coefficients (Regress AFR on BSIR, SCI and BSIR * SCI)  
Model B           Std. Error t Sig. 
Constant 21.82 1.63 13.34 0.000 
Centered BSIR -5.72 8.83 -0.64 0.520 
Centered SCI -30.51 9.38 -3.25 0.002 
Product term -90.27 46.31 -1.98 0.047 
 
Following the interpretation method of interactions suggested by Aiken and West 
(1991) and Cohen et al. (2003) (see Section 4.4.3), three simple regression equations 
for AFR on centered BSIR at three values of centered SCI (+1 Std. Dev., mean, and -1 
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Std. Dev.) were summarized in Table 5.31, and the lines were plotted in Figure 5.25.  
 
Table 5.31: Summary of Simple Regression Equations for AFR on Centered BSIR at 
Three Values of Centered SCI 
 Simple regression 
line 1 (SCI +1 Std. Dev.) 
Simple regression 
line 2 (SCI mean) 
Simple regression 
line 3 (SCI -1 Std. Dev.) 
Moderator SCI SCI SCI 
Level of the Moderator +1 Std. Dev. Mean -1 Std. Dev 
Simple slope -21.81* -5.72 10.36 
Intercept 16.39 21.82 27.26 
Std. Error of simple 
slope 
9.68 21.82 14.08 
Degree of Freedom 43 43 43 
T -2.25 -0.64 0.74 













Figure 5.25: Simple Regression Lines for AFR on Centered BSIR at Three Values of 
Centered SCI. 
 





SCI is high (SCI=+1 Std. Dev.), but no longer significant when SCI is at mean level 
(SCI=mean value) or low (SCI=-1 Std. Dev.). It was noteworthy that the simple slope 
of the simple regression line 3 (SCI=-1 Std. Dev.) is positive (10.36), which means 
that when the level of safety culture is low, the relationship between BSIR and AFR 
becomes positive. BSIR plays a positive role in accident prevention of building 
projects under high safety culture environment, while it plays a negative role under 
low safety culture environment. This finding is not consistent with the popular 
assumption that the higher the safety investment is, the better the safety performance 
will be (Levitt, 1975; Laufer, 1987; Brody et al., 1990; Hinze, 2000). This could 
perhaps explain why there were discrepancies on the relationship between safety 
investments and safety performance in previous studies, such as Crites (1995) and 
Tang et al. (1997). More in-depth discussions about this finding are provided in 
Section 6.4. 
 
5.3.3.2 Moderated effects (interaction effects) of basic safety investments and project 
hazard level on AFR 
 
Moderated regression analysis (see Section 4.4.3) was also used to test the moderated 
effects (interactive effects) of basic safety investments and project hazard level on 
AFR. The regression model postulates that AFR is a linear function of BSIR, PHI, and 
the interaction of BSIR and PHI (BSIR * PHI) (Eq. 5.6).  
 
AFR =β0 +β1 • BSIR +β2 • PHI+β3 • BSIR • PHI +ε…………………….. (Eq. 5.6) 
 
Where the interceptβ0 and the slopes (β1, β2 , β3) are unknown constants, ε is 
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a random error component. 
 
The results of regression analysis are presented in Tables 5.32 and 5.33. Table 5.33 
shows that the interaction term between BSIR and PHI (BSIR * PHI) has a significant 
effect on AFR (p <0.05). The R2 contribution of the interactive effects of BSIR and 
PHI on AFR is 8.6%.  
 
Table 5.32: Model Summary (Regress AFR on BSIR, PHI and BSIR * PHI) 
Model Summary  
R 0.43 
R2 0.19 
Adjusted R2 0.13 
Standard Error of the Estimate 11.67 
F 3.33 
Sig. 0.028 
R2 Contribution of the Product Term 0.086 
 
Table 5.33: Model Coefficients (Regress AFR on BSIR, PHI and BSIR * PHI) 
Model B           Std. Error t Sig. 
Constant 21.07 1.70 12.38 0.000 
Centered BSIR -20.62 8.70 -2.37 0.022 
Centered PHI 3.26 3.18 1.03 0.309 
Product term -39.06 18.30 -2.13 0.038 
 
Following the interpretation method of interactions suggested by Aiken and West 
(1991) and Cohen et al. (2003) (see Section 4.4.3), three simple regression equations 
for AFR on centered BSIR at three values of centered PHI (+1 Std. Dev., mean, and -1 




Table 5.34: Summary of Simple Regression Equations for AFR on Centered BSIR at 
Three Values of Centered PHI 
 Simple regression line 
1 (PHI +1 Std. Dev.) 
Simple regression line 
2 (PHI mean) 
Simple regression line 
3 (PHI -1 Std. Dev.) 
Moderator PHI PHI PHI 
Level of the 
Moderator 
+1 Std. Dev. Mean -1 Std. Dev 
Simple slope -41.75** -20.62* 0.51 
Intercept 22.84 21.07 19.30 
Std. Error of simple 
slope 
14.23 8.70 12.04 
Degree of Freedom 43 43 43 
T -2.25 -2.37 0.04 
Sig. of simple slope 0.003 0.011 0.483 











Figure 5.26: Simple Regression Lines for AFR on Centered BSIR at Three Values of 
Centered PHI 
 
As indicated in Table 5.34, the effect of BSIR on AFR is negative and significant 
when PHI is high (PHI= +1 Std. Dev) and at mean level (PHI= mean value), but no 
longer significant when PHI is low (PHI= -1 Std. Dev). The variance of the simple 
slopes for AFR on BSIR at different levels of PHI indicates a stronger positive effect 





about this result are provided in Section 6.4.  
 
In summary, the results of this section show that the relationship between BSIR and 
AFR is moderated by both SCI and PHI. This finding indicates that the effect of basic 
safety investments on AFR does not hold constant for all building projects. Basic 
safety investments have stronger positive effect on the reduction of accident 
frequency rate for those projects with higher project hazard level and higher safety 
culture level. Please refer to Section 6.4 for more in-depth discussions about this 
finding.  
 
5.3.4 Effects of voluntary safety investments on safety performance 
 
Having examined the effects of basic safety investments on safety performance, this 
section examines the effects of voluntary safety investments on safety performance of 
building projects.  
 
The results of bivariate correlation analysis (see Figure 5.14 in Section 5.3.1) show 
that VSIR is significantly correlated to AFR (r = -0.539, p < 0.05), while it is not 
significantly (p > 0.05) correlated with ASR (r = -0.109). This indicates that with the 
increase of VSIR, the frequency of construction accidents tends to be reduced. 
Moderated regression analysis (see Section 4.4.3) was used to test whether the effect 
of voluntary safety investments on AFR is moderated by safety culture level (see 
Section 5.3.4.1) and project hazard level (see Section 5.3.4.2) of building projects. As 
discussed in Section 5.3.1, the effect of voluntary safety investments on safety 
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performance is likely to be mediated by safety culture level. The mediation effects 
were tested using the regression methods suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) (see 
Section 4.4.4), and the results were presented in Section 5.3.4.3.  
 
Before the regression analyses are performed, the basic assumptions (refer to Section 
4.4.2 for details) underlying regression analysis are checked. Examination of the 
scatterplots (Figure 5.14) does not reveal either apparent nonlinear relationships or a 
dramatically different type of dot cluster. The histograms of AFR (see Figures 5.7), 
VSIR (see Figure 5.10), PHI (see Figure 5.11) and SCI (see Figure 5.12) indicate that 
the variables PHI and SCI have an approximate normal distribution, whilst variables 
AFR and VSIR exhibit positively skewed distribution. As regression analysis has been 
shown to be quite robust even when the normality assumptions are violated, then the 
original variables may be preferred for the comparability in the interpretation phase 
(Hair et al., 1998). Thus, transformations are not deemed necessary. The scatter plots 
were used to explore the patterns of the relationships between VSIR and AFR. To 
explore whether the patterns are different under different project hazard and safety 
culture conditions, five scattergrams are presented: (1) plotting the scatters using all 
cases (Figure 5.27); (2) plotting the scatters under higher project hazard level (i.e. 
when PHI >mean = 2.90) (see Figure 5.28); (3) plotting the scatters under lower 
project hazard level (i.e. when PHI ≤ 2.90) (see Figure 5.29); (4) plotting the scatters 
under higher safety culture level (i.e. when SCI > mean= 3.58) (see Figure 5.30); and 
(5) plotting the scatters under lower safety culture level (i.e. when SCI ≤ 3.58) (see 




Figure 5.27: Plotting AFR on VSIR (All Cases) 
 
 















Figure 5.31: Plotting AFR on VSIR (When SCI ≤3.58) 
 
 
From the Figures 5.27, 5.28, 5.29, 5.30 and 5.31, a general negative tendency of the 
relationship between AFR and VSIR is indicated. Furthermore, it seems that the 
relationship between VSIR and AFR does not show significant differences under 
different project hazard levels; while this relationship looks different under different 
safety culture levels. The following sections (Sections 5.3.4.1, 5.3.4.2 and 5.3.4.3) 
uses the moderation and mediation analyses to further explore the potential 
relationship between AFR and TSIR.  
 
5.3.4.1 Moderated effects (interaction effects) of voluntary safety investments and 
safety culture level on AFR 
 
To test the moderated effects (interaction effects) of VSIR and SCI on AFR, the 
regression model postulates that AFR is a linear function of VSIR, SCI, and the 
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interaction of VSIR and SCI (VSIR * SCI) (Eq. 5.7).  
 
AFR =β0 +β1 • VSIR +β2 • SCI+β3 • VSIR • SCI +ε…………………….. (Eq. 5.7) 
 
Where the interceptβ0 and the slopes (β1, β2 , β3) are unknown constants, ε is 
a random error component.  
 
The results of regression analysis are presented in Tables 5.35 and 5.36. It is shown 
that the interaction term between VSIR and SCI (VSIR * SCI) does not have a 
significant effect on AFR (p > 0.05). The R2 contribution of the interactive effect on 
AFR is only 2.02%. Thus, the effect of VSIR on AFR is not moderated by the level of 
safety culture of the project.  
 
Table 5.35: Model Summary (Regress AFR on VSIR, SCI and VSIR * SCI) 
Model Summary  
R 0.619 
R2 0.383 
Adjusted R2 0.340 
Standard Error of the Estimate 10.177 
F 8.89 
Sig. 0.000 
R2 Contribution of the Product Term 0.020 
 
Table 5.36: Model Coefficients (Regress AFR on VSIR, SCI and VSIR * SCI) 
Model B           Std. Error t Sig. 
Constant 21.68 1.56 13.85 0.000 
Centered VSIR -43.95 14.37 -3.05 0.003 
Centered SCI -18.66 9.06 -2.05 0.045 




5.3.4.2 Moderated effects (interaction effects) of voluntary safety investments and 
project hazard level on AFR 
 
To test the moderated effects (interaction effects) of VSIR and PHI on AFR, the 
regression model postulates that AFR is a linear function of VSIR, PHI, and the 
interaction of VSIR and PHI (VSIR* PHI) (Eq. 5.8).  
 
AFR =β0 +β1 • VSIR +β2 • PHI+β3 • VSIR • PHI +ε…………………….. (Eq. 5.8) 
 
Where the interceptβ0 and the slopes (β1, β2 , β3) are unknown constants, ε is 
a random error component.  
 
The results of regression analysis are presented in Tables 5.37 and 5.38. As shown in 
Table 5.38, the t-value for the coefficient of the product term is -0.06 with an 
associated probability of 0.948, thus it is possible that the regression coefficient has 
arisen by sampling error. In addition, the R2 contribution of the interactive effect of 
VSIR and PHI on AFR was found to be quite low (0.01%). Therefore, the effect of 
VSIR on AFR is not moderated by the project hazard level.  
 
Table 5.37: Model Summary (Regress AFR on VSIR, PHI and VSIR * PHI) 
Model Summary  
R 0.572 
R2 0.327 
Adjusted R2 0.280 
Standard Error of the Estimate 10.626 
F 6.97 
Sig. 0.001 




Table 5.38: Model Coefficients (Regress AFR on VSIR, PHI and VSIR * PHI) 
Model B           Std. Error T Sig. 
Constant 21.10 1.55 13.57 0.000 
Centered VSIR -59.96 14.63 -4.09 0.000 
Centered PHI 4.40 3.00 1.46 0.149 
Product term -1.94 29.62 -0.06 0.948 
 
5.3.4.3 Mediation effects of voluntary safety investments on AFR 
 
Mediated regression was carried out to test whether the effect of VSIR (independent 
variable) on AFR (dependent variable) is mediated /transmitted by SCI (mediator). 
Following the steps to test the mediation effects that were described in Section 4.4.4, 
regression analyses for path a, b, and c were conducted.  
 
The results of regression analysis for path a (regress SCI on VSI) are presented in 
Table 5.39 and Table 5.40. The relationship between SCI and VSI is expressed by 
means of the following equation (Eq. 5.9):  
 
SCI = 3.332 + 0.539 • VSIR + ε…………………………………………...(Eq. 5.9) 
 
where ε is the residual term. The effect of VSIR on SCI is significant (β=0.347, 
p<0.05).  
 
Table 5.39: Model Summary (Regress SCI on VSIR) 
Model Summary  
R 0.347 
R2 0.12 
Adjusted R2 0.101 












 B Std. Error β   
Constant 3.332 0.104  32.186 0.000 
VSIR 0.539 0.217 0.347 2.478 0.017 
 
Table 5.41 and Table 5.42 describe the results of regressing AFR on VSIR (path c). 
The regression equation is expressed as Eq. 5.10. 
 
AFR = 48.34 – 58.89 • VSIR + ε ……………...……………………….(Eq. 5.10) 
 
where ε is the residual term. VSIR is significantly related to AFR (β =-0.539, 
p<0.01).  
 
Table 5.41: Model Summary (Regress AFR on VSIR) 
Model Summary  
R 0.539 
R2 0.29 
Adjusted R2 0.275 




Table 5.42: Model Coefficients (Regress AFR on VSIR) 




 B Std. Error β   
Constant 48.34 6.537  7.395 0.000 
VSIR -58.89 13.726 -0.539 -4.291 0.000 
 
For the last step, SCI was added to Eq. 5.10. A regression analysis with both SCI and 
VSIR for predicting AFR was conducted and the results were presented in Table 5.43 
and Table 5.44. The regression equation is then expressed as Eq. 5.11. 
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AFR =115.56 – 48.03 • VSIR – 20.17 • SCI + ε…………………………(Eq. 5.11) 
 
where ε is the residual term.  
 
It is found that, in this equation, although both the effects of SCI (β =-0.287) and 
VSIR (β =-0.439) on AFR are significant (p <0.05), the effect of VSIR on AFR 
shrinks upon the addition of SCI to the model. Based on the conditions in which 
mediation can be said to occur (see Section 4.4.4), it could be inferred that the effect 
of VSIR to AFR is partially mediated by SCI.  
 
Table 5.43: Model Summary (Regress AFR on VSIR and SCI) 
Model Summary  
R 0.602 
R2 0.363 
Adjusted R2 0.334 




Table 5.44: Model Coefficients (Regress AFR on VSIR and SCI) 




 B Std. Error β   
Constant 115.56 30.70  3.764 0.000 
VSIR -48.03 14.02 -0.439 -3.425 0.001 
SCI -20.17 9.02 -0.287 -2.236 0.030 
 
Furthermore, Sobel Test (see Section 4.4.4) was carried out to determine the 
significance of the indirect effects by the mediator (SCI). The result of the Sobel Test 
is presented in Table 5.45. The result shows that the mediated/indirect effect by SCI is 
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significant (p <0.05). Thus, based on the results of Baron and Kenny (1986) method 
and Sobel Test, it could be concluded that the effects of voluntary safety investments 
on AFR are partially mediated (transmitted) by safety culture level. There are both 
direct and indirect effects of voluntary safety investments to AFR.  
 
Table 5.45: Results of Sobel Test (Mediated effect of VSIR on AFR) 
Input Results 
a b sa sb Test statistic Std. Error p-value 
0.539 -30.88 0.217 9.42 -1.98 2.52 0.047 
 
In summary, the results of moderation analysis in Sections 5.3.4.1 and 5.3.4.2 show 
that the relationship between the level of voluntary safety investments and accident 
frequency rate is not moderated by project hazard level and safety culture level. 
Nonetheless, the results of mediation analysis in Section 5.3.4.3 show that the effect 
of voluntary safety investments on accident frequency rate is partially mediated by 
safety culture level. This finding suggests that increase in voluntary safety 
investments may lead to the enhancement of safety culture, which then transmits the 
effects of voluntary safety investments to the safety performance. Both direct and 
indirect effects between the level of voluntary safety investments and accident 
frequency rate were detected. More discussions regarding the effects of voluntary 





5.3.5 Moderated effects (interaction effects) of safety culture level and project hazard 
level on safety performance 
 
Hypothesis 1 (see Section 3.2) of this study posits that safety performance of building 
projects is determined by the interactions of safety investments, safety culture and 
project hazard level. Previous sections (Sections 5.3.2, 5.3.3 and 5.3.4) have 
examined the interactions of safety investments and safety culture level and the 
interactions of safety investments and project hazard level in determining safety 
performance of building projects. This section examines the interactions of safety 
culture level and project hazard level in determining safety performance of building 
projects. The results of bivariate correlation analysis (see Figure 5.14 in Section 5.3.1) 
show that SCI is significantly (p <0.05) correlated with both ASR (r = -0.46) and AFR 
(r = -0.439) of building projects. It suggests that both ASR and AFR would be 
reduced with the increase of safety culture level of a building project. Moderated 
regression analysis (see Section 4.4.3) was conducted to test if the effects of SCI on 
ASR and AFR are moderated by PHI.  
 
Before the regression analysis was performed, the basic assumptions (refer to Section 
4.4.2 for details) underlying regression analysis are checked. Examination of the 
scatterplots (Figure 5.14) does not reveal either apparent nonlinear relationships or a 
dramatically different type of dot cluster. The histograms of the variables (refer to 
Figures 5.6, 5.7, 5.11 and 5.12) indicate that the variables PHI and SCI have an 
approximate normal distribution, whilst variables AFR and ASR exhibit positively 
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skewed distribution. As regression analysis has been shown to be quite robust even 
when the normality assumptions are violated, then the original variables may be 
preferred for the comparability in the interpretation phase (Hair et al., 1998). Thus, 
transformations are not deemed necessary.  
 
The scatter plots were used to explore the patterns of the relationships between SCI 
and ASR. To explore whether the patterns are different under different project hazard 
conditions, three scattergrams are presented: (1) plotting the scatters using all cases 
(Figure 5.32); (2) plotting the scatters under higher project hazard level (i.e. when 
PHI >mean = 2.90) (see Figure 5.33); and (3) plotting the scatters under lower project 
hazard level (i.e. when PHI ≤ 2.90) (see Figure 5.34). 
 
 





Figure 5.33: Plotting ASR on SCI (When PHI >2.90) 
 
 
Figure 5.34: Plotting ASR on SCI (When PHI ≤2.90) 
 
Similarly, the scatter plots were also used to explore the patterns of the relationships 
between SCI and AFR. To explore whether the patterns are different under different 
project hazard conditions, three scattergrams are presented: (1) plotting the scatters 
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using all cases (Figure 5.35); (2) plotting the scatters under higher project hazard level 
(i.e. when PHI >mean = 2.90) (see Figure 5.36); and (3) plotting the scatters under 
lower project hazard level (i.e. when PHI ≤ 2.90) (see Figure 5.37). 
 
 
Figure 5.35: Plotting AFR on SCI (All Cases) 
 
 





Figure 5.37: Plotting AFR on SCI (When PHI ≤2.90) 
 
 
5.3.5.1 Moderated effects (interaction effects) of safety culture level and project 
hazard level on ASR 
 
To test the moderated effects (interaction effects) of SCI and PHI to ASR, the 
regression model postulates that ASR is a linear function of SCI, PHI, and the 
interaction of SCI and PHI (SCI * PHI) (Eq. 5.12).  
 
ASR =β0 +β1 • SCI +β2 • PHI +β3 • SCI • PHI + ε………………..…...(Eq. 5.12) 
 
Where the interceptβ0 and the slopes (β1, β2 , β3) are unknown constants, ε is 
a random error component.  
 
The results of regression analysis are presented in Table 5.46 and Table 5.47. The 
results show that the interaction term between SCI and PHI (SCI * PHI) has a 
significant effect on ASR (p < 0.05). The R2 contribution of the interactive effect on 
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AFR is 5.6%. 
 
Table 5.46: Model Summary (Regress ASR on SCI, PHI and SCI * PHI) 
Model Summary  
R 0.649 
R2 0.421 
Adjusted R2 0.381 
Standard Error of the Estimate 385.174 
F 10.437 
Sig. 0.000 
R2 Contribution of the Product Term 0.056 
 
Table 5.47: Model Coefficients (Regress ASR on SCI, PHI and SCI * PHI) 
Model B           Std. Error t Sig. 
Constant 350.603 56.30 6.22 0.000 
Centered SCI -1266.88 320.76 -3.95 0.000 
Centered PHI 309.64 107.52 2.88 0.006 
Product term -1327.83 648.38 -2.05 0.046 
 
Three simple regression equations for ASR on centered SCI at three values of 
centered PHI (+1 Std. Dev., mean, and -1 Std. Dev.) were summarized in Table 5.48, 
and the lines were plotted in Figure 5.38. 
 
Table 5.48: Summary of Simple Regression Equations for ASR on Centered SCI at 
Three Values of Centered PHI 
 Simple regression line 
1 (PHI +1 Std. Dev.) 
Simple regression line 
2 (PHI mean) 
Simple regression line 
3 (PHI -1 Std. Dev.) 
Moderator PHI PHI PHI 
Level of the 
Moderator 
+1 Std. Dev. Mean -1 Std. Dev 
Simple slope -1985.27** -1266.88** -548.50 
Intercept 518.12 350.60 183.08 
Std. Error of simple 
slope 
452.53 320.76 497.08 
Degree of Freedom 43 43 43 
T -4.387 -3.949 -1.103 
Sig. of simple slope 0.000 0.000 0.276 




As shown in Table 5.48, the effect of SCI on ASR is negative and significant when 
PHI is high (PHI=+1 Std. Dev) and at mean level (PHI=mean value), but no longer 
significant when PHI is low (PHI=-1 Std. Dev). The variance of the simple slope for 
ASR on SCI at different levels of PHI indicates a stronger positive effect of SCI on 





Figure 5.38: Simple Regression Lines for ASR on Centered SCI at Three Values of 
Centered PHI 
 
5.3.5.2 Moderated effects (interaction effects) of safety culture level and project 
hazard level on AFR 
 
To test the moderated effects (interaction effects) of SCI and PHI to AFR, the 
regression model postulates that AFR is a linear function of SCI, PHI, and the 
interaction of SCI and PHI (SCI * PHI) (Eq. 5.13).  
 






Where the interceptβ0 and the slopes (β1, β2 , β3) are unknown constants, ε is 
a random error component.  
 
The results of moderated regression analysis were presented in Table 5.49 and Table 
5.50. As shown in Table 5.50, the t-value for the coefficient of the product term is 
1.54 with an associated probability of 0.131, thus it is possible that the regression 
coefficient has arisen by sampling error. In addition, the R2 contribution of the 
interactive effect of SCI and PHI on AFR was found to be low (4%). Therefore, the 
effect of SCI on AFR is not moderated by the PHI. 
 
Table 5.49: Model Summary (Regress AFR on SCI, PHI and SCI *PHI) 
Model Summary  
R 0.516 
R2 0.267 
Adjusted R2 0.215 
Standard Error of the Estimate 11.094 
F 5.212 
Sig.  0.004 
R2 Contribution of the Product Term 0.04 
 
Table 5.50: Model Coefficients (Regress AFR on SCI, PHI and SCI *PHI) 
Model B           Std. Error t Sig. 
Constant 20.935 1.621 12.908 0.000 
Centered SCI -33.000 9.239 -3.572 0.001 
Centered PHI 5.228 3.097 1.688 0.098 
Product term 28.754 18.676 1.540 0.131 
 
5.3.6 Relationship between accident frequency rate (AFR) and accident severity rate 
(ASR) 
 
This study aims to develop a model for determining safety performance of building 
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projects (see objective 2 in Section 1.4). However, it was found that the two indicators 
of safety performance (ASR and AFR) are correlated with different sets of variables 
(see Section 5.3.1). ASR is significantly (p <0.05) correlated to SCI (r = -0.46) and 
PHI (r =0.363). AFR is significantly (p <0.05) correlated with TSIR (r = -0.436), 
BSIR (r = -0.282), VSIR (r = -0.539), and SCI (r = -0.439). This finding suggests that 
AFR and ASR may measure the different aspects of safety performance. It also 
suggests that the differences and relationship between AFR and ASR should be 
recognized in the model for determining safety performance of building projects.  
 
This section examines the relationship between the two indicators of safety 
performance (AFR and ASR). Figure 5.14 (in Section 5.3.1) shows that ASR is 
significantly (p <0.05) and positively correlated with AFR (r =0.512) and PHI (r 
=0.363), while no significant (p >0.05) correlation was found between AFR and PHI 
(r =0.155). Moderation analysis (see Section 4.4.3) was conducted to test if the 
relationship between ASR and AFR is moderated by PHI.  
 
Before the regression analysis is carried out, the basic assumptions (refer to Section 
4.4.2 for details) underlying regression analysis are checked. Examination of the 
scatterplots (Figure 5.14) does not reveal either apparent nonlinear relationships or a 
dramatically different type of dot cluster. The histograms of the variables (refer to 
Figures 5.6, 5.7 and 5.11) indicate that the variable PHI has an approximate normal 
distribution, whilst variables AFR and ASR exhibit positively skewed distribution. As 
regression analysis has been shown to be quite robust even when the normality 
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assumptions are violated, then the original variables may be preferred for the 
comparability in the interpretation phase (Hair et al., 1998). Thus, transformations are 
not deemed necessary.  
 
The scatter plots were used to explore the patterns of the relationships between AFR 
and ASR. To explore whether the patterns are different under different project hazard 
conditions, three scattergrams are presented: (1) plotting the scatters using all cases 
(Figure 5.39); (2) plotting the scatters under higher project hazard level (i.e. when 
PHI >mean = 2.90) (see Figure 5.40); and (3) plotting the scatters under lower project 
hazard level (i.e. when PHI ≤ 2.90) (see Figure 5.41). 
 
 













The regression model postulates that ASR is a linear function of AFR, PHI, and the 
interaction of AFR and PHI (AFR * PHI) (Eq. 5.14).  
 
ASR =β0 +β1 • AFR +β2 • PHI +β3 • AFR • PHI + ε……………..…...(Eq. 5.14) 
 
where the interceptβ0 and the slopes (β1, β2 , β3) are unknown constants, ε is a 
random error component. The results of regression analysis are presented in Table 
5.51 and Table 5.52. It shows that the interaction term between AFR and PHI (AFR * 
PHI) has a significant effect on ASR (p<0.05). The R2 contribution of the interactive 
effect on ASR is 4.4%. 
 
Table 5.51: Model Summary (Regress ASR on AFR, PHI and AFR *PHI) 
Model Summary  
R 0.624 
R2 0.389 
Adjusted R2 0.346 
Standard Error of the Estimate 395.82 
F 9.121 
Sig. 0.000 
R2 Contribution of the Product Term 0.044 
 
Table 5.52: Model Coefficients (Regress ASR on AFR, PHI and AFI *PHI) 
Model B           Std. Error t Sig. 
Constant 327.80 58.36 5.62 0.000 
Centered AFR 17.68 4.72 3.74 0.001 
Centered PHI 230.33 110.76 2.08 0.043 
Product term 14.68 8.30 2.07 0.043 
 
Three simple regression equations for ASR on centered AFR at three values of 
centered PHI (+1 Std. Dev., mean, and -1 Std. Dev.) were summarized in Table 5.53, 




Table 5.53: Summary of Simple Regression Equations for ASR on Centered AFR at 
Three Values of Centered PHI 
 Simple regression line 
1 (PHI +1 Std. Dev.) 
Simple regression line 
2 (PHI mean) 
Simple regression line 
3 (PHI -1 Std. Dev.) 
Moderator PHI PHI PHI 
Level of the 
Moderator 
+1 Std. Dev. Mean -1 Std. Dev 
Simple slope 25.62 17.68 9.74 
Intercept 452.42 327.80 203.18 
Std. Error of simple 
slope 
6.30 4.73 6.73 
Degree of Freedom 43 43 43 
T 4.07 3.74 1.446 










Figure 5.42: Simple Regression Lines for ASR on Centered AFR at Three Values of 
Centered PHI 
 
As indicated in Table 5.53, the relationship between AFR on ASR is positive and 
significant when PHI is high (PHI = +1 Std. Dev) and at mean level (PHI =mean 
value), but no longer significant when PHI is low (PHI = -1 Std. Dev). The variance 




positive relationship between AFR and ASR under higher project hazard conditions. 
This finding is discussed in Section 6.2.  
 
5.4 Accident costs of building projects 
 
This Section examines the costs of accidents to building contractors (objective 3 of 
this study). Section 5.4.1 estimates the accident costs of building projects. Section 
5.4.2 addresses the magnitude of indirect accident costs and the factors influencing 
the magnitude of indirect accident costs. Section 5.4.3 investigates the factors 
influencing total accident costs of building projects and the factors influencing the 
relationship between accident frequency rate and total accident costs of building 
projects.  
 
5.4.1 Estimation of accident costs of building projects 
 
As presented in Section 4.3.1, the direct accident costs comprise the insured costs 
(DC1), medical leave wages (not covered by insurance policy) (DC2), medical 
expenses (not covered by insurance policy) (DC3), and lump sum compensation for 
permanent incapacity or death (not covered by insurance policy) (DC4). Based on the 
data collected from 47 building projects, the average direct accident costs for building 
projects in Singapore were estimated to be 0.165% of contract sum.  
 
The indirect accident costs consist of the following 13 cost items:  
 
 lost productivity due to the injured worker (IC1);  
254 
 
 lost productivity due to crew of injured worker (IC2);  
 lost productivity due to other workers in vicinity of accident (IC3);  
 losses due to replacement of the injured worker (IC4);  
 lost productivity due to the investigation or inspections as a result of the injury (IC5);  
 cost of supervisory or staff effort (IC6);  
 damaged equipment or plant, property, material or finished work due to the accident 
(IC7);  
 cost of transporting injured worker (IC8);  
 consumption of first-aid materials (IC9);  
 additional work required as a result of the accident (e.g. cleaning, additional barriers and 
so on) (IC10);  
 fines and legal expenses (IC11);  
 losses due to Stop Work Orders (SWO) issued to the project (IC12); and  
 additional benefits to the injured worker beyond the Work Compensation Act (WCA) 
(IC13).  
 
The survey result shows that the average indirect accident costs of the 47 building 
projects were 0.086% of contract sum. The survey result further reveals that not all 
the above 13 cost items were encountered by each of the accidents. Figure 5.43 shows 
how often the 13 cost items were encountered in connection with the 168 MOM 
reportable accidents collected. It was found that there are large variations in the 
frequency in which these items were involved in the 168 accidents. As shown in 
Figure 5.43, the items with relatively lower incidence rate (less than 30% of total 
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accidents) include: lost productivity due to other workers in vicinity of accident (IC3); 
fines and legal expenses (IC11); losses due to SWO issued to the project (IC12); and 
additional benefits to the injured worker beyond WCA (IC13). The items with 
relatively higher incidence rate (more than 70% of total accidents) include: lost 
productivity due to crew of the injured worker (IC2); cost of supervisory or staff effort 






Figure 5.43: Occurrence of Indirect Accident Cost Items  
 
Total accident costs (TAC) of building projects comprise the direct accident costs 
(DAC) and indirect accident costs (IAC). Among the 47 building projects examined, 
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TACR is 0.25% of total contract sum of a building project. This result is not much 
different from Tang et al.’s (1997) study, where the average accident loss ratio 
(equivalent to TACR in this study) was 0.31% of contract sum of a building project in 
Hong Kong. The major reason for the difference of the two research studies may lie in 
the methods used to collect data of accident costs. Compared with the components of 
accident costs used by Tang et al. (1997), this study classified the compensation to 
injured workers into two categories: the compensation covered by insurance policy; 
and the compensation not covered by insurance policy. The former was measured by 
the insurance premium paid by the contractors; whist the latter was measured by the 
amount of money directly paid to the injured workers by the employers. However, in 
Tang et al. (1997)’s study, the compensation to the injured person was assumed to be 
fully undertaken by the contractors. This may partly account for why the average 
accident costs ratio of building projects in Tang et al. (1997)’s study is slightly higher 
than that of this study. Moreover, the difference between the two figures (i.e., 0.25% 
and 0.31%) may also be explained by the differences in compensation required by 
legislation, wage level, and price level between Singapore and Hong Kong.  
 
5.4.2 Magnitude of indirect accident costs 
 
5.4.2.1 Estimation of indirect to direct accident costs ratio 
 
Based on the definition (see Section 2.4.2), direct costs of accidents tend to be those 
associated with the treatment of the injury and any unique compensation offered to 
workers as a consequence of being injured (Hinze, 1997). These costs are explicit and 
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easily ascertained by employers. However, the indirect costs remain, for the most part, 
either hidden or attributed to other accounting ledgers (Brody et al., 1990). To show 
the magnitude of indirect accident costs to employers, the ratio between indirect 
accidents costs and direct accidents costs building projects was examined.  
 
In this study, the average indirect accident cost was estimated to be 0.086% of total 
contract sum of a building project, and the average direct accident cost was estimated 
to be 0.165% of contract sum. Thus, a ratio between the average indirect accident 
costs and average direct accident costs of building projects was obtained, in the order 
of 1: 1.92. This result shows that the indirect accident costs account for about 50% of 
the direct accident costs. For every dollar paid by employers for the treatment and 
compensation of the injured worker, there would be additional 0.5 dollar of “hidden” 
losses. It suggests that the “hidden” costs of accidents are substantial, and therefore 
the focus on the perceived or explicit costs of accidents fails to show the “true reality” 
of accident costs. This finding reinforces Brody et al.’s (1990) study, which found that 
the existence of the indirect accident costs would stimulate additional prevention 
expenditures. It is consistent with the findings of many studies (Head and Harcourt, 
1997; Everett and Frank, 1996; Hinze, 1991; Leopold and Leonard, 1987; Heinrich, 
1931) that the indirect accident costs are significant and should be paid much attention 
to.  
 
5.4.2.2 Factors influencing the costs ratio 
 
Bivariate correlation analysis was conducted to determine whether the ratio of indirect 
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to direct accident costs is affected by project characteristics, such as company size 
(CS), project size (PS), project duration (PD), project hazard index (PHI) and 
percentage of work completed by sub-contractors (SUB). The results of correlation 
analysis presented in Figure 5.44 show that the indirect to direct accident costs ratio is 
significantly (p < 0.05) and positively correlated with the percentage of work 
completed by subcontractors (r = 0.345) and company size of contractors (r = 0.292). 
 
Figure 5.44: Factors Influencing the Ratio of Indirect Costs to Direct Costs 
  PHI CS PS PD SUB IAC /DAC 
PHI 1 
     
CS 0.282 1 
    
PS 0.225 0.593** 1 
   
PD 0.399** 0.621** 0.630** 1 
  




.314 .292* .027 .163 .345* 1 
* p< 0.05 (2-tailed); ** p< 0.01 (2-tailed). 
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• Percentage of work completed by subcontractors 
 
The positive correlation between the indirect to direct accident costs ratio and the 
percentage of work completed by subcontractors (see Figure 5.44) suggests that the 
more the work is executed by subcontractors, the higher the indirect accident costs 
would be. The involvement of more employers in the construction site may explain 
some of the variations. The involvement of more subcontractors in the project tends to 
increase the levels of management. It seems that, in a construction site with more 
subcontractors, more people would be involved in the administration, communication, 
investigation and inspection processes when an accident occurs. Thus the costs 
incurred in these processes due to the occurrence of an accident tend to be relatively 
higher if more work is undertaken by subcontractors. 
 
The influence of percentage of work undertaken by subcontractors on the magnitude 
of indirect accident costs could also be partly explained by the findings of Hinze 
(1991) that the cost ratios between indirect and direct cost vary with different types of 
contract such as lump sum contracts and cost reimbursable contracts. Hinze (1991) 
argued that a poorly managed cost reimbursable contract provides an inherent 
incentive for sub-contractors to increase costs. Moreover, where more subcontractors 
are employed, more costs would be incurred by those actions such as accident 




• Company size 
 
The positive correlation between the indirect to direct costs ratio and company size 
(see Figure 5.44) indicates that more indirect costs would be incurred by the accidents 
in larger contractors. This result supports Rikhardsson and Impgaard’s (2004) finding 
that more accident costs would be incurred in larger companies than in smaller 
companies. Rikhardsson and Impgaard (2004) found that, when an accident occurs in 
larger companies, more formal activities are initiated than in smaller companies. More 
people tend to be involved; more internal administrative processes need to be 
complied with; and more organisational levels have to be informed.  
 
As the projects of larger companies are generally larger than those of smaller 
companies, Hinze’s (1991) study provides another possible reason for the positive 
relationship between company size and the costs ratio. Hinze (1991) found that larger 
projects generally employ greater numbers of workers resulting in work being 
performed in more crowded conditions, and thus an injury would be expected to have 
a broader indirect cost impact on a larger project.  
 
5.4.3 Factors influencing total accident costs 
 
Total accident costs of building projects are sum of direct accident costs and indirect 
accident costs. Bivariate correlation analysis was conducted to identify the factors 
influencing the total accident costs of building projects. The results presented in 
Figure 5.45 show that TACR is significantly (p <0.05) and positively correlated to 
AFR (r =0.668) and PHI (r=0.489). This result suggests that more costs tend to be 
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incurred with the increase of accident frequency rate and project hazard level.  
 
Figure 5.45: Factors Influencing Total Accident Costs 
  TACR AFR PHI CS PS PD SUB 
TACR 
       
AFR 0.668**   
     
PHI 0.489** 0.155 
     
CS 0.223 0.027 0.282 
    
PS 0.031 -0.100 0.225 0.593** 
   
PD 0.098 -0.007 .399** 0.621** 0.630** 
  
SUB 0.247 0.024 0.314* 0.561** 0.517** 0.397** 
 
* p<0.05 (2-tailed); ** p<0.01 (2-tailed). 
 
To explore whether the patterns of the relationships between AFR and TACR are 
different under different project hazard conditions, scatter plots were used. In this 
regard, three scattergrams are presented: (1) plotting the scatters using all cases 
(Figure 5.46); (2) plotting the scatters under higher project hazard level (i.e. when 
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PHI >mean = 2.90) (see Figure 5.47); and (3) plotting the scatters under lower project 
hazard level (i.e. when PHI ≤ 2.90) (see Figure 5.48). 
 
Figure 5.46: Plotting TACR on AFR (All Cases) 
 
 





Figure 5.48: Plotting TACR on AFR (When PHI ≤2.90) 
 
 
Moderated regression analysis (see Section 4.4.3) was applied to test if there are 
interactive effects of AFR and PHI on total accident cost. Before the regression 
analysis was carried out, the basic assumptions (refer to Section 4.4.2 for details) 
underlying regression analysis were checked. Examination of the scatterplots (Figure 
5.45) does not reveal either apparent nonlinear relationships or a dramatically 
different type of dot cluster. The histograms of the variables (refer to Figures 5.7, 5.11 
and 5.13) indicate that all the three variables (i.e., AFR, PHI and TACR) exhibit 
positively skewed distribution. As regression analysis has been shown to be quite 
robust even when the normality assumptions are violated, then the original variables 
may be preferred for the comparability in the interpretation phase (Hair et al., 1998). 
Thus, transformations are not deemed necessary. The results of regression analysis are 
presented in Tables 5.54 and 5.55. Table 5.55 shows that the interaction term between 
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AFR and PHI (AFR * PHI) has a significant effect on TACR (p<0.05). The R2 
contribution of the interactive effect on TACR is 8.7% (see Table 6.3).  
 
Table 5.54: Model Summary (regress TACR on AFR, PHI and AFR*PHI) 
Model Summary  
R 0.828 
R 2 0.685 
Adjusted R 2 0.663 
Standard Error of the Estimate 0.084 
F 31.159 
Sig. 0.000 
R 2 Contribution of the Product Term 0.087 
 
Table 5.55: Model Coefficients (regress TACR on AFR, PHI and AFR*PHI) 
Model B           Std. Error t Sig. 
Constant 0.245 0.012 19.79 0.000 
Centered AFR 0.006 0.001 6.75 0.000 
Centered PHI 0.092 0.023 3.92 0.000 
Product term 0.006 0.002 3.44 0.001 
 
Three simple regression equations for TACR on centered AFR at three values of 
centered PHI (+1 Std. Dev., mean, and -1 Std. Dev.) are summarized in Table 5.56, 
and the lines are plotted in Figure 5.49. 
 
Table 5.56: Summary of Simple Regression Equations for TACR on Centered AFR 
 Simple regression 
line 1 (PHI+1 Std. Dev.) 
Simple regression 
line 2 (PHImean) 
Simple regression 
line 3 (PHI-1 Std. Dev.) 
Moderator PHI PHI PHI 
Level of the Moderator +1 Std. Dev. Mean -1 Std. Dev 
Simple slope 0.010** 0.007** 0.004* 
Intercept 0.296 0.246 0.196 
Std. Error of simple slope 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Degree of Freedom 43 43 43 
t 7.518 6.756 2.450 
Sig. of simple slope 0.000 0.000 0.018 




Figure 5.49: Simple Regression Lines for TACR on Centered AFR 
 
The variations of the simple slopes show that there is a stronger positive effect of AFR 
on TACR under higher project hazard level. The relationship between the number of 
accidents and the total costs of accidents of a building project is dependent on the 
project hazard level. One possible reason is that the higher level of project hazard (e.g., 
higher heights of building and more work in confined spaces) tends to be associated 
with greater chance of severe accidents, which would incur more medical expenses 
and compensation for the injured workers. Moreover, longer period of absence of 
injured workers due to the more severe injuries may result in higher indirect costs of 
accidents. For example, it appears unnecessary for contractors to hire another worker 
to replace the worker with less severe injuries (e.g., less than 7 days of medical care) 
because the injured worker is expected to return to work in a short period (i.e., less 





than 30 days of absence), especially those who are responsible for a key function in 
the production process or have key responsibilities, would impact the productivity of 
the work group and the schedule of the project, which would force the contractors to 
employ another worker to replace the injured worker. In such cases, additional costs 
tend to be incurred by the recruitment, selection, training and certification of new 
workers (Hinze, 1997).  
 
5.5 Optimization of safety investments 
 
This Section addresses objective 4 (i.e., to study the optimization of safety 
investments for building projects) of this study. Section 5.5.1and Section 5.5.2 
estimate the equations for predicting voluntary safety investments ratio (VSIR curve) 
and total accident costs ratio (TACR curve), respectively. Then, the model for 
predicting total controllable safety costs ratio (TCCR curve) is constructed through 
the combination of VSIR curve and TACR curve (see Section 5.5.3). The safety 
investments optimization model is developed with the objective of minimizing total 
controllable safety costs ratio for building projects (see Section 5.5.3). The curves of 
voluntary safety investments (VSIR curve), total accident costs (TACR curve), and 
total controllable safety costs (TCCR curve) are plotted under different project 
conditions. The financially optimum level of voluntary safety investments is 
quantified with three levels of safety culture and three levels of project hazard (see 




5.5.1 Equation for predicting voluntary safety investments 
 
5.5.1.1 Development of regression model 
 
Based on the analysis in Section 5.3.4, voluntary safety investments ratio was 
negatively related to accident frequency rate and the relationship between voluntary 
safety investments ratio and accident frequency rate was affected by the level of 
safety culture. Therefore, voluntary safety investments ratio could be predicted using 
accident frequency rate and safety culture index. Multiple regression modeling (see 
Section 4.4.2) was used to estimate the equation for predicting voluntary safety 
investments ratio. To determine (or approximate) the functional form for the 
relationship between VSIR and AFR, a limited amount of experimentation was 
conducted using the approach described in Section 4.4.2. The linear, log-log (for 
double log), and exponential versions of the model were estimated and then the “best” 
one was chosen among the alternative model specifications.  
 
Following the method of regression modeling in Section 4.4.2, the linear, log-log (for 
double log), and exponential functional forms for predicting VSIR are given below. 
 
 Basic linear functional form  
VSIR = β0 + β1 • SCI + β2 • AFR + β3 • SCI • AFR +ε……………..…… (Eq. 5.15) 
 
 Log-log functional form  




 Exponential function form  
ln (VSIR) =β0 +β1 • SCI +β2 • AFR +β3 • SCI • AFR + ε………………(Eq. 5.17) 
 
To overcome the threat of multicollinearity in interactive models, the variables were 
centered (prior to forming the multiplicative term) by subtracting the mean variable 
value from each score of the variables (see Section 4.4.2). Table 5.57 reports estimates 
for these three types of functional forms. Model 1 is the log-log model; model 2 is the 
exponential model; and model 3 is the basic linear model.  
 













Coef. t Coef. t Coef. T 
(Ln (AFR))centered -0.154** -3.409 ------ ------ ------ ------ 
AFR centered ------ ------ -0.010** -4.136 -0.005** -3.952 
SCI centered 0.187 1.089 0.257 1.551 0.134 1.635 
(SCI) centered (Ln AFR) centered -0.455* -2.268 ------ ------ ------ ------ 
(SCI) centered ( AFR) centered ------ ------ -0.031** -3.273 -0.016** -3.361 
CONSTANT -0.825** -28.913 -0.828** -30.209 0.448** 32.976 
F 11.657 12.04 11.719 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.410 0.418 0.411 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01 
 
The criteria for choosing the best functional form were presented in Section 4.4.2. As 
shown in Table 5.57, all three of the models produce similar results regarding the 
signs and statistical significance of the variables, the error distributions, and the 
adjusted R2 in different models. However, Brody et al. (1990) found that at extremely 
low levels of risk the preventive costs curve is asymptotic to the vertical axis (see 
Figure 2.5). This indicates that the elimination of all risks is unlikely even with huge 
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prevention expenditures. It seems that the curve derived by the log-log functional 
form is the best one to meet this condition. Consequently, the log-log model was 
selected as the most appropriate model for predicting VSIR of building projects.  
 
As shown in Table 5.57, as the effect of SCI on VSIR was not significant (r = 0.187, 
p > 0.05), it was dropped from the regression model to increase the power of 
prediction. The parameters of the log-log model were re-estimated and reported in 
Table 5.58.  
 
Table 5.58: Adjusted Log-Log Model for Predicting VSIR 













Constant  -0.823** 
(Ln AFR)c -0.177** 
(SCI)c • (Ln AFR)c -0.405* 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01 
 
Thus, the equation for predicting VSIR is written in Eq. 5.18. 
 
Ln VSIR = - 0.823 – 0.177 • (Ln AFR)c - 0.405 • (SCI)c • (Ln AFR)c…..….. (Eq. 5.18) 
 
where (Ln AFR)c and (SCI)c are the centered variables and derived from Eq. 5.19 and 
Eq. 5.20. 
 




(SCI)c = SCI - (SCI)mean = SCI – 3.58…………………………….……...…. (Eq. 5.20) 
 
To enhance the validity of the estimated equation, the following assumptions (refer to 
Section 4.4.2 for details) underlying multiple regression analysis were checked:  
 
The first assumption, linearity, was assessed through an analysis of residuals and 
partial regression plots. Figure 5.50 shows the analysis of Studentized Residuals. It 
does not exhibit any nonlinear pattern to the residuals, thus ensuring that the overall 
equation is linear. Figure 5.51 presents the partial regression plots for each 
independent variable in this equation (Eq. 5.18). As can be seen in Figure 5.51, for 
both independent variables, no nonlinear pattern is shown, thus meeting the 












Figure 5.51: Partial Regression Plots 
 
The next assumption deals with the constancy of the residuals across values of the 
independent variables, which can be tested through examination of the residuals plots. 
Figure 5.50 shows no pattern of increasing or decreasing residuals. This indicates 




The third assumption deals with the effect of carryover from one observation to 
another, thus making the residual not independent. Again, the analysis of residuals 
was used to check the independence of residuals. From Figure 5.50, no pattern was 
identified among predicted value and the residual. Moreover, Durbin-Watson test was 
also conducted. The Durbin-Watson test value is 2.113 (see Table 5.54) in this 
regression model. For N = 47, number of independent variables is 2, and p value = 
0.05, the critical values for the Durbin-Watson Test are: Dlower = 1.44; and Dupper = 
1.62. The Durbin-Watson test value (2.113) is greater than Dupper (1.62) but less than 





Figure 5.52: Histogram of Residuals 
 
The final assumption is normality of the error term. Figure 5.52 presents the 
histogram of residuals. This figure shows that the mean of residuals is 0.000 and the 
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shape is close to normal distribution. Thus, the regression variate was found to meet 
the assumption of normality.  
 
Eq. 5.18, Eq. 5.19, and Eq. 5.20 were combined by substituting (Ln AFR – 2.85) for 
(Ln AFR)c and (SCI – 3.58) for (SCI)c, then 
 
Ln VSIR = (-4.451+1.154 • SCI) + (1.273 – 0.405 • SCI) • Ln AFR 
VSIR = e (-4.451+1.154 • SCI) • AFR (1.273 – 0.405 • SCI)…………..………………. (Eq. 5.21) 
 
Eq. 5.21 shows that the VSIR curve varies with different levels of safety culture of the 
project. As shown in Figure 5.53, a typical VSIR curve is plotted at the mean value of 
SCI.  
 
Eq. 5.21 indicates a general negative tendency of the relationship between voluntary 
safety investments and AFR of building projects. It further reveals the curvilinear 
nature of the relationship between safety investments and safety performance. This 
result is consistent with the finding of Tang et al. (1997), who also found a curvilinear 
relationship between safety investments and safety performance. It also reinforces the 
studies of Lingard and Rowlinson (2005), Hinze (2000), Brody et al. (1990), HSE 
(1993b), and Laufer (1987a, b), where they postulated a negative and curvilinear 





Figure 5.53: VSIR Curve under Mean Level of Safety Culture 
 
5.5.1.2 Validation of regression model 
 
In the previous section, the regression model (see Eq. 5.21) was developed to predict 
VSIR of building projects using AFR and SCI. Proper validation of the regression 
model was made to investigate its prediction performance. The model (Eq. 5.21) was 
next validated using the procedures described in Section 4.4.5.  
 
The computation of PRESS statistic (see Section 4.4.5) for the prediction model of  
















VSIR = 0.726 • AFR (-0.177) 
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ei = yi - ŷi  
Diagonal elements of 
the hat matrix, 
hii = x’i (X’ X)-1 xi 
1 -0.916 -0.854 -0.062 0.024 
2 -0.994 -0.902 -0.092 0.034 
3 -0.799 -0.806 0.007 0.031 
4 -1.204 -0.891 -0.313 0.255 
5 -0.755 -0.768 0.013 0.028 
6 -1.05 -0.969 -0.081 0.049 
7 -0.562 -0.516 -0.046 0.116 
8 -1.079 -1.047 -0.032 0.108 
9 -0.844 -0.823 -0.021 0.026 
10 -0.994 -0.925 -0.069 0.036 
11 -0.616 -0.485 -0.131 0.112 
12 -0.545 -0.762 0.217 0.033 
13 -0.994 -0.866 -0.128 0.046 
14 -0.248 -0.538 0.290 0.090 
15 -0.821 -0.814 -0.007 0.025 
16 -0.774 -0.701 -0.073 0.089 
17 -1.022 -0.865 -0.157 0.056 
18 -0.635 -0.862 0.227 0.161 
19 -0.892 -0.840 -0.052 0.024 
20 -0.635 -0.893 0.258 0.121 
21 -0.598 -0.874 0.276 0.087 
22 -1.204 -0.715 -0.489 0.114 
23 -0.528 -0.287 -0.241 0.279 
24 -0.916 -0.788 -0.128 0.031 
25 -0.562 -0.761 0.199 0.028 
26 -0.635 -0.825 0.190 0.025 
27 -0.693 -0.878 0.185 0.033 
28 -0.494 -0.650 0.156 0.044 
29 -1.171 -0.901 -0.270 0.061 
30 -0.942 -0.917 -0.025 0.044 
31 -0.916 -0.858 -0.058 0.025 
32 -0.755 -0.778 0.023 0.030 
33 -0.821 -0.816 -0.005 0.026 
34 -0.799 -0.788 -0.011 0.025 
35 -0.755 -0.768 0.013 0.028 
36 -0.968 -0.874 -0.094 0.029 
37 -0.892 -0.851 -0.041 0.025 


















ei = yi - ŷi  
Diagonal elements of 
the hat matrix, 
hii = x’i (X’ X)-1 xi 
39 -0.386 -0.735 0.349 0.028 
40 -0.892 -0.838 -0.054 0.023 
41 -1.05 -0.878 -0.172 0.028 
42 -0.968 -0.886 -0.082 0.029 
43 -0.357 -0.342 -0.015 0.255 
44 -0.892 -0.847 -0.045 0.025 
45 -0.868 -0.830 -0.038 0.022 
46 -0.994 -1.111 0.117 0.132 
47 -0.799 -0.796 -0.003 0.027 
 
VSIR (Eq. 5.21) is presented in Table 5.59. Column 1 of Table 5.59 shows the 
observed values of y (Ln VSIR), while column 2 shows the predicted values using the 
least-squares model developed from all the 47 data points (Eq. 5.21). Columns 3 and 
4 present the computations of prediction error (ei) and diagonal elements of the hat matrix 
(hii), which are used to calculate the PRESS statistic. Then 
 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆 =  ∑ ( 𝑒𝑖
1−ℎ𝑖𝑖
)247𝑖=1  = 1.156 
 
𝑅𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
2 =  1 − 𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆
𝑆𝑆𝑇
 =  1 − 1.556
2.493 = 0.38 
 
Therefore, as compared to the 40.8% of the variability in the original data explained 
by the least-squares fit, this model (Eq. 5.21) could be expected to explain about 38% 
of the variability in predicting new observations. This result indicates that the 
least-squares model predicts new observations almost as well as it fits the original 
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data, as the “loss” in R2 for prediction is slight (i.e., 2.8%, being 40.8% minus 38%). 
According to Montgomery et al. (2007), the small loss in R2 provides reasonably 
strong evidence that the least-squares model will be a satisfactory predictor. Thus, the 
predictive capability of the model (Eq. 5.21) seems satisfactory. 
 
5.5.2 Equation for predicting total accident costs 
 
5.5.2.1 Development of regression model 
 
Based on the analysis in Section 5.4, total accident costs ratio (TACR) is positively 
related to accident frequency rate (AFR) and the relationship between TACR and AFR 
is moderated by the project hazard index (PHI). Therefore, TACR could be predicted 
using AFR and PHI. Following the approach that were presented in Section 4.4.2, 
linear, log-log, and exponential versions of the model were developed and then to 
choose the best one as the model specification for predicting the total accident costs 
ratio of building projects. The linear, log-log (for double log), and exponential 
functional forms for predicting TACR are given below. 
 
 Basic linear functional form  
TACR = β0 + β1 • PHI + β2 • AFR + β3 • PHI • AFR +ε……………..…(Eq. 5.22) 
 
 Log-log functional form  
ln (TACR) = β0 +β1 • PHI +β2 • ln (AFR) +β3 • PHI • ln (AFR) + ε……. (Eq. 5.23) 
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 Exponential function form  
ln (TACR) =β0 +β1 • PHI +β2 • AFR +β3 • PHI • AFR + ε……………(Eq. 5.24) 
 
To overcome the threat of multicollinearity in interactive models, the variables were 
centered (prior to forming the multiplicative term) by subtracting the mean variable 
value from each score of the variables (see Section 4.4.2). Table 5.60 presents 
estimates for these three types of functional forms. Model 1 is the log-log model; 
model 2 is the exponential model; and model 3 is the basic linear model. 
 













Coef. t Coef. t Coef. T 
(Ln AFR)centered 0.390** 7.546 ------ ------ ------ ------ 
AFR centered ------ ------ 0.024** 8.647 0.007** 6.756 
PHI centered 0.302** 4.425 0.283** 4.440 0.092** 3.921 
(PHI) centered (Ln AFR) centered 0.303** 3.317 ------ ------ ------ ------ 
(PHI) centered ( AFR) centered ------ ------ 0.013** 2.660 0.006** 3.438 
CONSTANT -1.503** -41.528 -1.502** -44.678 0.246** 19.793 
F 33.997 42.099 31.159 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.682 0.729 0.663 
Durbin-Watson 2.167 2.070 2.083 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01 
 
The criteria stated in Section 4.4.2 were applied to choose the best functional form for 
predicting TACR. As shown in Table 5.60, all the three models produce statistically 
significant coefficients with the same signs. Thus, each of the models satisfies the first 
criterion. Then, the error distributions of these models were compared (see Figures 
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5.54, 5.55 and 5.56). The comparison of the normal P-P plot of regression 
standardized residual of the three models shows that the error distributions of double 
log model (model 1) and exponential model (model 2) are closer to normal 
distribution than that of basic linear model (model 3). Thus, the double log model 
(model 1) and exponential model (model 2) are more appropriate than basic linear 
model in this case. Moreover, the adjusted R2 s are comparable as the dependent 
variables of double log model (model 1) and exponential model (model 2) are 
consistent with one another (i.e., Ln TACR). Table 5.60 shows that the exponential 
model (model 2) has higher adjusted R2 (0.729) compared with the double log model 
(model 1) (0.682). Therefore, the exponential functional form (model 2) was chosen 
as the best model for predicting TACR of building projects, and the formula is given 
in Eq. 5.25.  
 
Ln TACR = -1.502 + 0.024 • (AFR)c + 0.283 • (PHI)c + 0.013 • (PHI)c • (AFR)c 
…………….………….. (Eq. 5.25) 
 
where (AFR)c and (PHI)c are the centered variables and derived from Eq. 5.26 and Eq. 
5.27, respectively.  
 
(AFR)c = AFR - (AFR)mean = AFR – 21.1…………………………..……. (Eq. 5.26) 
 


















Figure 5.56: Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual of Basic Linear 
Model 
 
To evaluate the validity of the estimated equation (Eq. 5.27), the following 
assumptions (refer to Section 4.4.2 for details) underlying multiple regression analysis 
were checked:  
 
The assumption of linearity was assessed through an analysis of residuals and partial 
regression plots. The Plot of Studentized Residuals (see Figure 5.57) does not exhibit 
any nonlinear pattern to the residuals, thus ensuring that the overall equation is linear. 
Figure 5.58 presents the partial regression plots for each independent variable in this 
equation (Eq. 5.27). As can be seen in Figure 5.58, for both independent variables, no 
nonlinear pattern is shown, thus meeting the assumption of linearity for each 





Figure 5.57: Analysis of Studentized Residuals 
 
The next assumption deals with the constancy of the residuals across values of the 
independent variables, which can be tested through examination of the residuals plots. 
Figure 5.57 shows no pattern of increasing or decreasing residuals. This indicates 
homoscedasticity in the multivariate case.  
 
The assumption of independence of residuals was checked through examining the 
plots of residuals and the Durbin-Watson test. From Figure 5.57, no pattern was 
identified among predicted value and the residual. The Durbin-Watson test value is 
2.070 (see Table 5.56) in this regression model. For N = 47, number of independent 
variables is 3, and p value = 0.05, the critical values for the Durbin-Watson Test are: 
Dlower = 1.40; and Dupper = 1.67. The Durbin-Watson test value (2.07) is greater than 
Dupper (1.67) but less than (4- Dupper) (2.33), thus indicating no serial dependency 












The final assumption is normality of the error term. Figure 5.59 presents the 
histogram of residuals. It shows that the mean of residuals is 0.000 and the shape is 
close to normal distribution. Furthermore, the normal P-P plot of regression 
standardized residual (see Figure 5.55) shows that the residual values are very close to 
the reference line, which indicates very little deviation of the expected values from the 





Figure 5.59: Histogram of Residuals 
 
Eq. 5.25, Eq. 5.26, and Eq. 5.27 were combined by substituting (AFR – 21.1) for 
(AFR)c and (PHI – 2.90) for (PHI)c, then, 
 
Ln TACR = (-2.034+0.009 • PHI) + (-0.014 + 0.013 • PHI) • AFR 




Eq. 5.28 shows that the TACR curve varies with different project hazard levels. As 




Figure 5.60: TACR Curve under Mean Level of PHI 
 
Figure 5.60 shows a general positive tendency of the relationship between total 
accident costs and AFR of building projects. Eq. 5.28 further reveals the curvilinear 
nature of this relationship. This result is consistent with Tang et al.’s (1997) study, 
which also found an exponential relationship between total accident costs and safety 
performance of building projects in Hong Kong. This finding supports the 
hypothetical analyses of Lingard and Rowlinson (2005), Hinze (2000), Brody et al. 
(1990) and HSE (1993b), who assumed a positive and curvilinear relationship 
between total accident costs and the degree of OSH risk.  
 
















TACR = e (-2.008+0.024 • AFR) 
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5.5.2.2 Validation of regression model 
 
In the previous section, the regression model was developed to predict the TACR of 
building projects using AFR and PHI (see Eq. 5.28). Leave-one-out cross-validation 
(LOOCV) (see Section 4.4.5) was used to assess the prediction performance of the 
model (Eq. 5.28).  
 
Following the method for running the leave-one-out cross-validation described in 
Section 4.4.5, the computation of PRESS statistic for the prediction model of TACR 
(Eq. 5.28) was presented in Table 5.61. Column 1 of Table 5.61 shows the observed 
values of y (Ln TACR), while column 2 shows the predicted values using the 
least-squares model developed from all the 47 data points (Eq. 5.28). Columns 3 and 
4 present the computations of prediction error (ei) and diagonal elements of the hat matrix 
(hii), which are used to calculate the PRESS statistic. Then 
 PRESS =  ∑ ( ei
1−hii
)247𝑖=1  = 2.66 
 Rprediction2 =  1 − PRESSSST  =  1 − 2.668.797 = 0.698 
 
Therefore, as compared to the 72.9% of the variability in the original data explained 
by the least-squares fit, this model (Eq. 5.28) could be expected to explain about 69.8% 
of the variability in predicting new observations. This result indicates that the  
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ei = yi - ŷi 
Diagonal elements of 
the hat matrix, 
hii = x’i (X’ X)-1 xi 
1 -1.56 -1.384 -0.176 0.032 
2 -0.94 -0.980 0.040 0.133 
3 -1.97 -2.007 0.037 0.183 
4 -0.93 -0.764 -0.166 0.067 
5 -1.9 -1.696 -0.204 0.030 
6 -0.21 -0.937 0.727 0.028 
7 -2.12 -1.937 -0.183 0.063 
8 -1.59 -1.116 -0.474 0.062 
9 -1.9 -1.736 -0.164 0.042 
10 -1.66 -1.445 -0.215 0.067 
11 -2.04 -2.063 0.023 0.125 
12 -1.61 -1.642 0.032 0.045 
13 -0.54 -1.193 0.653 0.039 
14 -1.83 -1.773 -0.057 0.074 
15 -1.31 -1.460 0.150 0.057 
16 -1.66 -1.707 0.047 0.092 
17 -0.92 -1.065 0.145 0.072 
18 -0.73 -0.833 0.103 0.126 
19 -1.71 -1.787 0.077 0.082 
20 -1.02 -1.068 0.048 0.165 
21 -1.31 -1.170 -0.140 0.063 
22 -2.04 -1.916 -0.124 0.058 
23 -1.84 -2.104 0.264 0.126 
24 -1.83 -1.658 -0.172 0.030 
25 -1.61 -1.603 -0.007 0.050 
26 -1.71 -1.616 -0.094 0.024 
27 -1.6 -1.367 -0.233 0.038 
28 -1.66 -1.766 0.106 0.039 
29 -1.14 -1.052 -0.088 0.059 
30 -1.35 -1.503 0.153 0.030 
31 -1.61 -1.520 -0.090 0.023 
32 -1.77 -1.748 -0.022 0.032 
33 -1.47 -1.662 0.192 0.026 
34 -1.56 -1.565 0.005 0.041 
35 -1.51 -1.640 0.130 0.037 
36 -1.35 -1.233 -0.117 0.043 
37 -1.51 -1.568 0.058 0.023 


















ei = yi - ŷi 
Diagonal elements of 
the hat matrix, 
hii = x’i (X’ X)-1 xi 
39 -1.44 -1.827 0.387 0.046 
40 -1.35 -1.246 -0.104 0.101 
41 -1.66 -1.614 -0.046 0.047 
42 -1.66 -1.574 -0.086 0.066 
43 -2.1 -1.673 -0.427 0.088 
44 -1.77 -1.746 -0.024 0.065 
45 -1.71 -1.690 -0.020 0.042 
46 -0.43 -0.502 0.072 0.447 
47 -1.28 -1.784 0.504 0.045 
 
lease-squares model predicts new observations almost as well as it fits the original 
data, as the “loss” in R2 for prediction is slight (i.e., 3.1%, being 72.9% minus 69.8%). 
As suggested by Montgomery et al. (2007), the least-squares model can be seen as a 
satisfactory predictor if the loss in R2 is small. Thus, the small loss (3.1%) in R2 for 
prediction provides reasonably strong evidence that the predictive capability of the 
model (Eq. 5.28) is satisfactory.  
 
5.5.3 Optimization of safety investments 
 
5.5.3.1 Formula for predicting total controllable safety costs 
 
The aim of safety costs optimization is to minimize the total controllable safety costs 
on workplace safety of building projects to achieve the acceptable level of safety 
performance. Total controllable costs (TCC) on workplace safety represent the sum of 
voluntary safety investments (VSI) and total accident costs (TAC). A dimensionless 
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quantify, the Total Controllable Costs Ratio (TCCR) was used to enable the 
comparison of the level of total controllable safety costs among projects of different 
sizes. TCCR is therefore defined as  
 
TCCR =     TCC     X 100% 
        Contract Sum 
 
where TCC is the sum of VSI and TAC of building project. Then, TCCR is the sum of 
VSIR (from Eq. 5.21) and TACR (from Eq. 5.28). Thus, the formula for predicting 
TCCR is given in Eq. 5.29. 
 
TCCR = e(-4.451+1.154•SCI) •AFR(1.273–0.405•SCI) +e(-2.034+0.009•PHI) • e(-0.014 + 0.013 • PHI) •AFR 
………………….. (Eq. 5.29) 
 
where TCCR is total controllable costs ratio, SCI is safety culture index, AFR is 
accident frequency rate, and PHI is project hazard index. 
 
5.5.3.2 Optimization of voluntary safety investments 
 
Finding the minimal level of total controllable safety costs is the goal of optimization, 
that is to find the global minima of TCCR curve. According to the extreme value 
theorem (Barnett et al., 2005), if a function is continuous on a closed interval, global 
maxima and minima exist. Furthermore, a global maximum (or minimum) either must 
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be a local maximum (or minimum) in the interior of the domain, or must lie on the 
boundary of the domain (Barnett et al., 2005). So a method of finding a global 
maximum (or minimum) is to look at all the local maxima (or minima) in the interior, 
and also look at the maxima (or minima) of the points on the boundary; and take the 
biggest (or smallest) one. Fermat's theorem gives a method to find local maxima and 
minima of differentiable functions by showing that every local extremum of the 
function is a stationary point (the function derivative is zero in that point) (Barnett et 
al., 2005). To check if a stationary point is an extreme value and to further distinguish 
between a function maximum and a function minimum, it is necessary to analyze the 
second derivative (if it exists). As a corollary, global extrema of a function f on a 
domain A occurs only at boundaries, non-differentiable points, and stationary points 
(Barnett et al., 2005). 
 
The first derivative of TCCR curve (Eq. 5.29) is given in Eq. 5.30. 
 
(TCCR)’ = e(-4.451+1.154 • SCI) • (1.273 – 0.405 • SCI) • AFR(0.273– 0.405 • SCI)                    
+ e(-2.034+0.009 • PHI) • (-0.014 + 0.013 • PHI) • e(-0.014 + 0.013 •PHI) • AFR 
                               …………..………………..… (Eq. 5.30) 
 






= e(-4.451+1.154 •SCI) • (1.273–0.405•SCI) • (0.273–0.405•SCI) • AFR(-0.727–0.405•SCI) + 
e(-2.034+0.009 •PHI) • (-0.014 + 0.013 • PHI)2 • e(-0.014 + 0.013 •PHI) •AFR 
                                ……………….………..… (Eq. 5.31) 
 
As shown in Eq. 5.29, different TCCR curves would be obtained with different safety 
culture levels and project hazard levels. The TCCR curves were plotted at three 
typical values of SCI: the mean value of SCI; a low value of SCI (1 standard deviation 
below the mean value); and a high value of SCI (1 standard deviation above the mean 
value). Three typical values of PHI: the mean value of PHI, a low value of PHI (1 
standard deviation below the mean value), and a high value of PHI (1 standard 
deviation above the mean value) were also used to plot the curves. A total of nine 
TCCR curves are generated and analyzed as below. 
 
• Scenario 1: SCI = mean (SCI) = 3.58; PHI = -1 dev (PHI) = 2.36 
 
In this scenario, safety culture level is set at the mean value (i.e., SCI = mean (SCI) = 
3.58), and project hazard level is set at a low value (i.e., PHI = -1 dev (PHI) = 2.36).  
 
Then, by substituting 3.58 for SCI and 2.36 for PHI in Eq. 5.21, Eq. 5.28, and Eq. 
5.29, the VSIR curve, TACR curve, and TCCR curve for scenario 1 are given in Eq. 
5.32, Eq. 5.33, and Eq. 5.34, respectively. The VSIR, TACR, and TCCR curves are 
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plotted in Figure 5.61. 
 
VSIR = 0.726• AFR (-0.177)……………..………..…………………….…. (Eq. 5.32) 
TACR = 0.134 • e0.017•AFR …………………………….………………………. (Eq. 5.33) 
TCCR = 0.726• AFR (-0.177) + 0.134 • e0.017•AFR……………………….……. (Eq. 5.34) 
 
Figure 5.61: Optimization of Safety Costs for Scenario 1 
 
The first derivative of TCCR curve (Eq. 5.34) is given in Eq. 5.35. 
 
(TCCR)’ = -0.129 •AFR-1.177 + 0.0022 • e0.017 • AFR……………..…..……. (Eq. 5.35) 
 
The second derivative of TCCR curve (Eq. 5.34) is given in Eq. 5.36. 
 






















(TCCR)’’ = 0.152 • AFR-2.177 + 0.00003 • e0.017 • AFR………………..…….. (Eq. 5.36) 
 
Eq. 5.36 shows that the sign of the second derivative of TCCR is positive whatever 
the value of AFR. This indicates that the stationary point (the function derivative is 
zero in that point) of TCCR curve is the function minimum.  
 
Set, (TCCR)’ = 0 
Then, AFR = 22.85 
 
Substituting 22.85 for AFR in Eq. 5.32 and Eq. 5.33 produces the following:  
VSIR = 0.418% 
TACR = 0.196%. 
 
Thus, the optimum level of VSI is 0.418% of total contract sum of a building project, 
when SCI is at the mean level and PHI is at the low level.  
 
• Scenario 2: SCI = mean (SCI) = 3.58; PHI = mean (PHI) = 2.9 
 
In this scenario, both safety culture level and project hazard level are set at the mean 
value (i.e., SCI = mean (SCI) = 3.58; PHI = mean (PHI) = 2.9).  
 
Then, by substituting 3.58 for SCI and 2.9 for PHI in Eq. 5.21, Eq. 5.28, and Eq. 5.29, 
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the VSIR curve, TACR curve, and TCCR curve for scenario 2 are given in Eq. 5.37, 
Eq. 5.38, and Eq. 5.39, respectively. The VSIR, TACR, and TCCR curves under 
scenario 2 are plotted in Figure 5.62. 
 
VSIR = 0.726• AFR (-0.177)……………..………..…………………….…. (Eq. 5.37) 
TACR = 0.134 • e0.024 • AFR …………………………….………………………. (Eq. 5.38) 
TCCR = 0.726• AFR (-0.177) + 0.134 • e0.024 • AFR……………………….……. (Eq. 5.39) 
 
 
Figure 5.62: Optimization of Safety Costs for Scenario 2 
 
The first derivative and second derivative of TCCR curve (Eq. 5.39) are given in Eq. 
5.40 and Eq. 5.41, respectively. 
 






















(TCCR)’ = -0.129 • AFR -1.177 + 0.0032 • e0.024 • AFR…………..…………. (Eq. 5.40) 
(TCCR)’’ = 0.152 • AFR-2.177 + 0.0001 • e0.024 • AFR…………………….. (Eq. 5.41) 
 
Eq. 5.41 shows that the sign of the second derivative of TCCR is positive whatever 
the value of AFR. This indicates that the stationary point (the function derivative is 
zero in that point) of TCCR curve is the function minimum.  
 
Set, (TCCR)’ = 0 
Then, AFR = 16.51 
 
Substituting 16.51 for AFR in Eq. 5.37 and Eq. 5.38 produces the following:  
 
VSIR = 0.442% 
TACR = 0.199%. 
 
Thus, the optimum level of VSI is 0.442% of total contract sum of a building project, 
when SCI and PHI are at their mean level.  
 
• Scenario 3: SCI = mean (SCI) = 3.58; PHI = +1 dev (PHI) = 3.44 
 
In this scenario, safety culture level is set at the mean value (i.e., SCI = mean (SCI) = 
3.58), and project hazard level is set at a high value (i.e., PHI = +1 dev (PHI) = 3.44).  
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Then, by substituting 3.58 for SCI and 3.44 for PHI in Eq. 5.21, Eq. 5.28, and Eq. 
5.29, the VSIR curve, TACR curve, and TCCR curve for scenario 3 are given in Eq. 
5.42, Eq. 5.43, and Eq. 5.44, respectively. The VSIR, TACR, and TCCR curves under 
scenario 3 are plotted in Figure 5.63. 
 
VSIR = 0.726• AFR (-0.177)……………..………..…………………….…. (Eq. 5.42) 
TACR = 0.135 • e0.031• AFR…………………………….………………………. (Eq. 5.43) 
TCCR = 0.726• AFR (-0.177) + 0.135 • e0.031• AFR……………………….……. (Eq. 5.44) 
 
 
Figure 5.63: Optimization of Safety Costs for Scenario 3 
 
The first derivative and second derivative of TCCR curve (Eq. 5.44) are given in Eq. 
5.45 and Eq. 5.46, respectively. 






















(TCCR)’ =-0.129 • AFR-1.177 + 0.0041 • e0.031 • AFR…………..…………. (Eq. 5.45) 
(TCCR)’’ = 0.152 • AFR-2.177 + 0.0001 • e0.031 • AFR…………………….. (Eq. 5.46) 
 
Eq. (7.32) shows that the sign of the second derivative of TCCR is positive whatever 
the value of AFR. This indicates that the stationary point (the function derivative is 
zero in that point) of TCCR curve is the function minimum.  
 
Set, (TCCR)’ = 0 
Then, AFR = 13.22 
 
Substituting 13.22 for AFR in Eq. 5.42 and Eq. 5.43 produces the following:  
 
VSIR = 0.46% 
TACR = 0.203%. 
 
Thus, the optimum level of VSI is 0.46% of total contract sum of a building project, 
when SCI is at the mean level and PHI is at the high level.  
 
• Scenario 4: SCI = -1 dev (SCI) = 3.40; PHI = -1 dev (PHI) = 2.36 
 
In this scenario, both safety culture level and project hazard level are set at a low 
value (i.e., SCI = -1 dev (SCI) = 3.40; PHI = -1 dev (PHI) = 2.36).  
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Then, by substituting 3.4 for SCI and 2.36 for PHI in Eq. 5.21, Eq. 5.28, and Eq. 5.29, 
the VSIR curve, TACR curve, and TCCR curve for scenario 4 are given in Eq. 5.47, 
Eq. 5.48, and Eq. 5.49, respectively. The VSIR, TACR, and TCCR curves under 
scenario 4 are plotted in Figure 5.64. 
 
VSIR = 0.59 • AFR (-0.104)……………..………..…………………….…. (Eq. 5.47) 
TACR = 0.134 • e 0.017 • AFR…………………………….………………………. (Eq. 5.48) 
TCCR = 0.59 • AFR (-0.104) + 0.134 • e 0.017 • AFR……………………….……. (Eq. 5.49) 
 
 
Figure 5.64: Optimization of Safety Costs for Scenario 4 
 
The first derivative and second derivative of TCCR curve (Eq. 5.49) are given in Eq. 
5.50 and Eq. 5.51, respectively. 




















(TCCR)’ =-0.061 •AFR -1.104 + 0.0022 • e 0.017 • AFR…………..…………. (Eq. 5.50) 
(TCCR)’’ = 0.068 • AFR -2.104 + 0.00003 • e 0.017 • AFR…………………….. (Eq. 5.51) 
 
Eq. (5.51) shows that the sign of the second derivative of TCCR is positive whatever 
the value of AFR. This indicates that the stationary point (the function derivative is 
zero in that point) of TCCR curve is the function minimum.  
 
Set, (TCCR)’ = 0 
Then, AFR = 15.88. 
 
Substituting 15.88 for AFR in Eq. 5.47 and Eq. 5.48 produces the following:  
 
VSIR = 0.443% 
TACR = 0.174% 
 
Thus, the optimum level of VSI is 0.443% of total contract sum of a building project, 
when both the SCI and PHI are at the low level.  
 
• Scenario 5: SCI = -1 dev (SCI) = 3.40; PHI = mean (PHI) = 2.9 
 
In this scenario, safety culture level is set at a low value (i.e., SCI = -1 dev (SCI) = 
3.40), and project hazard level is set at the mean value (i.e., PHI = mean (PHI) = 2.9).  
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Then, by substituting 3.4 for SCI and 2.9 for PHI in Eq. 5.21, Eq. 5.28, and Eq. 5.29, 
the VSIR curve, TACR curve, and TCCR curve for scenario 5 are given in Eq. 5.52, 
Eq. 5.53, and Eq. 5.54, respectively. The VSIR, TACR, and TCCR curves under 
scenario 5 are plotted in Figure 5.65. 
 
VSIR = 0.59 • AFR (-0.104)……………..………..…………………….…. (Eq. 5.52) 
TACR = 0.134 • e 0.024 • AFR…………………………….………………………. (Eq. 5.53) 
TCCR = 0.59 • AFR (-0.104) + 0.134 • e 0.024 • AFR……………………….……. (Eq. 5.54) 
 
 
Figure 5.65: Optimization of Safety Costs for Scenario 5 
 
The first derivative and second derivative of TCCR curve (Eq. 5.54) are given in Eq. 
5.55 and Eq. 5.56, respectively. 





















(TCCR)’ =-0.061 • AFR -1.104 + 0.0032 • e 0.024 • AFR…………..…………. (Eq. 5.55) 
(TCCR)’’ =0.067 • AFR -2.104 + 0.0001 • e 0.024 • AFR…………………….. (Eq. 5.56) 
 
Eq. 5.56 shows that the sign of the second derivative of TCCR is positive whatever 
the value of AFR. This indicates that the stationary point (the function derivative is 
zero in that point) of TCCR curve is the function minimum.  
 
Set, (TCCR)’ = 0 
Then, AFR = 11.30 
 
Substituting 11.30 for AFR in Eq. 5.52 and Eq. 5.53 produced the following:  
 
VSIR = 0.459% 
TACR = 0.176%. 
 
Thus, the optimum level of VSI is 0.459% of total contract sum of a building project, 
when SCI is at the low level and PHI is at the mean level. 
 
• Scenario 6: SCI = -1 dev (SCI) = 3.40; PHI = +1 dev (PHI) = 3.44 
 
In this scenario, safety culture level is set at a low value (i.e., SCI = -1 dev (SCI) = 
3.40), and project hazard level is set at a high value (i.e., PHI = +1 dev (PHI) = 3.44).  
302 
 
Then, by substituting 3.4 for SCI and 3.44 for PHI in Eq. 5.21, Eq. 5.28, and Eq. 5.29, 
the VSIR curve, TACR curve, and TCCR curve for scenario 6 are given in Eq. 5.57, 
Eq. 5.58, and Eq. 5.59, respectively. The VSIR, TACR, and TCCR curves under 
scenario 6 are plotted in Figure 5.66. 
 
VSIR = 0.59 • AFR (-0.104)……………..………..…………………….…. (Eq. 5.57) 
TACR = 0.135 • e0.031 • AFR…………………………….………………………. (Eq. 5.58) 
TCCR = 0.59 • AFR (-0.104) + 0.135 • e0.031 • AFR……………………….……. (Eq. 5.59) 
 
Figure 5.66: Optimization of Safety Costs for Scenario 6 
 
The first derivative and second derivative of TCCR curve (Eq. 5.59) are given in Eq. 
5.60 and Eq. 5.61, respectively. 























(TCCR)’ =-0.061 • AFR -1.104 + 0.0041 • e 0.031 • AFR…………..…………. (Eq. 5.60) 
(TCCR)’’ =0.067 • AFR -2.104 + 0.0001 • e 0.031 • AFR…………………….. (Eq. 5.61) 
 
Eq. (5.61) shows that the sign of the second derivative of TCCR is positive whatever 
the value of AFR. This indicates that the stationary point (the function derivative is 
zero in that point) of TCCR curve is the function minimum.  
 
Set, (TCCR)’ = 0 
Then, AFR = 8.97 
 
Substituting AFR = 8.97 for AFR in Eq. 5.57 and Eq. 5.58 produces the following: 
 
VSIR = 0.47% 
TACR = 0.178%. 
 
Thus, the optimum level of VSI is 0.47% of total contract sum of a building project, 
when SCI is at the low level and PHI is at the mean level.  
 
•  Scenario 7: SCI = +1 dev (SCI) = 3.76; PHI = -1 dev (PHI) = 2.36. 
 
In this scenario, safety culture level is set at a high value (i.e., SCI = +1 dev (SCI) = 
3.76), and project hazard level is set at a low value (i.e., PHI = -1 dev (PHI) = 2.36).  
304 
 
Then, by substituting 3.76 for SCI and 2.36 for PHI in Eq. 5.21, Eq. 5.28, and Eq. 
5.29, the VSIR curve, TACR curve, and TCCR curve for scenario 7 are given in Eq. 
5.62, Eq. 5.63, and Eq. 5.64, respectively. The VSIR, TACR, and TCCR curves under 
scenario 7 are plotted in Figure 5.67. 
 
VSIR = 0.894 • AFR (-0.25)……………..………..…………………….…. (Eq. 5.62) 
TACR = 0.134 • e 0.017 • AFR…………………………….………………………. (Eq. 5.63) 
TCCR = 0.894 • AFR (-0.25) + 0.134 • e 0.017 • AFR……………………….……. (Eq. 5.64) 
 
 
Figure 5.67: Optimization of Safety Costs for Scenario 7 
 
The first derivative and second derivative of TCCR curve (Eq. 5.64) are given in Eq. 
5.65 and Eq. 5.66, respectively. 




















(TCCR)’ =-0.223 • AFR -1.25 + 0.0022 • e0.017 • AFR…………..…………. (Eq. 5.65) 
(TCCR)’’ =0.279 • AFR -2.25 + 0.00003 • e 0.017 • AFR…………………….. (Eq. 5.66) 
 
Eq. 5.66 shows that the sign of the second derivative of TCCR is positive whatever 
the value of AFR. This indicates that the stationary point (the function derivative is 
zero in that point) of TCCR curve is the function minimum.  
 
Set, (TCCR)’ = 0 
Then, AFR = 27.64. 
 
Substituting 27.64 for AFR in Eq. 5.62 and Eq. 5.63 produces the following:  
 
VSIR = 0.39% 
TACR = 0.212%. 
 
Thus, the optimum level of VSI is 0.39% of total contract sum of a building project, 
when SCI is at the high level and PHI is at the low level.  
 
• Scenario 8: SCI = +1 dev (SCI) = 3.76; PHI = mean (PHI) = 2.9. 
 
In this scenario, safety culture level is set at a high value (i.e., SCI = +1 dev (SCI) = 
3.76), and project hazard level is set at the mean value (i.e., PHI = mean (PHI) = 2.9).  
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Then, by substituting 3.76 for SCI and 2.9 for PHI in Eq. 5.21, Eq. 5.28, and Eq. 5.29, 
the VSIR curve, TACR curve, and TCCR curve for scenario 8 are given in Eq. 5.67, 
Eq. 5.68, and Eq. 5.69, respectively. The VSIR, TACR, and TCCR curves under 
scenario 8 are plotted in Figure 5.68. 
 
VSIR = 0.894 • AFR (-0.25)……………..………..…………………….…. (Eq. 5.67) 
TACR = 0.134 • e 0.024 • AFR…………………………….………………………. (Eq. 5.68) 
TCCR = 0.894 • AFR (-0.25) + 0.134 • e 0.024 • AFR……………………….……. (Eq. 5.69) 
 
 
Figure 5.68: Optimization of Safety Costs for Scenario 8 
 
The first derivative and second derivative of TCCR curve (Eq. 5.69) are given in Eq. 
5.70 and Eq. 5.71, respectively. 




















(TCCR)’ =-0.223 • AFR -1.25+ 0.0032 • e 0.024 • AFR…………..…………. (Eq. 5.70) 
(TCCR)’’ =0.279 • AFR -2.25 + 0.0001 • e 0.024 • AFR…………………….. (Eq. 5.71) 
 
Eq. 5.71 shows that the sign of the second derivative of TCCR is positive whatever 
the value of AFR. This indicates that the stationary point (the function derivative is 
zero in that point) of TCCR curve is the function minimum.  
 
Set, (TCCR)’ = 0 
Then, AFR = 20.22. 
 
Substituting 20.22 for AFR in Eq. 5.67 and Eq. 5.68 produces the following:  
 
VSIR = 0.422% 
TACR = 0.217%. 
 
Thus, the optimum level of VSI is 0.422% of total contract sum of a building project, 
when SCI is at the high level and PHI is at the mean level.  
 
• Scenario 9: SCI = +1 dev (SCI) = 3.76; PHI = +1 dev (PHI) = 3.44 
 
In this scenario, both safety culture level and project hazard level are set at a high 
value (i.e., SCI = +1 dev (SCI) = 3.76; PHI = +1 dev (PHI) = 3.44).  
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Then, by substituting 3.76 for SCI and 3.44 for PHI in Eq. 5.21, Eq. 5.28, and Eq. 
5.29, the VSIR curve, TACR curve, and TCCR curve for scenario 9 are given in Eq. 
5.72, Eq. 5.73, and Eq. 5.74, respectively. The VSIR, TACR, and TCCR curves under 
scenario 9 are plotted in Figure 5.69. 
 
VSIR = 0.894 • AFR (-0.25)……………..………..…………………….…. (Eq. 5.72) 
TACR = 0.135 • e0.031 • AFR…………………………….………………………. (Eq. 5.73) 
TCCR = 0.894 • AFR (-0.25) + 0.135 • e0.031 • AFR……………………….……. (Eq. 5.74) 
 
 
Figure 5.69: Optimization of Safety Costs for Scenario 9 
 
The first derivative and second derivative of TCCR curve (Eq. 5.74) are given in Eq. 
5.75 and Eq. 5.76, respectively. 




















(TCCR)’ =-0.223 • AFR -1.25 + 0.0041 • e 0.031 • AFR…………..…………. (Eq. 5.75) 
(TCCR)’’ =0.278 • AFR -2.25 + 0.0001 • e 0.031 • AFR…………………….. (Eq. 5.76) 
 
Eq. 5.76 shows that the sign of the second derivative of TCCR is positive whatever 
the value of AFR. This indicates that the stationary point (the function derivative is 
zero in that point) of TCCR curve is the function minimum.  
 
Set, (TCCR)’ = 0 
Then, AFR = 16.32. 
 
Substituting 16.32 for AFR in Eq. 5.72 and Eq. 5.73 produces the following:  
 
VSIR = 0.445% 
TACR = 0.223%. 
 
Thus, the optimum level of VSI is 0.445% of total contract sum of a building project, 
when both the SCI and PHI are at the high level.  
 





This chapter analysed the data collected. Section 5.3 examined the relationships 
among safety investments, safety culture, project hazard level, accident frequency rate 
and accident severity rate. The results of bivariate correlation analysis (see Section 
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5.3.1) provide evidence to support hypotheses 1.1 (i.e., safety performance of building 
projects varies positively with the level of safety investments), 1.2 (i.e., safety 
performance of building projects varies positively with the level of safety culture) and 
1.3 (i.e., safety performance of building projects varies inversely with the project 
hazard level). The results of moderation analysis and mediation analysis show that: (1) 
the effect of basic safety investments on safety performance is moderated by project 
hazard level and safety culture; (2) the effect of total safety investments on safety 
performance is mediated by safety culture; (3) the effect of voluntary safety 
investments on safety performance is mediated by safety culture; (4) the effect of 
safety culture on safety performance is moderated by project hazard level; and (5) the 
relationship between accident frequency rate and accident severity rate is moderated 
by project hazard level. The above results provide evidence to support hypotheses 1.4 
(i.e., the effect of safety investments on safety performance varies with project hazard 
level) and 1.5 (i.e., the effect of safety investments on safety performance varies with 
safety culture level).  
 
Section 5.4 examined the costs of accidents to building projects (objective 3 of this 
study). The results (see Section 5.4.1) show that the average direct accident costs, 
indirect accident costs and total accident costs of building projects account for 0.165%, 
0.086%, and 0.25% of total contract sum, respectively. The result of bivariate 
correlation analysis shows that the total accident costs of building projects vary 
positively with accident frequency rate and project hazard level, thus supporting 
hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2. The result of moderation analysis (see Section 5.4.3) shows 
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that the relationship between the number of accidents and the costs of accidents is 
dependent on the project hazard level. There is a stronger positive effect of accident 
frequency rate on total accident costs under higher project hazard level. This result 
provides empirical evidence to support hypothesis 2.4 that the effect of accident 
frequency rate on the total accident costs of a building project varies with the project 
hazard level. No evidence was found to support the hypotheses 2.3 (i.e., the total 
accident costs of a building project vary with the project characteristics). 
 
Section 5.5 investigated the optimization of safety investments (Objective 4 of this 
study). In this section, the models for predicting VSIR (Eq. 5.21) and TACR (Eq. 5.28) 
were developed and validated. The model for predicting TCCR (Eq. 5.29) was 
constructed through the combination of VSIR curve (Eq. 5.21) and TACR curve (Eq. 
5.28). The VSIR, TACR and TCCR curves were plotted at three typical values of SCI: 
the mean value; a low value (1 standard deviation below the mean value); and a high 
value (1 standard deviation above the mean value); as well as three typical values of 
PHI: the mean value; a low value (1 standard deviation below the mean value); and a 
high value (1 standard deviation below the mean value). The optimization results 
under 9 typical scenarios (see Section 5.5.3) show that the financially optimum level 
of voluntary safety investments coincide with the minimal level of total controllable 
safety costs of building projects. It was found that the financially optimum level of 
voluntary safety investments of building projects in Singapore is about 0.44% of the 

































Having analysed the data and tested the hypotheses in Chapter 5, this chapter 
discusses the implications of these empirical results. Section 6.2 discusses the 
relationship between the two safety performance indicators. Section 6.3 and Section 
6.4 discuss the effects of safety investments on safety performance. Then, based on 
the empirical findings in Chapter 5 and the discussions in Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4, a 
model for determining safety performance of building projects is proposed in Section 
6.5. Finally, the results of safety investments optimization are discussed in Section 
6.6.  
 
6.2 Safety performance indicators 
 
In Singapore, both AFR and ASR are used by the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) to 
measure workplace safety performance. As shown from the formulae (see Section 
4.3.1), AFR reflects the total number of accidents in a project, and ASR collects 
information on both total number of accidents in a project and the number of 
man-days lost due to each accident.  
 
The results of bivariate correlation analysis (see Section 5.3.1) show that ASR is 
significantly (p <0.05) correlated with safety culture level (r = -0.46) and project 
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hazard level (r =0.363), while AFR is significantly (p <0.05) correlated with total 
safety investments (r =-0.436), basic safety investments (r =-0.282), voluntary safety 
investments (r =-0.539), and safety culture level (r =-0.439). This result implies that 
frequency of accidents is related to human effort (i.e. safety investments and safety 
culture), while severity of accidents tends to be affected by not only human effort (i.e. 
cultivation of safety culture) but also initial project conditions (i.e. project hazard 
level).  
 
Furthermore, the result of moderated regression (see Section 5.3.6) shows that the 
relationship between AFR and ASR is moderated by project hazard level. This result 
indicates that the relationship between frequency and severity of accidents becomes 
stronger when the hazard level of a project is higher. A possible reason is that higher 
level of project hazard (e.g., higher heights of building and more work in confined 
spaces) tends to be associated with greater chance of serious injuries. Table 5.53 (see 
Section 5.3.6) shows that the simple slope for ASR on AFR is not significant when 
project hazard level is low (-1 Std. Dev.). This indicates that accident severity rate 
might be low even if the accident frequency rate is high for those projects with low 
hazard level. It implies that, in low hazard conditions, frequent occurrence of 
accidents does not necessarily result in severe injuries, possibly due to the role of 
“blind chance”. This finding supports the arguments put forward by the U.S. 
Department of Labor (1955) that blind chance usually plays a greater part in 
determining seriousness of an injury than it does in determining how frequently 
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accidental injuries occur. This is also consistent with Lingard and Rowlinson’s (2005) 
finding that accidents prevention strategies must take into account the frequent 
occurrence of incidents which have the potential to cause serious injury but which do 
not do so, largely due to blind chance.  
 
The implication of the findings is that safety performance indicators that focus on 
serious injuries may fail to show the true effectiveness of safety efforts. Therefore, it 
could be argued that accident frequency rate tends to be more directly related to the 
effectiveness of human efforts in accident prevention activities than accident severity 
does due to the role of project hazard level and blind chance in determining accidents 
severity rate.  
 
The findings of this study suggest that the use of different safety performance 
indicators may partly explain why the findings of the relationship between safety 
investments and safety performance were inconsistent in previous studies. For 
example, Crites (1995) used Loss Workday Rate (WDR) as the safety performance 
indicator to compare safety performance with the size and funding of formal safety 
programs over an 11-year period (1980-1990), while Tang et al. (1997) investigated 
the relationship between safety investments and safety performance of building 
projects using Accident Occurrence Index (AOI) as the indicator of safety 
performance. Crites (1995) found that safety performance was independent of – or 
even inversely related to – safety investment, whilst Tang et al. (1997) found a weak 
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correlation between safety investments and safety performance. The results of this 
study further confirmed the possible discrepancies of the findings due to the use of 
different safety performance indicators. For example, the correlation between total 
safety investments and safety performance (see Figure 5.14 in Section 5.3.1) indicates 
that the level of safety investments has an impact on AFR, while no impact on ASR. 
Therefore, it is advisable for researchers in the area of construction safety to draw 
conclusions of their research with consideration of the possible discrepancies incurred 
by the selection of safety performance indicators.  
 
6.3 Voluntary safety investments and safety performance 
 
6.3.1 Direct effect of voluntary safety investments on safety performance 
 
Total safety investments (TSI) comprise two categories: basic safety investments 
(BSI); and voluntary safety investments (VSI) (see Section 4.3.1). It was found that 
different types of safety investments have different effects on safety performance of 
building projects (see Section 5.3.1). Figure 5.14 (see Section 5.3.1) shows that the 
effect of VSIR on AFR (r = -0.539, p < 0.05) is more significant than that of BSIR on 
AFR (r = -0.282, p < 0.05).  
 
Based on the definition of basic safety investments (see Section 4.3.1), the 
investments in basic safety measures (e.g., employment of safety professionals, 
provision of safety equipments, and enforcement of formal safety training courses) are 
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largely determined by industry and government regulations and construction process 
to maintain minimal safety standard. One possible reason for the relatively weaker 
effect of BSIR on AFR could be that the contractors have to invest in certain basic 
safety prevention activities even if some of these activities could be ineffective or 
inefficient for their projects. This is supported by Hallowell’s (2010) study, where it 
was found that employment of full-time safety professionals (i.e. individuals with 
formal construction safety and health experience and/or education) was among the 
least cost-effective elements of a safety programme. In comparison with the 
enforcement nature of basic safety measures, the investments in voluntary safety 
measures (e.g., accident investigation, safety inspections, safety committee, safety 
promotion and incentives and in-house safety training and orientation) are the result 
of contractors’ voluntary selection and therefore reflect the willingness of contractors 
to improve safety standard of their projects.  
 
Consequently, a possible reason for the relatively stronger effect of VSI on safety 
performance could be that contractors may choose to invest in those activities that 
would be considered to be more effective or efficient and determine the level of 
investments based on the specific needs of individual projects. This finding is 
consistent with the results of many studies (Aksorn and Hadikusumo, 2008; Findley et 
al., 2004; Poon et al., 2000; Tam and Fung, 1998; Jaselskis et al., 1996), where the 
researchers examined and compared the effectiveness of various safety measures. 
These studies revealed that safety inspections and investigations (Aksorn and 
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Hadikusumo, 2008; Poon et al., 2000; Jaselskis et al., 1996; Tam and Fung, 1998), 
safety committees and meetings (Tam and Fung, 1998; Jaselskis et al., 1996), safety 
promotions and incentives (Aksorn and Hadikusumo, 2008; Tam and Fung, 1998; 
Jaselskis et al., 1996), and in-house safety trainings and orientations (Findley et al., 
2004; Tam and Fung, 1998) were among the most effective safety measures for 
construction safety performance improvement. This finding also suggests that basic 
safety investments (e.g., employment of safety professionals, provision of personal 
protection equipments and enforcement of formal safety training courses) are less 
cost-effective than voluntary safety investments (e.g., accident investigation, safety 
inspections, safety committee, safety incentives and in-house safety training and 
orientation).  
 
6.3.2 Indirect effect of voluntary safety investments on safety performance 
 
The result of mediation analysis for the effects of total safety investments on safety 
performance (see Section 5.3.2) shows that the effects of total safety investments on 
safety performance (measured by AFR) are partially mediated by safety culture level. 
It indicates that some of the effects of total safety investments on AFR are direct, 
while some are indirect. Teo and Feng (2011) found that some kinds of safety 
investments like the time invested in accident prevention activities (e.g., the time 
invested in participation in safety training and orientation, the time invested in 
emergency response drills, the time invested in safety meetings and inspections, and 
the time invested in accident investigations and other activities) do not produce a 
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direct impact on safety performance, while they contribute to the cultivation of safety 
culture and then indirectly influence safety performance through the effect of safety 
culture. Thus, the total safety investment was found to have its impact on safety 
performance by partly going through the mediator, safety culture. 
 
This process could be further explained by the results of correlation analysis between 
BSIR, SCI and AFR, and the results of mediation analysis for the effect of VSIR on 
AFR. As discussed earlier, BSIR has positive impacts on the reduction of AFR. The 
results of bivariate correlation analysis (see Figure 5.14 in Section 5.3.1) show that 
BSIR is not significantly (p >0.05) correlated with SCI (r = 0.23). This result 
indicates that the effect of basic safety investments on safety performance is direct 
and not mediated by safety culture. The effect of basic safety investments on safety 
performance is further discussed in next section (see Section 6.4). 
 
The result of mediation analysis for the effect of VSIR on AFR (see Section 5.3.4) 
shows that the mediation effect of VSIR on AFR is significant. This result suggests 
that an increase in voluntary safety investments contributes to the cultivation of a 
positive safety culture, which then brings down the accident frequency rate of 
building projects. The positive impact of voluntary safety investments on safety 
culture level reflects the importance of voluntary efforts in constructing safety culture 
of building projects. This result supports Teo and Fang’s (2006) finding that a good 
safety culture is the result of a concerted effort, and requires investments in training 
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and safe work procedures. This finding also supports Fang et al.’s (2006) study, which 
investigated the safety climate in the Hong Kong construction environment and 
highlighted the importance of providing enough safety resources in constructing a 
positive safety climate. The finding of positive relationship between safety culture 
level and the reduction of AFR reinforces the critical role of safety culture for 
improving safety performance, which has been addressed by many researchers (Fang 
et al., 2006; Wiegmann et al., 2004; Guldenmund, 2000; Cooper, 1997, 2000). For 
example, Cooper (1997) found that safety culture impacts not only on accident rates, 
but also on work methods, absenteeism, quality, productivity, commitment, loyalty 
and work satisfaction. Fang et al. (2006) argued that it is especially important for a 
construction company to improve its safety culture to achieve better safety 
performance.  
 
Figure 6.1 describes the paths in which safety investments (TSI, BSI and VSI) impact 
safety performance (AFR) of building projects. It illustrates the relationships between 
safety investments, safety culture and safety performance. As shown in Figure 6.1, 
there are both direct (paths (c) and (d)) and indirect (paths (a) and (b)) effects of 
safety investments on safety performance. Path (c) shows the direct impact of 
voluntary safety investments on safety performance. Path (d) represents the direct 
effect of basic safety investments on safety performance. Paths (a) and (b) show the 
indirect impact of voluntary safety investments on safety performance. Voluntary 
safety investments lead to improvement of safety culture (path (a)), and then positive 
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Figure 6.1: Model of the Relationships between Safety Performance, Safety Investment 
and Safety Culture 
 
6.4 Basic safety investments and safety performance 
 
Having discussed the effects of voluntary safety investments on safety performance, 
this section discusses the effects of basic safety investments on safety performance of 
building projects.  
 
The results of bivariate correlation analysis (see Figure 5.14 in Section 5.3.1) show 
that basic safety investments are negatively correlated with accident frequency rate. 
Nevertheless, the result of moderation analysis (see Section 5.3.3) indicates that the 
effect of basic safety investments on accident frequency rate does not hold constant 
under different project conditions. The variance of the simple slopes for AFR on BSIR 
at different levels of PHI (see Figure 5.26 in Section 5.3.3) and SCI (see Figure 5.25 















accident prevention under higher project hazard level and higher project safety culture 
level. Basic safety investment plays a more critical role in accident prevention for 
those projects with higher project hazard level and higher project safety culture level. 
For those projects with lower hazard level and lower safety culture level, the role of 
basic safety investment is less significant in accident prevention. Noticeably, Table 
5.34 (see section 5.3.3) shows that the relationship between BSIR and AFR is no 
longer significant when PHI is at low level (-1 Std. Dev.). Table 5.31 (see section 
5.3.3) shows that this relationship becomes even positive when SCI is low (-1 Std. 
Dev.). It suggests that the increase in basic safety investments may lead to higher 
accident frequency rate if the safety culture level of the project is low. This result is 
inconsistent with the commonly held assumption that the higher the safety investment 
is, the better the safety performance will be (Hinze, 2000; Brody et al., 1990; Laufer, 
1987a, b; Levitt, 1975). It is also inconsistent with the findings of many empirical 
studies (Lanoie and Trottier, 1998; Tang et al., 1997; Bertrand, 1991; Harms-Ringdhal, 
1990; Spilling et al., 1986), which reached the same conclusion: investments in 
accident prevention are profitable.  
 
The differences between the findings of this study and the previous studies could be 
explained by the economic theory of risk compensation developed by Peltzman (1975) 
and the risk homeostasis theory developed by Wilde (1982) (please refer to Section 
3.2.2 for a detailed review of the two theories).  
 
The findings that BSIR has a stronger positive effect on accident prevention under 
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higher project hazard level and that the effect of BSIR on accident prevention is no 
longer significant when the project hazard level is low may be explained by the Risk 
Compensation Theory developed by Peltzman (1975). Peltzman (1975) found that, 
under safer environment, drivers tend to increase speed rather than enjoy the increased 
safety associated with driving at the same speed. Peltzman’s (1975) theory suggests 
that individuals tend to adjust their behaviour in response to perceived changes in risk. 
They will behave less cautiously in situations where they feel "safer" or more 
protected. This is seen as self-evident that individuals will tend to behave in a more 
cautious manner if their perception of risk or danger increases. In the construction 
context, basic safety investments include equipping workers with basic knowledge 
about occupational safety and physical protections. The increase of basic safety 
investment tends to enhance the workers’ perceptions that the environment has 
become safer, especially under lower project hazard level. As predicted by Peltzman’s 
(1975) Risk Compensation Theory, workers are likely to adjust their work behaviour 
in response to the perceived changes in the accident risk level. Riskier behaviours 
tend to result from workers’ perceptions that the environment has become safer.  
 
Risk Homeostasis Theory (Wilde, 1982) may help to explain why there is a stronger 
positive effect of BSIR on accident prevention under higher safety culture level and 
why BSI plays even a negative role in accident prevention when safety culture level is 
low. Risk Homeostasis Theory (Wilde, 1982) states that the degree of risk-taking 
behaviour and the magnitude of loss, due to accident and lifestyle-dependent disease, 
tend to be maintained over time unless there is a change in the target level of risk. As 
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predicted by the risk compensation theory (Peltzman, 1975) and risk homeostasis 
theory (Wilde, 1982), the effect of an increase in basic safety investments is likely to 
be counteracted by the less cautious behaviours of workers unless there is a change in 
the target level of risk, which is the level of risk a person expects to accept to 
maximize the overall expected benefit from an activity (Wilde, 1982). Higher level of 
safety culture tends to be associated with higher expected safety performance and 
lower target level of risk (Cooper, 1997). Thus, the findings of this study implies that 
more protections and safer environment do not always produce better safety 
performance without the improvement of safety culture. This is supported by the role 
of safety culture in fostering workers’ safety behaviours (Uttal, 1983), increasing 
people's commitment to safety (Cooper, 2000), and ensuring that organisational 
members share the same ideas and beliefs about risks (CBI, 1991). There are 
occasions that individuals who take unsafe behaviours on site are conscious of the fact 
that these behaviours are associated with higher risk. They tend to believe that, under 
more safety protections and less hazardous working environment, the risks associated 
with their unsafe behaviour are essentially lowered. This suggests that individuals 
who knowingly engage in unsafe behaviours may already be cognizant of the 
associated risks. Such compensatory (or riskier) behaviours resulted from the 
perceptions that their working environment has become safer tend to be modified by a 
positive safety culture (Uttal, 1983). This is confirmed by the findings of many studies 
(Cooper, 2000; Geller, 1997; HSC, 1993; Bandura, 1986) that safety behaviours are 
influenced by the internal psychological factors of workers.  
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The moderated effect of basic safety investment on accident prevention suggests that 
improving safety performance from a strict engineering prospective, which 
emphasizes the development of safer equipment (both personal and production), is not 
sufficient. A good safety culture could not only increase the level of risk awareness, 
but also convince individuals to be less tolerant of risks. The findings of this study 
further reveal that the interventions that synthesize engineering advances with 
cultivation of a good safety culture are more likely to reduce accident rates. This is 
supported by the study of Cameron and Duff (2007), where they argued that 
engineering controls may be unable to modify disagreeable behaviours, such as 
wearing uncomfortable personal protective equipment (PPE). The finding of this 
study also supports the argument of Lingard and Rowlinson (2005) that a purely 
engineering approach to OHS is not likely to yield the best results. Lingard and 
Rowlinson (2005) further suggested that it is also important to address the 
psychological factors impacting upon workers’ perceptions of OHS and behaviour.  
 
6.5 Model for determining safety performance 
 
Having discussed the effects of safety investments, safety culture and project hazard 
level on safety performance and the relationship between the two indicators of safety 
performance (AFR and ASR), this section develops the model for determining safety 
performance of building projects.  
 
Based on the results of bivariate correlations between variables (see Figure 5.14 in 
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Section 5.3.1), the main effects of factors on safety performance are summarized in 
Table 6.1. Both AFR and ASR are used to measure safety performance of building 
projects. Table 6.1 shows that AFR is negatively and significantly (p < 0.05) related to 
safety culture level (r = -0.439), basic safety investments (r = -0.282), and voluntary 
safety investments (r = -0.539). ASR is significantly (p < 0.05) and negatively related 
to safety culture level (r = -0.46) and positively related with project hazard level (r = 
0.363). Furthermore, Table 6.1 shows that there is a significant (p < 0.05) and positive 
relationship between the two safety performance indicators (r = 0.512).  
 





Correlation of Dependent and 
Independent variable (r) 
N Sig. 
AFR BSIR -0.282 47 0.045 
AFR VSIR -0.539 47 0.000 
AFR SCI -0.439 47 0.002 
ASR PHI 0.363 47 0.012 
ASR SCI -0.460 47 0.001 
ASR AFR 0.512 47 0.000 
 
The moderated effects (interactive effects) of factors on safety performance are 
summarized in Table 6.2. It shows that AFR is significantly affected by the 
interactions between basic safety investments and project hazard level, and the 
interactions between basic safety investments and safety culture level. ASR is 
significantly affected by the interactions between safety culture level and project 
hazard level, and the interactions between AFR and project hazard level. The result of 
mediated regression analysis (see Section 5.3.4) implies that safety culture level is 
positively related to voluntary safety investments, and that the effect of voluntary 
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safety investments on AFR is partially mediated by safety culture level of building 
projects. 
 















AFR BSIR • PHI -39.06 0.13 0.086 0.038 
AFR BSIR • SCI -90.27 0.24 0.063 0.047 
ASR PHI • SCI 1327.83 0.38 0.056 0.046 
ASR PHI • AFR 14.68 0.346 0.044 0.043 
 
The variables and their relationships (including the main effects, interactive effects, 
and mediated effects) are integrated in a graphic model for determining safety 
performance of building projects (see Figure 6.2). 
 
This model demonstrates how the two safety performance indicators (AFR and ASR) 
are influenced by safety investments, safety culture, and project hazard level. As 
shown in Figure 6.2, the thin lines with double arrows represent the correlations 
between two variables. Path (a) shows the positive correlation between basic safety 
investments and voluntary safety investments. Path (b) shows the positive correlation 
between the two safety performance indicators (AFR and ASR). 
 
The thin lines with single arrow represent the main effect of the independent variable 
on the dependent variable. Path (c) shows that AFR tends to be reduced with the 























Figure 6.2: Model for Determining Safety Performance of Building Projects 
 



















BSI: Basic safety investments 
VSI: Voluntary safety investments 
PHI: Project hazard index 
SCI: Safety culture index 
AFR: Accident frequency rate 








path (f) indicate the positive effects of safety culture level on the reduction of AFR 
and ASR. Path (d) and path (e) demonstrate the indirect effect of voluntary safety 
investments on AFR. Path (g) shows the positive impact of project hazard level on 
ASR.  
 
The thick lines with double arrows represent the interactive effects. As can be seen in 
Figure 6.2, path (h) shows the interactive effects of basic safety investments and 
project hazard level on AFR. Path (i) represents the interactive effects of basic safety 
investments and safety culture level on AFR. Path (j) reflects the interactive effects of 
safety culture level and project hazard level on ASR. Path (k) indicates the interactive 
effects of AFR and project hazard level on ASR. 
 
This model recognizes both the main effects and interactive effects of safety 
investments, safety culture and project hazard level on safety performance as well as 
the differences between the two safety performance indicators: AFR and ASR. It 
indicates that safety performance of building projects is determined by the synergies 
of safety investments, project hazard level and safety culture level. The effect of any 
individual factor on safety performance is not constant but varies with the changes in 
other factors. 
 
6.6 Financially optimum level of voluntary safety investments 
 
This study aims to investigate the financially optimum level of safety investments for 
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building projects. The methods and models for optimizing voluntary safety 
investments have been established in Section 5.5. The results of voluntary safety 
investments optimization under 9 typical scenarios are summarized in Table 6.3. It 
shows that the optimal level of voluntary safety investment varies with different levels 
of safety culture and project hazard condition. The highest level of optimal voluntary 
safety investment occurs with the highest project hazard level and lowest project 
safety culture level, while the lowest level of optimal voluntary safety investment 
occurs with the lowest project hazard level and highest project safety culture level.  
 
Table 6.3: Summary of the Optimization under 9 Typical Scenarios 
 -1 dev (PHI) mean (PHI) +1 dev (PHI) 
-1 dev (SCI) VSIR = 0.443% 
AFR = 15.88 
VSIR = 0.459% 
AFR = 11.3 
VSIR = 0.47% 
AFR = 8.97 
mean (SCI) VSIR = 0.418% 
AFR = 22.85 
VSIR = 0.442% 
AFR = 16.51 
VSIR = 0.46% 
AFR = 13.22 
+1 dev (SCI) VSIR = 0.39% 
AFR = 27.64 
VSIR = 0.422% 
AFR = 20.22 
VSIR = 0.445% 
AFR = 16.32 
 
From Table 6.3, it can be seen that the optimal level of voluntary safety investment 
tends to decline with the increase of safety culture level when holding the project 
hazard level constant. This finding indicates that cultivating a positive safety culture 
would not only improve safety performance but also contribute to lower the 
expenditures on safety for building projects. The empirically proven critical role of 
safety culture in accident prevention reinforces previous studies on safety culture (e.g., 
Fang et al., 2006; Teo and Phang, 2005; Cooper, 2000). The positive effect of safety 
culture to construction safety performance improvement was also confirmed in this 
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study (see Section 6.5). However, this finding may further extend the role of safety 
culture in cost control of building projects. A possible reason is that, with a better 
safety culture, safety initiatives could be better understood by workers and 
management staff and thereafter more effectively implemented. This agrees with Teo 
and Phang (2005), who found that the proper implementation of safety initiatives is 
significantly affected by contractors’ attitudes towards safety issues. It is also in 
concordant with Lingard and Rowlinson’s (2005) finding that contractors may have 
difficulties in enforcing their safety programmes on workers who do not understand 
these programmes. Another possibility is that the efficiency of safety initiatives would 
be undermined if contractors attached too much emphasis on productivity. This is 
evidenced by the studies of Goldenhar et al. (2003) and Ahmed et al. (1999), where 
they found that tight construction schedules caused problems in implementing safety 
programs. The marginal returns of the investments in safety and the effects of safety 
interventions appear to be more significant for those organisations in which 
everybody has a positive attitude towards safety and is committed to build a safer 
work environment. Thus, the finding of this study would give another impetus (i.e., to 
lower the expenditures on safety) for contractors to promote safety culture in their 
projects.  
 
Table 6.3 also shows that the optimal level of voluntary safety investment is higher for 
projects with higher project hazard level when holding the level of safety culture 
constant. This is mainly because of the role of project hazard level in determining 
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total accident costs of building projects. Based on the analysis in Section 5.4, the total 
accident costs tend to be higher with the increase of project hazard level and the effect 
of accident frequency rate on total accident costs tends to be stronger under higher 
project hazard level. Therefore, when the project hazard level is higher, contractors 
have to take more efforts to lower the accident frequency rate so that the lowest level 
of total controllable safety costs could be achieved.  
 
Moreover, Table 6.3 shows that higher VSIR corresponds to lower AFR. More 
interestingly, it is found that small changes in VSIR tend to bring about more 
significant changes in AFR. This finding implies that the improvement of safety 
performance is sensitive to the changes in the levels of voluntary safety investments. 
This finding further supports the earlier finding that the effect of voluntary safety 
investments on accident prevention is more significant than that of the basic safety 
investments (see Section 6.3.1).  
 
Table 6.3 shows that the optimal level of voluntary safety investment of building 
projects in Singapore was found to be about 0.44% (i.e., when both SCI and PHI are 
at the mean level) of the contract sum. Based on the principle of optimum safety costs, 
it would initially seem that a voluntary safety investment of more than the optimal 
figure indicated in this study will increase the total controllable safety costs and thus 
is unnecessary. However, this figure should be regarded as a minimum amount of 




Figure 6.3 describes the schematic relationships between VSIR, TACR, TCCR and 
AFR based on the results of Section 5.5. The VSIR curve is derived from Eq. 5.21. 
The TACR curve is derived from Eq. 5.28. The VSIR curve has a negative slope since, 
as the VSIR is increased, the AFR declines; whilst the TACR curve has a positive 
slope since the total accident costs vary positively with the accident frequency rate. 
The TCCR curve is derived from Eq. 5.29. It is the vertical sum of the VSIR curve 
and TACR curve. Theoretically, there is a minimal point on the TCCR curve. As 
shown in Figure 6.3, the point “M” minimizes total controllable safety costs with y1 as 
total accident costs ratio and y2 in voluntary safety investments ratio at the accident 
frequency rate of x. Thus, from the financial perspective, y2 represents the optimal 
level of voluntary safety investments since it coincides with the minimal level of total 
controllable safety costs.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 6.3, an investment exactly at the optimal level (y2) would 
result in the best financial performance (the minimal point of TCCR curve) and a 
fairly good safety performance. If contractors chose a level of voluntary safety 
investment less than the optimal level (y2), they would probably suffer both financial 
losses and poorer safety performance. The contractors would also suffer higher 
financial costs if they chose a level of voluntary safety investment greater than the 





















Figure 6.3: Schematic Relationships between VSIR, TACR, TCCR and AFR  
 
Thus, “y2” in Figure 6.3 would only represent the financially optimal level of 
voluntary safety investment of building projects and should be regarded as the 
minimum level of voluntary safety investment to achieve the overall balance of 
financial performance and safety performance. It is because the potential benefits of 
better safety performance may outweigh the possible increase of financial costs that 






























supported by many researchers (e.g., Mohamed, 2002; Hinze, 1997; Tang et al., 1997; 
Grimaldi and Simonds, 1975), who found that better safety performance may result in 
intangible benefits, such as greater job satisfaction of employees, better reputation of 
the company, better relationship with the project owner, stronger corporate 
competitiveness and so on, which are valuable assets to the contractors. Lingard and 
Rowlinson (2005) further suggested that such benefits are likely to be underestimated 
because many of them are intangible and difficult to measure. This is also consistent 
with Hopkins’s (1995) finding that, without knowing the magnitude of the intangible 
benefits as a result of safety performance improvement, it is not likely to reduce risk 
to a level reflecting the true optimum point.  
 
Thus, this study does not suggest that no further investments are needed once the 
financially optimum point is reached. This is because it is not clear whether the 
corresponding accident frequency rate is tolerable for individual companies (Lingard 
and Rowlinson, 2005; HSE, 1993b). More voluntary safety investments beyond the 
financially optimum level may be necessary to reduce the accident rates to a tolerable 
level, which may reflect the corporate value system and the moral and ethical 
considerations (Lingard and Rowlinson, 2005). It is therefore suggested that the 
desirable level of voluntary safety investments should be determined by not only the 
financially optimum level of voluntary safety investments but also the tolerable levels 
of accident rate.  
 
Although the above discussions suggest that the financially optimal level of voluntary 
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safety investments does not reflect the desirable level of voluntary safety investments, 
the finding of the financially optimal VSIR is still of value because it defines the 
minimal requirement about the level of voluntary safety investments in building 
projects. The financially optimal level of voluntary safety investments refers to a 
certain amount of voluntary safety investments which coincide with the minimal point 
of total controllable safety costs. An investment below the financially optimal level 
would result in not only poorer financial performance but also poorer safety 
performance. This may serve as an impetus for the contractors to voluntarily take up 
investments in accident prevention. The financially optimal level of voluntary safety 
investments may also provide a basis to support the decision making on the level of 
safety investments for building projects. It is hoped that the current research will 
inspire further developments of desirable level of safety investments in future studies 




In this chapter, the empirical results from the data analysis were discussed in the 
context of theories. The discussions mainly concerned the effects of safety 
investments on safety performance of building projects, the model for determining 
safety performance of building projects, and the financially optimum level of 
voluntary safety investments in building projects. These findings have many 
implications to theories and practices. The next chapter will conclude this study and 





























CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Based on the data analysis and discussions of results in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the 
conclusions of this study are presented in this chapter. A brief summary of this study 
is described in Section 7.2. The key findings addressing the research aim and 
objectives are summarized in Section 7.3. Then, the implications of the findings for 
theory and practice are discussed in Sections 7.4 and 7.5. Section 7.6 presents some 
recommendations for safety management practices in construction sites. Finally, the 
research limitations and suggestions for future research are discussed in Section 7.7 




The construction industry is increasingly reliant on the voluntary and self-generating 
effort to reduce accidents on construction site. As the investments in construction 
safety cannot be limitless, there is a need for a scientific way to support the decision 
making about the investments in construction safety. This need was addressed in this 
study by investigating the financially optimum level of investments in workplace 
safety for building projects in Singapore. 
 
Four specific objectives were defined within the context of building construction at 
the level of contractor project organisation in Singapore (see Chapter 1). To fulfill 
these objectives, a theoretical framework (see Chapter 3) for the interrelationship 
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between safety investments, safety culture, project hazard level, safety performance 
and accident costs was developed based on the literature review (see Chapter 2). The 
positivistic paradigm and quantitative approach were adopted to achieve the research 
aims. A correlation/regression research design was adopted by this study. Data were 
collected using multiple techniques comprising structured interviews, review of 
archival data and questionnaires (see Chapter 4). Data collected were analyzed using 
various statistical and mathematical techniques, e.g., bivariate correlation analysis, 
regression analysis, moderation analysis, mediation analysis and extreme value 
theorem (see Chapter 5). The empirical results of the data analysis were then 
discussed in the context of theories (see Chapter 6). The next section summarizes the 
key findings and evaluates the achievement of the research objectives.  
 
7.3 Key findings 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, this study aims to investigate the financially optimum level of 
investments in workplace safety through exploring the relationships between safety 
investments, safety performance and accident costs for building projects in Singapore. 
This aim is particularized into four specific research objectives. The key findings of 
this study addressing the research aim and objectives are summarized in the following 
sections.  
 
7.3.1 Effects of safety investments on safety performance of building projects 
 
The first objective of this study is to examine the effects of safety investments on 
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safety performance of building projects. This objective has been achieved by way of 
testing Hypotheses 1.1, 1.4 and 1.5 of the first group of hypotheses, which are 
summarized in Table 7.1. Safety performance of building projects can be improved 
with the increase of overall level of safety investments. However, different types of 
safety investments have different effects on safety performance. Voluntary safety 
investments are more effective to reduce accident frequency rate of building projects 
than basic safety investments. The effect of basic safety investments on accident 
prevention varies with different levels of safety culture and project hazard. There is a 
stronger positive effect of basic safety investments on accident prevention under 
higher project hazard level and higher project safety culture level. Increase in 
voluntary safety investments contributes to the cultivation of a positive safety culture, 
which then brings down the accident frequency rate of building projects.  
 
Table 7.1: Results of Hypotheses Testing (Hypothesis 1) 
Item 
No. 
Hypothesis Description Supported 
or Not 
1.1 Safety performance of building projects varies positively with the 
level of safety investments. 
Yes* 
1.2 Safety performance of building projects varies positively with the 
level of safety culture. 
Yes* 
1.3 Safety performance of building projects varies inversely with the 
project hazard level. 
Yes* 
1.4 The effect of safety investments on safety performance varies with 
the project hazard level. 
Yes* 
1.5 The effect of safety investments on safety performance varies 
positively with the level of safety culture. 
Yes* 
* p < 0.05 
 
7.3.2 Model for determining safety performance of building projects  
 
The second objective of this study is to develop a model for determining safety 
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performance of building projects. This objective has also been achieved by testing the 
first group of hypotheses (see Table 7.1). The first main hypothesis (i.e. safety 
performance of building projects is determined by the level of safety investments, 
safety culture level and project hazard level as well as the interactions among the 
three variables) is confirmed, as a result of substantiation of the sub-hypotheses. 
Moreover, the relationship between accident frequency rate and accident severity rate 
becomes stronger when the project hazard level is higher. Thus, a model was 
constructed to demonstrate how the two safety performance indicators are influenced 
by safety investments, safety culture and project hazard level. This model shows that 
safety performance of building projects is determined by the synergies of safety 
investments, project hazard level and safety culture level. The effect of any individual 
factor on safety performance is not constant but varies with the change of other 
factors. 
 
7.3.3 Costs of accidents for building projects 
 
The third objective of this study is to investigate the costs of accidents to building 
contractors. This objective has been achieved by testing the second group of 
hypotheses, which are summarized in Table 7.2. The average direct accident costs, 
indirect accident costs and total accident costs of building projects account for 0.165%, 
0.086% and 0.25% of contract sum, respectively. The total accident costs of building 
projects are influenced by both accident frequency rate and project hazard level. The 
relationship between the number of accidents and the costs of accidents is dependent 
on the project hazard level. There is a stronger positive effect of accident frequency 
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rate on total accident costs under higher project hazard level.  
 
Table 7.2: Results of Hypotheses Testing (Hypothesis 2) 
Item 
No. 
Hypothesis Description Supported 
or Not 
2.1 The total accident costs of a building project vary positively with the 
accident frequency rate. 
Yes* 
2.2 The total accident costs of a building project vary positively with the 
project hazard level. 
Yes* 
2.3 The total accident costs of a building project vary with the project 
characteristics. 
No* 
2.4 The effect of accident frequency rate on the total accident costs of a 
building project varies with the project hazard level. 
Yes* 
* p < 0.05 
 
7.3.4 Optimization of safety investments 
 
The last objective is to study the optimization of safety investments for building 
projects. To achieve this objective, the model for predicting total controllable safety 
costs ratio was constructed through the combination of voluntary safety investments 
ratio curve and total accident costs ratio curve, which were developed using 
regression methods. The optimisation of voluntary safety investments ratio was 
conducted using the extreme value theorem and with the objective of finding the 
minimal level of total controllable safety costs. It was found that the financially 
optimum level of voluntary safety investments varies with different levels of safety 
culture and project hazard. It is a function of project hazard level and safety culture 
level. The financially optimum level of voluntary safety investments of building 
projects in Singapore is about 0.44% of the contract sum (i.e., when both safety 
culture and project hazard are at the mean level). Thus, the fourth objective of this 
study (i.e., to study the optimization of safety investments for building projects) has 
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been achieved.  
 
7.4 Contribution to knowledge 
 
This study contributes to knowledge in construction safety management by 
investigating the desirable level of safety investments for building projects. It offers a 
better understanding of the theory behind: (1) the relationship between safety 
investments and safety performance; (2) the interrelationship among the variables 
determining safety performance of building projects; (3) the costs of accidents for 
building projects; and (4) the optimization of safety investments for building projects. 
 
Firstly, this study contributes to the theory behind the relationship between safety 
investments and safety performance of building projects. A popular assumption about 
the relationship between safety investments and safety performance holds that the 
higher the safety investments are, the better the safety performance will be (e.g., levitt, 
1975; Brody et al., 1990; Hinze, 2000). This study confirmed the general positive 
relationship between total safety investments and safety performance of building 
projects. By examining the effects of different types of safety investments (i.e., basic 
safety investments and voluntary safety investments) on safety performance, this 
study adds some new insights into the relationship between safety investments and 
safety performance of building projects: 
 
 voluntary safety investments are more effective or efficient for accident 
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prevention than basic safety investments; 
 the effect of basic safety investments on accident prevention is moderated by 
safety culture and project hazard level of building projects;  
 basic safety investments have a stronger positive effect on accident prevention 
under higher safety culture level and project hazard level; 
 the effect of basic safety investments on accident prevention might not be positive 
if project hazard level and safety culture level of the project were low; and 
 the effect of voluntary safety investments on accident prevention is partially 
mediated by safety culture of building projects.  
 
Secondly, this study developed a model for determining safety performance of 
building projects. The accident causation theories developed by many researchers 
(e.g., Heinrich, 1931; Peterson, 1971; Bird, 1974; Abdelhamid and Everett, 2000) 
suggest that safety performance of building projects is associated with the inherent 
hazard level in the project and the level of human efforts in accidents prevention. The 
model developed in this study (see Figure 5.6 in Section 5.9) confirmed that safety 
performance of building projects is influenced by safety investments, safety culture 
and project hazard level. The possible innovations of this model lie in the following 
aspects: 
 
 this model recognizes the interactive effects of safety investments, safety culture 
and project hazard level on safety performance;  
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 this model recognizes the differences of the two safety performance indicators: 
accident frequency rate and accident severity rate; and  
 this model recognizes both the direct and indirect effects of safety investments on 
safety performance.  
 
Next, this study examined the costs of accidents for building projects. It appears to be 
the first known research to estimate the costs of accidents to Singapore’s building 
contractors. It was found that the average direct accident costs, indirect accident costs 
and total accident costs of building projects in Singapore account for 0.165%, 0.086% 
and 0.25% of total contract sum, respectively. This study adds to the theory of 
accident costs (Hinze, 1991; Bird, 1974; Simonds and Grimaldi, 1963; Heinrich, 1931) 
in that the relationship between total accident costs and accident frequency rate of 
building projects is moderated by project hazard level. There is a stronger positive 
relationship between total accident costs and accident frequency rate of building 
projects under higher project hazard level.  
 
Finally, this study contributes to the theory behind the optimization of safety costs and 
investments. The principle of optimum safety costs states that a company would 
invest a certain amount of dollars in safety which coincide with the minimal point of 
total safety costs (e.g., Hinze, 2000; HSE, 1993b; Diehl and Ayoub, 1980; Tang et al., 
1997). This study provides empirical evidence to support the principle of optimum 
safety costs. It demonstrates that the financially optimum level of voluntary safety 
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investments could be achieved through the minimization of total controllable safety 
costs of building projects (see Section 7.4). Moreover, this study improves the safety 
costs optimization model (Tang et al., 1997) by integrating the impacts of project 
hazard level and safety culture level of building projects in the analysis. It was found 
that the financially optimum level of voluntary safety investments is affected by 
project hazard level and safety culture level of building projects. This improvement 
enables that the financially optimum VSIR formula (presented as the function of PHI 
and SCI) could be tailored for an individual building project.  
 
7.5 Contribution to practice 
 
The findings of this study provide the basis for financial decision making to manage 
construction safety for building contractors. The findings suggest that the efficiency or 
effectiveness of safety investments is dependent on the project hazard level and safety 
culture level of building projects. Such knowledge implies that the improvement of 
safety performance relies on the synergies of two kinds of human efforts, i.e., safety 
investments and safety culture. By applying the findings of this study, contractors may 
achieve safety performance improvement with reasonable expenditure on accident 
prevention activities.  
 
The models and procedures for safety costs optimization can be used in various stages 
of a building project. In the project tendering stage, the proposed models and 
procedures are able to propose to contractors a budget for safety related activities. It 
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can also be used by the clients as a basis to assess the reasonableness of the safety 
management components of the tendering price offered by contractors.  
 
In the construction stage, the proposed models and procedures for deriving financially 
optimum level of voluntary safety investments should be of interest to building 
contractors as they may use it to check the adequacy of the resources allocated to 
safety control activities based on the suggested minimal level of voluntary safety 
investment. It may help to effectively allocate resources to various activities within 




Based on the findings of this study, some recommendations for safety management 
practices are now presented.  
 
• The finding of the moderated effect of basic safety investments on accident 
prevention (refer to Section 6.4 for detailed discussion) implies that more 
protections and safer environment do not always produce better safety 
performance without the improvement of safety culture. The interventions which 
emphasize the provision of physical protections (both personal and production) 
and the enforcement of formal safety training courses are not sufficient. It is also 
important to address the cultural factors impacting upon workers’ perceptions of 
safety and behaviours. It is recommended for contractors to implement the 
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interventions that synthesize engineering advances with cultivation of a good 
safety culture.  
 
• The finding of the stronger positive effect of basic safety investments on accident 
prevention under higher project hazard level (refer to Section 6.4 for detailed 
discussion) implies that different investment decisions in workplace safety need to 
be made under different project conditions. As recommended by Feng and Teo 
(2009) and Teo and Feng (2010), to achieve a certain level of safety performance, 
more basic safety investments (e.g., provision of PPEs and safety facilities, and 
enforcement of formal safety training courses, etc.) are required for those projects 
with higher project hazard level than those with lower project hazard level. 
 
• The finding of the direct and indirect effects of voluntary safety investments on 
accident prevention (see Section 6.3 for detailed discussions) suggests that 
voluntary safety investments are important for accident prevention as they may 
not only reduce the accident frequency rate but also promote a good safety culture 
on site. Previous studies also suggest that safety inspections and investigations 
(Aksorn and Hadikusumo, 2008; Poon et al., 2000; Jaselskis et al., 1996; Tam and 
Fung, 1998), safety committees and meetings (Tam and Fung, 1998; Jaselskis et 
al., 1996), safety promotions and incentives (Aksorn and Hadikusumo, 2008; Tam 
and Fung, 1998; Jaselskis et al., 1996), and in-house safety trainings and 
orientations (Findley et al., 2004; Tam and Fung, 1998) were among the most 
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effective safety measures for construction safety performance improvement. Thus, 
based on the definition of voluntary safety investments (refer to Section 4.3.1), the 
investments (including dollars and time spent on the accident prevention activities) 
in the following activities deserve sufficient considerations: (1) in-house safety 
training; (2) safety inspections and meetings; (3) safety incentives and promotions; 
and (4) safety innovation (please refer to Section 4.3.1 for details).  
 
• The analysis of accident costs of building projects (see Section 5.4 for detailed 
discussions) implies that the indirect accident costs are substantial for building 
projects and should be paid much attention to, especially for those projects with 
more work completed by subcontractors and in larger companies (see Section 
5.4.2). The existence and magnitude of the indirect accident costs would stimulate 
additional accident prevention expenditures. Thus, the focus on the perceived or 
explicit costs of accidents fails to show the “true reality” of accident costs. It is 
recommended that contractors may use the Section D of the questionnaire of this 
study (see Appendix) to estimate the direct and indirect accident costs for their 
building projects.  
 
• As mentioned in Section 7.5, the models and procedures for safety investments 
optimization can be used in the project tendering stage to propose to contractors a 
budget for safety related activities. As it is not possible to estimate the AFR, PHI 
and SCI based on the actual information in this stage, it is recommended that the 
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contractors may use the estimated target AFR based on the company/project 
targets, corporate/project strategies, and firm’s past safety records. The attributes 
of various hazard trades could be assessed based on the design documents, site 
conditions, technical proposals, and past experiences in similar projects. In 
addition, the SCI could be estimated through the review of the safety management 
systems in the company and the assessment of safety culture in other ongoing 
projects carried out by the contractor.  
 
• The findings of this study also have implications for clients of building projects. 
As safety investments have a general positive impact on safety performance (refer 
to Section 5.3), clients of building projects are suggested to support the 
contractors’ investments in accident prevention activities by setting up a separate 
budget for safety. It is also suggested that clients may use the models and 
procedures for safety costs optimization to evaluate the reasonableness of the 
safety budget proposed by contractors. Moreover, considering the critical role of 
safety culture in accident prevention (refer to Sections 6.3 and 6.4 for more 
discussions), clients of building projects are recommended to include the 
assessment of safety culture of contractors as a selection criterion.  
 
7.7 Limitations of study  
 




The first limitation is that the costs of workplace accident are confined to the financial 
losses of a contractor. Other ancillary costs arising from the accident, such as damage 
to company reputation and morale of employees were not included in this study. This 
is because the ancillary costs are intangible and difficult to quantify. Another 
limitation lies in the theoretical basis of safety costs optimization. The optimization 
was based on the economic principle of profit maximization. However, profit 
maximization may not be the primary business target for many companies, especially 
for public or state-owned companies. Thus, the financially optimum solution may not 
be the sole criteria for decision making on WSH. Other criteria like the tolerable risk 
level should be considered when making decisions. However, these two limitations 
did not impact the validity of the results of this study as this study suggested (see 
Section 7.5) that the financially optimum level of voluntary safety investments should 
be regarded as the minimum level of voluntary safety investments. Despite this, it is 
acknowledged that a more rigorous model could be proposed to quantify the optimal 
level of voluntary safety investments of building projects if the intangible accident 
costs and the tolerable risk level of individual companies were considered. This leads 
to future research possibilities discussed in the next section. 
 
The third limitation of this study lies in the choice of research approaches. The 
findings of this study were reached based on the use of a correlation/regression 
research design. It is effective in testing the associations between variables, but not 
effective in explaining the causal mechanism among variables. It is acknowledged 
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that the explanation of the relationship among variables would be more incisive if 
qualitative data (e.g., observation and in-depth interview) were collected. This 
limitation leads to future research possibilities discussed in the next section. 
 
The fourth limitation is that the response rate and the sample size were not as large. 
The data was obtained from 47 building projects of 23 building contractors, 
representing a response rate of 20%. The relatively lower response rate may impact 
the representativeness of the contractors selected. However, this impact was 
minimized by the stratified sampling method and the random selection process (see 
Section 4.3). Moreover, the analysis shows that the relatively small sample size (n=47) 
did not affect the validity of the results as the effect size and statistical power of the 
analysis were satisfactory.  
 
The fifth limitation lies in the accuracy/reliability of the data collected. Regardless of 
the field of study or preference for defining data (quantitative, qualitative), accurate 
data collection is essential to maintaining the integrity of research. Inaccurate data 
may distort the fact and lead to misleading inferences. It is acknowledged that it is not 
likely to collect absolutely accurate data, not only because a research instrument 
cannot be so but also because it is impossible to control all the factors affecting 
reliability (Kumar, 2005). However, to minimize the threat of inaccuracy of data 
collected to the validity of the findings, two strategies were adopted by this study: (1) 
adopting a proactive attitude towards this issue and carrying out precautions to 
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mitigate the threat of this issue (please refer to 4.3.7.2 for details of precautions); and 
(2) interpreting the statistical results in the context of the theory and of results of 
previous research.  
 
The sixth limitation concerns the use of indexes (PHI and SCI) to measure the levels 
of project hazard and safety culture. It is acknowledged that it is not likely to have an 
absolute measure of safety culture and project hazard. The PHI and SCI can only 
provide relative measures of project hazard level and safety culture level. This 
limitation may result in the incorrect specifications of the regression models and 
incorrect relationships between variables. To minimise the potential threats of this 
limitation to the validity of the findings, this study adopted the following strategies: (1) 
establishing the validity and reliability of the data collection instrument (refer to 
Section 4.3.7.1 for details); (2) proactively identifying potential threats of bias and 
carrying out precautions to mitigate them (refer to Section 4.3.7.2 for details); and (3) 
interpreting the statistical inferences in the context of theories and literature.  
 
The last limitation lies in the generalizability of the findings. The findings were 
reached based on the information of 47 building projects in Singapore. Thus, findings 
of this study should be interpreted in the context of building construction in Singapore. 
The profile of the projects (see Section 4.5.2) shows that the data were collected from 
a wide range of building projects but with a focus on residential (63.8%), 
medium-size (83%), and private-sector building projects (83%). The findings are 
354 
 
based on this set of data and hence generalizations to other populations may be 
difficult.  
 
7.8 Recommendations for future study 
 
As highlighted in Section 7.7, several areas of interest can be further explored in 
future studies. These areas are now discussed. 
 
As highlighted in the first limitation (see Section 7.7), the costs of workplace accident 
are confined to the financial losses of a contractor in this study. In a future study, a 
method for quantifying the intangible costs to contractors incurred by accidents could 
be developed. The intangible accident costs may serve as a better motivation for 
contractors to voluntarily invest in accident prevention activities. A more rigorous 
model could be proposed to quantify the optimum level of safety investments for 
building projects with consideration of the intangible accident costs. 
 
The second limitation mentioned that the financially optimum solution may not be the 
sole criteria for decision making on WSH. Other criteria like the tolerable risk level 
should be considered when making decisions. The tolerable risk level tends to be 
associated with the corporate culture and management targets of individual companies. 
Thus, in a future study, a more rigorous decision making mechanism on the desirable 
level of safety investments could be developed with consideration of tolerable risk 
level and management targets of individual companies.  
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As mentioned in the third limitation, quantitative data are effective in testing the 
associations between variables, but not effective in explaining the causal mechanism 
among variables. Future studies may be carried out using both quantitative and 
qualitative data. For example, case studies and in-depth interviews could be used to 
illustrate the reasons why safety investments have a stronger positive impact on safety 
performance under high project hazard conditions. Observational research techniques 
may be employed to investigate how the risk compensation behaviours may occur 
when the workers are provided with more physical protections. The validity of the 
relationship among the variables may also be boosted by collecting both quantitative 
and qualitative data. 
 
As suggested in the last limitation, the data comprised a mixture of residential 
buildings (63.8%) and other building types. In future, a study may be conducted to 
examine whether the amount of safety investments varies with different types of 
buildings. More sets of data should also be collected so that separate models may be 
developed for different types of buildings. 
 
Another area of interest that can be further explored is to develop a Decision Support 
System (DSS) for safety investments of building projects based on the findings of this 
study. A decision support system has been described as an interactive computer-based 
system which may help decision makers to use data and models to solve unstructured 
problems (Gorry and Scott Morton, 1971). The DSS for safety investments could be 
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developed using MATLAB, VBATM and MS AccessTM software with the aid of 
computer specialists.   
 
Finally, the topic of safety costs and investments may also be investigated using the 
marginal analysis approach. In a future study, the allocation of resources to health and 
safety can be examined based on the principle that the marginal cost of control 
measures should be no more than the marginal cost of the injury or ill-health. The 
major problems involved in the application of the marginal analysis approach lie in 
the following aspects: (1) the difficulties in identifying and quantifying the benefits of 
health and safety; (2) the allocation of the benefits (it is possible that a range of 
stakeholders who bear none of the costs receive the benefits); and (3) the valuation of 
human health effects and human life. These aspects deserve further exploration in 
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National University of Singapore, Department of Building 
 
INTERVIEW ON SAFETY INVESTMENTS/COSTS OF  
BUILDING PROJECTS IN SINGAPORE 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
We are conducting a study to investigate the desirable level of safety investments in building 
projects of Singapore. In this regard, your help is needed by providing us with information on the 
workplace safety practices of one of your building projects that were completed within the past 
three years in Singapore. The information sought include characteristics of your project, safety 
control activities of your project and accident costs. 
There are no commercial interests involved in this study. All information we obtain will be treated 
with strict confidentiality and used solely for the purpose of research. This research is supervised 
by Dr Evelyn Teo, Assoc Prof Florence Ling and Prof Low Sui Pheng. 
I would be very grateful if you could grant me an interview at a place and time that is convenient 
to you. The interview is likely to last one to two hours. I look forward to your reply and thank you 
in advance for your help. 
Yours faithfully 
Feng Yingbin 
冯 迎 宾 
Ph.D. Candidate 
Department of Building 
National University of Singapore 







National University of Singapore, Department of Building 
SAFETY INVESTMENTS/COSTS OF BUILDING PROJECTS IN SINGAPORE 
 
Please answer the questions based on a building project completed within the last three years. 
Section A: Project and Contractor Information                               
1. Project name(Optional):                                                          
2. Company name(Optional):                                                        
3. BCA Grade of your company (please circle):  A1;  A2;  B1;  B2;  C1;  C2;  C3. 
4. Contract sum: S$                          
5. Duration of the project:                  months. 
6. Year of completion:                         
7. How many contractors (main and sub contractors) are there on this project? Include your own 
company in this total:                 contractors. 
8. Percentage of work completed by subcontractors (in terms of contract value):            % 
9. Total man-days worked inclusive of subcontractors (till completion) :                      
10. Height of building:                     Stories 
11. Type of the project:      [  ] Commercial building; [  ] Residential building;  
                      [  ] Office building;     [  ] Industrial building;  
                      [  ] Others, please specify                                 
12. Proportion of foreign workers:                     % 
13. Type of client:   [  ] Public;     [  ] Private 
 
Section B: Safety Performance                                                   
14. Total number of injured workers:              
� Number of fatal deceased workers:              
� Number of injured workers who are permanently disabled:              
� Number of injured workers who are temporarily disabled (more than 3 days of medical 
care):               
� Number of minor injuries (i.e., three or less days lost):                 
15. Number of man-days lost due to accidents:                     
400 
 
Section C: Investments in Safety Control Activities of the Project                                   
 
16. Staffing costs 
Post Type (Part-time or 
Full-time) & Number 
Monthly Wages 
(S$) 
Percentage of Time 
Spent on Safety Work 
On-site module 
Safety manager    
Safety officer    
Safety supervisor    
Lifting supervisor    
Admin support to 
safety personnel 
   
Others    
Head office module (Please fill in monthly wages on pro rata according to number of projects 
supervised in the same period) 
Director (safety)    
Safety manager    
Safety officer    
Safety coordinator    
Admin support to 
safety personnel 
   
Others    
 
17. Training costs 
17.1 Costs of formal training courses (including subcontractors) 
 Training courses Costs (S$) 
Total No. of 
participants 
Duration for each 
time (Hours) 
1 
Safety training courses for project 
managers 
   
2 
Safety training courses for foremen 
and supervisors 
   
3 Safety training courses for workers    
4 
Safety training courses for 
operators/signalmen 
   
Total costs of formal safety training 
courses 




17.2 In-house safety training and orientation for workers (including sub-contractors) 
 Safety training and 
orientation 










1 Safety orientation before work 
commences each day 
    
2 Emergency response and drills 
for various possible situations 
    
3 Briefing on first-aid facilities, 
first aiders, and first aid 
procedures 
    
4 Briefing on major hazards on 
site (including health hazards 
like noise & air contaminants) 
    
5 Safety workshops for 
supervisors and above 
    
6 Safety seminars and 
exhibitions, demonstration of 
safe work procedures and 
first-aid drills 
    
7 Other in-house training 
activities 
    
 
18. Total safety equipments/facilities costs 
Item Costs (S$) 
Personal Protective Equipments  
Safety facilities (material costs)  
Safety facilities (manpower costs)  
Other costs  
Total costs  
 
19. Safety committees 
19.1 Is there a site safety committee? 
[  ] Yes (if so, please go to Q21.2);   [  ] No (if so, please go to Q22). 
19.2 The budget allocated for the activities of the safety committee is: S$                  
19.3 The number of committee members is:                             
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19.4 Please estimate the average attendance rate and average duration of the activities 












Committee meetings     
Inspections on a regular basis     
Special inspections (e.g. 
occurrence of near misses) 
    
 
20. Safety promotion costs (exclusive of those spent on site environmental control purpose) 
Activities Costs (S$) 
Safety boards, banners and posters at prominent locations on site  
Safety pamphlets about safety policies, promotional materials and 
safety rules and regulations 
 
Others   
 
21. Safety incentives  
 Costs of safety incentive/award: S$                                
 
22. Safety inspections (exclusive of those for site environmental control purpose) 
Type of inspection Frequency 
Duration 
(hours) 
Number of workers 
who had to stop 




of the workers 
(S$/hour) 
MOM safety inspection     
Safety audit     
Head office safety inspection     
Internal safety inspections     
 
23. Use of new technologies, methods, and tools for the sake of workplace safety. 
 Increased production costs incurred by the use of new technologies, methods and tools: 
S$                    (or                 man-days) 
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Section D: Accident Costs                                                
24. The amount of Work Injury Compensation Insurance premiums paid for this project: 
S$                          
 
25. Please estimate the average costs of the minor injuries (i.e., three or less man-days lost): 
S$                          
 
The rest of the questions in this section are designed for the filling of ONE reportable accident 
(including fatal, permanently disabled and temporarily disabled injuries). For more than one 
accident, please photocopy this section for other accidents. Please provide the information 
based on a job related accident that happened in the project.  
 
26. Information about injured workers 
26.1 Craft/occupation:                                   
26.2 Nature/severity of injury (please tick the box) 
[  ] Death; 
[  ] Permanent Incapability; 
[  ] Temporarily Incapability, days of medical leave:           days 
[  ] Minor cases, days of medical leave:          days 
26.3 Job relatedness of injury (please tick the box) 
[  ] Injury is clearly related to work activities; 
[  ] Injury not verified as being work related, but worker claims it is or is covered by 
worker’s compensation. 
26.4 Hourly wages of injured worker: S$                  /hour 
 
27. Compensation for the injured worker paid by project 
27.1 Medical leave wages that are not covered by insurance policy: 
            Days             S$/day  S$              
27.2 Medical expenses that are not covered by insurance policy: S$                      
27.3 Lump sum compensation for Permanent Incapacity (PI) or death that are not covered by 
insurance policy: S$                         
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28. Lost productivity due to the injured worker 
28.1 Number of productive hours lost by injured worker on the day of injury:          hours 
28.2 Number of productive hours lost by injured worker due to follow-up medical treatment:  
               hours 
28.3 Assuming the injured worker’s productivity was 100% before the injury, what was his 
productivity after returning to work?                        % 
28.4 How many hours did the injured worker work at this reduced level of productivity?  
                   Hours OR                man-days. 
 
29. Lost productivity due to crew of injured worker 
29.1 Number of hours fellow workers spent assisting the injured worker in obtaining medical 
treatment (e.g., getting first-aid, transportation, accompaniment to treatment facility, etc.): 
                    hours. 
29.2 Average hourly wage of these assisting workers: S$             /hour 
29.3 Was the crew productivity decreased because of the worker’s injury or absence?  
[  ] Yes;        [  ] No, please go to Q30. 
29.4 If the answer of the above question (Q29.3) is “Yes”, please answer the following three 
questions: 
(a) Crew productivity after the injury was      % of the productivity before the injury; 
(b) How many hours did the fellow workers work at this reduced level of productivity?  
                 hours; 
(c) Average hourly cost of crew: S$             /hour 
 
30. Lost productivity due to other workers in vicinity of accidents 
30.1 Were any other workers near the accident site non-productive due to time spent watching 
or talking about it? 
[  ] No; 
[  ] Yes, the number of non-productive hours were              at an average hourly 




31. Losses due to replacement of the injured worker 
31.1 Was another worker hired to replace the injured worker? 
[  ] No, please answer Q32;    [  ] Yes, please answer Q31.2. 
31.2 Please answer the following four questions: 
(a) The replacement worker’s productivity was           % of the injured worker’s 
prior to the injury; 
(b) The replacement worker worked               hours at this level of productivity; 
(c) The replacement worker’s hourly wage was S$               /hour; 
(d) The costs incurred by the recruitment, selection, training and certification of new 
workers to replace the injured worker (e.g., costs of Man-year): S$                
 
32. Did the investigation or inspection as a result of this injury adversely impact the 
productivity of any work crews? 
[  ] No;     [  ] Yes, it is estimated that the inspection/investigation resulted in           
hours of lost productivity at an average cost of S$           /hour. 
 
33. Cost of supervisory/staff effort 
33.1 Time spent assisting the injured worker:          hours at average costs of 
S$          /hour 
33.2 Time spent investigating the accident:           hours at average of 
S$           /hour 
33.3 Time spent with regulatory inspector, project owner, or news media as a result of accident: 
          hours at average of S$            /hour 
 
34. Damaged equipment or plant, property, material or finished work 
34.1 Costs of damaged property, material or finished work, excluding those covered by 
insurance policy: S$                       
34.2 Was any productive time lost (e.g. interruption of production) because of damage to 
equipment, property or finished work?  
[  ] No;  
[  ] Yes, the number of hours lost were             hours at an average hourly cost of 
S$                   /hour.  
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35. Estimated cost of transporting injured worker: S$                  
 
36. Estimated consumption of first-aid materials in this accident: S$                   
 
37. Any additional work required as a result of the accident? (e.g. cleaning, additional 
barriers and so on) 
[  ] No;                
[  ] Yes, the number of hours lost were              at an average hourly cost of 
S$                   /hour. 
 
38. Fines and legal expenses 
38.1 Fines by government or court due to the accident: S$                         
38.2 Legal fees and other administrative costs: S$                            
 
39. Losses due to Stop Work Orders (SWO) issued to the project 
39.1 Wages paid to workers during the period of Stop Work:                    days 
39.2 Liquidated damages due to the SWO:                    days 
 
40. The number of Demerit points awarded due to the accident:                     
 
41. Was there any additional benefits/compensation to the injured worker beyond the Work 
Injury Compensation Act? 
[  ] No;                 
[  ] Yes, please specify the costs: S$                     
 
Section E: Project Hazard Level                                           
42. Please rate the level of hazard posed by the following parameters in various works of 
this project. Please tick your responses below using the following scale: 
1 – Very low; 2 – Low; 3 – Ordinary level; 4 – High; 5 – Very high 
Parameters and works 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Demolition works 
� Volume/size of demolition 1 2 3 4 5 
� Type of structure 1 2 3 4 5 
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Parameters and works 1 2 3 4 5 
� Method of demolition 1 2 3 4 5 
(2) Excavation works 
� Excavation configuration (depth, width and length) 1 2 3 4 5 
� Geological condition (soil type, water table, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 
� Underground utilities (electrical, water and sewer lines) 1 2 3 4 5 
� Nearby vehicular traffic (vibration and surcharge) 1 2 3 4 5 
� Nearby building & structures (distance and height) 1 2 3 4 5 
(3) Scaffolding and ladder usage 
� Volume of scaffolding & ladder usage 1 2 3 4 5 
� Height of the scaffold/ladder that is to be used 1 2 3 4 5 
� Design (Type of material, member size, bracing, guardrails, platform size, toe 
board) 
1 2 3 4 5 
(4) Temporary structures 
� Volume of temporary structures involved in the project 1 2 3 4 5 
� Design (Material, member size, bracing, guardrails, platform size, toe board) 1 2 3 4 5 
(5) Roof works 
� Volume of roofing involved 1 2 3 4 5 
� Height of the roof 1 2 3 4 5 
� Roofing material property such as slippery, brittleness, asbestos, etc. 1 2 3 4 5 
� Inclination of the roof 1 2 3 4 5 
(6) Erection of steel/precast concrete structures 
� Volume of erection work 1 2 3 4 5 
� Height of erection work 1 2 3 4 5 
� Erection method (partial/full erection at height, labour involvement level) 1 2 3 4 5 
(7) Crane use 
� Volume of lifting involved 1 2 3 4 5 
� Nature of materials lifted 1 2 3 4 5 
� Operating platform 1 2 3 4 5 
� Nature of site vicinity (nearby structures, overhead cables, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 
(8) Construction tools and machinery use 
� Volume of plant and machinery used 1 2 3 4 5 
� Operating platform of plant and machinery (i.e. slope, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 
� Site layout 1 2 3 4 5 
� Volume of tools used 1 2 3 4 5 
� Type of tools used 1 2 3 4 5 
(9) Works on contaminated sites 
� Type of contaminants on the site 1 2 3 4 5 
� Quantity of contaminants present 1 2 3 4 5 
� Duration of work on contaminated site 1 2 3 4 5 
(10) Welding and cutting works 
� The volume of welding & cutting works 1 2 3 4 5 
� Location of welding (confined space, underground, on ladders, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 
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Parameters and works 1 2 3 4 5 
(11) Works in confined spaces 
� The volume of confined space works 1 2 3 4 5 
� Confined space configuration 1 2 3 4 5 
� Type of activity to be involved (e.g. welding, waterproofing, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 
� Current usage of the confined space (if any) 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Section F: Safety Culture of the Project                                                
43. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements based on the safety practices in this project by ticking your responses using 
the following scale: 
 
1 – Strongly disagree; 2 – Disagree; 3 – Neutral; 4 – Agree; 5 – Strongly agree 
Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Management Commitment 
� Top management considers safety to be more important than productivity 1 2 3 4 5 
� Management acts only after accidents have occurred  1 2 3 4 5 
� Management praises site employees for working safely 1 2 3 4 5 
� Management penalizes site employees for working unsafely  1 2 3 4 5 
(2) Communication and Feedback 
� Management clearly communicates safety issues to all levels within the 
organisation 
1 2 3 4 5 
� Management operates an open-door policy on safety issues 1 2 3 4 5 
� Management encourages feedback from site employees on safety issues 1 2 3 4 5 
� Management listens to and acts upon feedback from site employees 1 2 3 4 5 
� Management communicates lessons from accidents to improve safety 
performance 
1 2 3 4 5 
(3) Supervisory Environment 
� Site management and supervisors see themselves as safety role models for all 
workers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
� Supervisor/safety officer usually engages in regular safety talks. 1 2 3 4 5 
� Supervisors endeavor to ensure that individuals are not working by 
themselves under risky or hazardous conditions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
� Supervisor/safety officer is a good resource for solving safety problems. 1 2 3 4 5 
� Supervisors have positive safety behaviour. 1 2 3 4 5 
(4) Supportive Environment 
� As a group, workers maintain good working relationships. 1 2 3 4 5 
� Co-workers always offer help when needed to perform the job safely. 1 2 3 4 5 
� Workers always remind each other on how to work safely. 1 2 3 4 5 
� The communication between workers and supervisors is effective (no 
language barriers) 
1 2 3 4 5 
� The communication between workers and their co-workers is effective. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
(5) Work Pressure 
� Workers always work under a great deal of tension, and not given enough 
time to get the job done safely. 
1 2 3 4 5 
� Under tight schedule, management tolerates minor unsafe behaviours 
performed by workers.  
1 2 3 4 5 
� The wages of workers are not determined solely by the amount of work 
completed by them  
1 2 3 4 5 
� Productivity targets are in conflict with some safety measures. 1 2 3 4 5 
(6) Personal Appreciation of Risk 
� Everyone on site is clear about his/her responsibilities for safety. 1 2 3 4 5 
� Everyone on site is aware that safety is the top priority in his/her mind while 
working 
1 2 3 4 5 
� Workers are willing to report the unsafe and unhealthy conditions on site. 1 2 3 4 5 
� Workers have the right to refuse to work in unsafe and unhealthy conditions. 1 2 3 4 5 
(7) Training and Competence level 
� There is adequate safety training to site management team, such as 
supervisors and project management team members. 
1 2 3 4 5 
� There is adequate safety certification & training for the operators in the 
project. 
1 2 3 4 5 
� Enough safety training is conducted for personnel receiving and handling 
hazardous chemicals. 
1 2 3 4 5 
� Enough in-house safety training and orientations for workers (including 
sub-contractors) on site. 
1 2 3 4 5 
� The designated persons of the permit-to-work systems have the appropriate 
certificates and experience. 
1 2 3 4 5 
� Workers are familiar (>1 year experience in similar type of work) with the 
type of work that they are doing in this project.  
1 2 3 4 5 
� Personnel are required to attend refresher and upgrading course on a regular 
basis to maintain and enhance their safety knowledge and awareness. 
1 2 3 4 5 
(8) Safety Rules and Procedures 
� Your project has a project-specific Health & Safety (H&S) plan 1 2 3 4 5 
� The set of safety rules and regulations is reviewed or updated periodically 
(minimum once per year). 
1 2 3 4 5 
� The set of safety rules and regulations is understood by site supervisors. 1 2 3 4 5 
� The set of safety rules and regulations is understood by workers. 1 2 3 4 5 
� Permit-To-Work (PTW) systems are established and implemented. 1 2 3 4 5 
� Emergency and initial response procedures were developed. 1 2 3 4 5 
� There are procedures to ensure that the sub-contractors meet the site safety 
requirements. 
1 2 3 4 5 
� There is a system to record and monitor worker’s behaviour and/or attitude. 1 2 3 4 5 
(9) Workers’ Involvement 
� Workers play an active role in identifying site hazards. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Statements 1 2 3 4 5 
� Workers report accidents, incidents, and potentially hazardous situations. 1 2 3 4 5 
� Workers are consulted when safety plan is compiled. 1 2 3 4 5 
� Workers are involved with Health and Safety (H&S) inspections. 1 2 3 4 5 
(10) Appraisal of Work Hazards 
� There is an established and implemented hazard analysis or risk assessment 
programme/plan. 
1 2 3 4 5 
� Potential risks and consequences are identified prior to execution. 1 2 3 4 5 
� Control measures for risks identified are adequate. 1 2 3 4 5 
� The inspection systems for the following items in the project were adequate. 
 Excavation by a competent person on a daily basis and after hazardous 
events (e.g. inclement weather). 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Scaffolding by a scaffold supervisor on a weekly basis and after 
inclement weather. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Temporary structures by a PE or other competent person before, during 
and after casting and after inclement weather. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Demolition by a competent person on a daily basis and after inclement 
weather. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Material loading platform by a competent person on a regular basis and 
after inclement weather. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Temporary structures such as site office, canteen, site hoardings and 
concrete batching plant on a regular basis 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Housekeeping of construction worksite 1 2 3 4 5 
 Housekeeping of canteen, quarters, toilets, washing facilities, and site 
offices 
1 2 3 4 5 
 Housekeeping of storages for materials, tools and wastes 1 2 3 4 5 
 Inspection of machinery and tools 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Section G: Personal Information                                                  
44. Your name(Optional):                            
45. Designation: [  ] Top management; [  ] Project manager; [  ] Safety officer; 
           [  ] Safety supervisor; [  ] Others, please specify                        
46. Years of working experience in construction industry                        Years 
47. Contact No (optional):                          
48. Email (optional):                               
 
Thank you for your kind assistance 
